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Abstract
This study is concerned with the dynamic control changes within a joint 
venture company between First Automobile Work (FAW) and 
Volkswagen (VW) over a period of 17 years. Concepts from New 
Institutionalism and the govemmentality literature are used to shed light 
on how the controls were designed, shaped, and transformed at FAW-VW 
and how the tensions and conflicts between the two partners evolved and 
developed.
Since 1991 when the joint venture was created, a significant transition in 
the control focus from cost to quality took place. I examine this transition 
in the context of wider social and institutional changes. Concepts from the 
govemmentality framework are drawn upon to investigate the linkages 
and relays among rationales, discourses, national programmes, diverse 
bodies of expertise, and the transition in the control focus within the joint 
venture under study, and the calculative and non-calculative technologies 
through which the various interpretations tied to the local programme 
were rendered operable. Various attempts by the FAW partner to 
transform employees and workers who came from a socialist legacy into 
responsible/governable individuals in a neoliberal sense through several 
modem and scientific management techniques are examined in 
conjunction with changes in ideological values permeating Chinese 
society. The effects of control techniques reflective of different forces and 
roots at FAW-VW are analysed.
Concepts from the new institutionalism framework are drawn upon to 
investigate the interactions and conflicts between managers and 
employees from each partner at the firm level. In this process, the 
political usage of particular rationalities by various parties within and 
without the firm is examined and the institutional pressures faced by each 
partner are explored. Attention is directed on the manner in which 
political rationalities are used strategically by both partners in their 
attempt to effect control.
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Chapter 1 Control Within Joint Ventures
—In my view, the company culture is essential. 
The culture in joint ventures, in a way, 
combines both oriental and western cultures 
together, therefore it tends to be more 
positive and active. ... FAW-VW has designed 
its own culture, to make the best cars and to 
be the best joint venture in the eyes o f  
Chinese employees. ... (An FAW manager in 
Finance Department)
—The advantage ofV W  employees is that they 
are very strict — they follow the processes step 
by step. While the advantage o f FAW 
employees is that they are very flexible but 
they tend to be so clever that they take 
shortcuts. ... (An FAW employee in 
Management Department)
1 Introduction
Joint ventures as a particular form of strategic alliance have become more 
visible and more important over the last four decades around the globe (Child, 
et al. 2005; Contractor and Lorange 2002; Groot and Merchant 2000). They are 
defined as “business agreements whereby two or more owners create a separate
entity” which can either be a partnership or a closely held corporation, or can
issue corporate securities in its own right (Harrigan 1988: p. 142). They occur
l i
when two or more entities pool part of their resources within a common legal 
organization with specific strategic ambitions.
Strategic alliances (SA) and joint ventures (JV) in particular have been studied 
with many theoretical lenses including transaction cost economics (Buckley and 
Casson 1998; Chalos and O'Connor 2004; Dyer 1997; Van der Meer-Kooistra 
and Vosselman 2000; Williamson 1975), resource dependence perspective 
(Hamel 1991; Pfeffer and Slancik 1978; Teece, et al. 1997), game theory 
(Parkhe 1993), strategic management theory (Faulkner 1995; Geringer and 
Hebert 1991; Inkpen 1995) and organisational theories (Groot and Merchant 
2000; Tomkins 2001; Velez, et al. 2008). Prior research on joint ventures and 
strategic alliances can be segmented into the following two streams. The first 
one focuses on motivations for, and the nature of, the formation of the SA. In 
this stream of research, transaction costs, strategic considerations and learning 
and knowledge transfer are considered the main reasons for companies to 
decide to form strategic alliances (Dyer and Singh 1998; Harrigan 1988; 
Hennart 1988; Hennart 1991; Inkpen 1995). The second stream of research in 
this area takes the performance of the SA as its central concern. Factors that 
lead to the success of the SA, the nature of the instability of the SA, the issue of 
trust building between partners and the control mechanisms adopted within the 
SA have been analysed and closely examined (Das and Teng 2001; Dekker 
2004; Hakansson and Lind 2007; Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2007; 
Luo 2002; Velez, et al. 2008; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000; 
Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2009).
These studies contribute to the literature by shedding light on why specific 
forms of SA are chosen and formed when compared with choices of market 
transaction or hierarchical integration, and how strategic alliances can survive 
and succeed with the appropriate design management control mechanisms. 
Economic models with statistical analysis have been developed to predict and
12
empirically test the relationships between contingency factors, appropriate 
forms of management controls and the performance of the SA. Little research 
on strategic alliances has been done from a management accounting perspective. 
That research that has been undertaken attempts to contribute to our 
understanding by providing universally applicable control models at an 
aggregate level (Chua and Mahama 2007). There is a void of in-depth 
sociological analysis of how controls in SA, and joint ventures in particular, 
evolve, developed and are implemented in practice. Little is known about the 
ways in which different actors and agencies, discourses, cultural attributes, and 
historical inheritance shape and transform the control elements and affect the 
ways in which individuals react to the controls imposed on them within 
international joint ventures. This thesis begins to attempt to address such a void.
This thesis has as its focal concern the development of an understanding of 
control dynamics within an international joint venture. It considers how specific 
control foci come into being; the internal and external forces that shape the 
nature of the control systems in existence; how such control systems become 
implemented through the day-to-day practices of employees; how the control 
mechanisms evolve over time in the face of the emergence of new events; how 
particular rationalities of control are played out by each partner to achieve 
specified strategic objects, and how employees reacted to the controls imposed 
on them. The intent is to explore the mix of organisational, institutional and 
wider historical forces at play underlying the shifting control dynamics of an 
international joint venture. The company under study is a Chinese-German 
automobile manufacturing joint venture between First Auto Work Group (FAW) 
and Volkswagen (VW) which was established in 1992. By investigating the 
shaping and evolution of the control dynamics at FAW-VW, this study takes 
the analysis beyond the traditional transaction cost perspective and the ‘trust* or 
‘resource* based approach adopted by other scholars in the study of strategic 
alliances. It attempts to draw out a more sustained social and organisational
13
analysis of accounting by relying upon alternative conceptual forms of 
reference.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The first section will provide a 
literature review of the research done in the area of strategic alliances and 
highlight the unanswered questions that this thesis attempts to address. The 
second section will elaborate on the research focus and research questions 
proposed in this thesis. This chapter will conclude with a plan of the thesis.
2 Literature review
In this section, different theoretical lenses adopted in the prior studies on 
strategic alliances and joint ventures are examined. The literature on the 
management controls within a joint venture, and specifically within Chinese 
joint ventures, is further discussed. Problems associated with the extant 
research on controls within joint ventures are elaborated and examined in detail.
2.1 Research on strategic alliances
There has been an increasing research interest in comprehending the nature of, 
and the challenges presented by, the design and managing of strategic alliances. 
Previous scholars have applied different theoretical lenses to study hybrid firms 
or alliances. Table 1.1 summarises the literature relating to joint ventures and 
strategic alliances and highlights the theoretical frameworks adopted by prior 
researchers and their research focus.
Table 1.1 Prior Research on Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances
Authors Theoretical Framework Research Focus
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Harrigan, Strategic management Strategic
1988 theory considerations of JV
Hennart, 
1988,1991
Transaction cost 
economics
Nature of JV
Joint
Kogut, 1988 Transaction cost 
economics and strategic 
perspectives
Motivations for JV
ventures Geringer, Strategic management Selection criteria for
1991 theory JV partners
Kogut, 1991 Real option Strategic
considerations of JV
Geringer & 
Hebert, 1991
- Factors that affect 
the performance of 
JV
Inkpen, 1995 Strategic management 
theory
Organisational
learning
Groot & 
Merchant, 
2000
Organisational theory Control framework 
for JV
Contractor & Strategic and transaction Strategic
Lorange, cost perspective considerations of JV
15
2002
Chalos & Transaction cost Determinants of
Strategic
O'Connor,
2004
economics control mechanisms
Alliances Kamminga & 
Van der 
Meer- 
Kooistra, 
2007
Control patterns of 
JV
Williamson
1975
Transaction cost 
economics
Motivation of SA
Pfeffer & Resource based Relationship
Salancik,
1978
perspective between resource 
dependency and 
control
Hamel, 1991 Resource based 
perspective
Organisational
learning
Parkhe, 1993 Transaction cost 
economics and game 
theory
Nature of SA
Faulkner, Strategic management Strategic
1995 theory considerations of SA
Dyer, 1997 Transaction cost 
economics
Motivation of SA
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Teece et al., Resource based Strategic
1997 perspective considerations of SA
Buckley & Transaction cost Strategic
Casson, 1998 economics considerations of SA
Dyer & Transaction cost Strategic
Singh, 1998 economics considerations of SA
Folta, 1998 Real option Strategic
considerations of SA
Van der Transaction cost Contingency factors
Meer- 
Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 
2000
economics of control patterns
Das & Teng, 
2001
Transaction cost 
economics
Trust and control
Tomkins,
2001
Organizational theory Relationship 
between trust and 
information
Luo, 2002 
Folta &
Transaction cost 
economics
Trust building and 
contingency factors 
Strategic
Miller, 2002 Real option considerations of SA
Dekker, 2004 Transaction cost 
economics and
Trust building
17
organizational theory
Hakansson & - Inter-organisational
Lind, 2007 accounting
techniques
Velez et al., Organisational theory Trust and
2008 management control
mechanisms
Vosselman & Transaction cost Accounting for
Van der economics control and trust
Meer- building
Kooistra,
2009
As shown in Table 1.1 above, the three main theoretical frameworks adopted to 
shed light on the special features of strategic alliances are: transaction cost 
economics (TCE), resource based perspective and strategic management 
theories. Within a transaction cost economics perspective, alliances are seen to 
exist to avoid the costs of market mechanisms where these costs are not high 
enough to justify vertical integration (Williamson 1985). Under this perspective, 
human behaviour is regarded as being inherently opportunistic. Thus 
organisational welfare will likely be sacrificed. Three specific situations are 
commonly highlighted in the literature: asset specificity, imperfect information 
and small numbers of transactions (Conner 1991). The risk of opportunism, 
which is enhanced by asset specificity, makes contracting a desirable safeguard 
for the interests of both partners. Alliances, framed by contracts, are seen as the 
entities which enable and guide the application of these contracts. 
Formalization is not the only control mechanism applied in alliances. Some 
scholars have attempted to characterize the interface between formal and 
informal control systems. The literature states that trust and formalization may
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act as substitutes or complements (Das and Teng 2001; Dyer and Singh 1998; 
Poppo and Zenger 2002). The relationship between performance, risk, trust and 
control is also examined. Empirical data has suggested that formalization and 
trust have various effects on performance (Luo 2002). Trust, control and risk 
are divided into certain key dimensions and the relationship between 
dimensions of three factors is subsequently examined (Das and Teng 2001). In 
most of the transaction cost economics research, hypotheses are made and 
empirical data then statistically analyzed. Contextual and historical factors are 
usually neglected. The criticisms of transaction cost economics as being 
reductionist and functionalist, have been documented in the accounting 
literature (Chua and Mahama 2007).
Under the resource based view, firms compete based on their strategic assets 
(Hamel and Prahalad 1994). This line of research argues that each firm has its 
own specific set of resources, tangible and intangible including product and 
process technologies, organizational structures, know-how, patent, cultures, and 
so forth which are accumulated during its development (Demsetz 1988; Teece, 
et al. 1997; Wemerfelt 1984). The ambiguous relationship between 
performance and resources and the nature of intangible assets make it difficult, 
if not impossible, for competitors to imitate firms’ competitive strategies or 
duplicate advantageous resources. Hence, sharing complementary resources 
between partners becomes the motive for the establishment of a joint venture. 
This perspective has been attacked due to the vague relationship between the 
success of firms and their resources. Moreover the firms’ resources are 
generally analyzed in a static manner whereas the resources of firms and their 
values are changing continuously.
Strategic management theories maintain that strategic alliances are formed as a 
means of cooperative strategy to obtain market competence (Child, et al. 2005; 
Harrigan 1988; Inkpen 1998; Kogut 1988). Child et al., (2005) argues that
19
strategic alliances including joint ventures, collaborations and consortia are 
basically about organisational learning while other forms of cooperative 
organisational forms are primarily structured towards skill/capacity substitution 
(p. 7). Similarly, organizational learning and knowledge acquisition are 
considered as the motivation for firms to enter strategic alliances and guide 
their choices of partners (Geringer 1991; Inkpen 1995; Inkpen 1998). It is also 
argued that the instability of strategic alliances is associated with the shift in the 
balance of partners’ bargaining powers when a partner enables sufficient 
knowledge transfer and eliminates partner dependency (Inkpen and Beamish 
1997). This strand of research to some extent neglects the effects that other 
social and organisational factors, beyond learning and knowledge sharing, have 
on the formation and development of strategic alliances.
2.2 Research on management controls within joint ventures
The focal concern of this research is with the management controls adopted at 
FAW-VW over an extended period of 17 years. In the management accounting 
literature, management control is defined and categorised in many different 
ways (Langfield-Smith 1997; Macintosh 1994; Merchant and Van der Stede 
2007; Otley 1994; Ouchi 1979; Ouchi 1980). Tannenbaum (1968) interprets 
control as the sum of interpersonal influence relations in an organization. Ouchi 
(1979, 1980) takes a simpler view of management control and considers it as 
the mechanisms through which an organization can be managed so that it 
moves towards its objectives. Three types of such mechanisms are suggested: 
market, bureaucratic and clan. Simons (1995) posits the notion of levers of 
control framework of management control systems in organisations. Four levers 
of control are identified: belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control 
systems, and interactive control systems. Moreover, management control 
systems are defined as ‘the formal and informal-based routines and procedures
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managers use to maintain or alter patterns in organisation activities’ (Simons 
1995, p. 5). Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) argue that management control 
includes all the devices/mechanisms managers use to ensure that the behaviour 
of employees is consistent with the organization’s objectives and strategies (p. 
5). Following such a definition, three types of controls are distinguished: action 
controls, results controls and people controls.
Overall, management controls in this context are conceived as all the 
mechanisms adopted to direct, shape and guide the behaviour and actions of the 
manager and others. This study takes a wider view of the concept of 
management control. The control mechanisms are not seen as fixed, static or 
mechanically implemented. Instead they are considered as proactive and subject 
to employees’ interpretation and strategic manipulation. Such ever-changing 
control mechanisms are addressed as the dynamics of control or the control 
dynamics in this study.
How do specific control foci come into being in joint ventures? What are the 
internal and external forces that shape the control systems in joint ventures? 
How are such control systems implemented through the day-to-day practices of 
employees and how do the control mechanisms evolve over time as new events 
emerge? How are particular rationales of control played out by each partner to 
achieve specified strategic objects? How do employees react to the controls 
imposed upon them? By engaging in an investigation into the evolution and 
shaping of the control dynamics at FAW-VW, this study takes the analysis 
beyond the traditional transaction cost and the ‘trust’ or ‘resource’ based 
approach to strategic alliances and attempts to enrich the literature of the 
sociological analysis of accounting.
Although the last ten years have witnessed a growing interest in understanding 
the challenges of management and control issues in joint ventures, little
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research has been done in this area from a management accounting perspective 
(Chua and Mahama 2007; Geringer and Hebert 1989; Groot and Merchant 
2000). The following section provides a summary of the main studies in this 
area and highlights the problems associated with much of the prior extant 
research.
Geringer and Hebert (1989) reviewed and synthesised the principal research 
focusing on the control of international joint ventures (IJV). They concluded 
that three dimensions of control had been addressed: (1) the focus of control, 
i.e., the scope of activities over which parents exercised control; (2) the extent 
of control achieved by the parents; and (3) the mechanisms the parents used to 
exercise control. They summarised the findings of the antecedent research, as 
shown in the table below:
Table 1.2 Summary of Research on JV Control
Summary of RomjucH on JV Control
Conception 
of Control Author*
Typa 
of JVs1
Measure of 
Performance
JV Controi-Bsiformance 
Relationship
Mechanism* Tbmfineon (1970) LDC Profitability indirect
Friedman & Begun (1971) LDC — —
Stopford & Walls (1972) both — —
Cullender (1976) LDC — — .
R3f3(1979 LDC Cost efficiency Direct
Scftaan (1989 LDC farceptual measure of 
satisfaction
Contingent on fit among criteria 
of success, activities controlled 
and mechanisms
Extent Franto (1971) both Instability (change In ownership 
structure)
Contingent oh MNC2 parent’s  
strategy
Dang (1377) LDC — — '
Jangar (190OJ both Not provided Supposed as contingent
Killing (1989 DC Survival & perceptual measure 
of satisfaction
Dominant control associated 
with performance
Beamish (1984) LDC Same a* Killing (1969 No solid evidence for Killing's 
(1969 hypothesis
Geringer (1986) DC —. —
Awacfcd et al (1989 DC Composite Index including 
financial, non-financial and 
industry-oriented measure*
Non-significant relationship
Focus Schain(l989 LDC See above See above
Geringer (1969 DC — —
*LDG reter* to less Developed Country; DC refers to Developed Country. 
*MNC refers to multinational corporation.
(Source: Geringer and Hebert, 1989, p. 247)
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Geringer and Hebert (1989) have inspired a number of studies (Geringer 1991; 
Groot and Merchant 2000; Mjoen and Tallman 1997; Yan and Gray 1994). This 
stream of research mainly adopts a transaction cost economics conceptual 
framework to investigate the relationship between the characteristics of 
transactions (such as bargaining power, commitment of the parent's strategic 
resources, etc.), and the control imposed on joint ventures and their 
performance. For example, Mjoen and Tallman (1997) conducted a 
questionnaire survey with 137 Norwegian IJVs, the results of which were 
statistically analysed to test the hypotheses concerning the correlation between 
transaction characteristics, control and performance. They concluded that the 
contribution one partner makes, the ways partners use to control the IJV, and 
the perceived performance, are all positively correlated. Although it attempts to 
elaborate on the factors that impact the controls imposed on IJVs, this research 
fails to capture the complexity of the linkages and relays formed between the 
complicated web of controls imposed on IJVs, the power plays between 
partners and the social environments in which the IJVs are embedded. Two 
more recent studies attempted to provide a more comprehensive framework to 
further interpret the relationship between contingency factors and controls 
imposed.
Groot and Merchant (2000) identified three dimensions of IJV controls: (1) 
control mechanisms which are characterised as action control, result control and 
personnel/cultural control; (2) control focus which consists of broad and narrow 
control; (3) control tightness which is distinguished as tight or loose control. 
The authors advance four explanatory factors which are suggested to be linked 
with joint venture design choices related to the foregoing three dimensions and 
propose that: (i) when IJV objectives are expressed in terms of financial returns, 
they will heavily rely on financially oriented results controls and when the 
partners have a broad set of objectives, control foci are broad; (ii) when IJV are 
established to diversify partners’ product offerings, they will tend to use loose
23
controls; (iii) when trust between partners is low, controls will be relatively 
tight and control foci will be broad; (iv) when recent performance of IJV is high, 
looser controls and narrower control foci will be adopted.
Groot and Merchant (2000) provided a framework to explain how partners exert 
control over an IJV. It attempted to establish a causal relationship between 
control dimensions and certain explanatory factors. Certain problems can be 
identified within this framework. First, there is an underlying assumption 
embedded in the framework that IJV partners rationally decide and choose the 
type of control systems imposed on the IJV in concert, based on the four 
constraints faced by them. It overlooks the complexity of the power relationship 
between/among partners during the process of control system design. For 
example, if the objectives of one partner for setting up the IJV command a tight 
financially-oriented result control while those of another partner dictate a loose 
multi-foci control, how will the two partners settle their conflicts? What type of 
control will be eventually imposed on the IJV? Second, it assumes a simple 
correlation between the explanatory factors and the control dimensions. It does 
not explain how these attributes impact the control characteristics in 
combination. For example, if trust among partners is high while recent 
performance is poor, what forms of controls are going to be observed - loose or 
tight?
Following this line of work, Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2007) 
proposed a more extensive theoretical model of joint venture control based on 
transaction cost economics and relational concepts, to explain how parents 
control joint ventures. They classified joint ventures from a management 
control perspective into three categories: joint venture with little control 
complexity, joint venture with medium control complexity and joint venture 
with high control complexity. For these three types of joint ventures, they 
identified three corresponding control patterns (content-based control pattern,
24
consultation-based control pattern, and context-based control pattern), based on 
both TCE characteristics (measurability, uncertainty and asset specificity) and 
relational characteristics (parental differences, information asymmetry, 
bargaining power, and trust) developed for these joint ventures.
This study elaborates on the relationships between management control patterns 
and TCE and relational characteristics, and supports the theoretical model by 
examining two exploratory case studies. However, there are some problems in 
terms of the conceptualisation and application of the theoretical model 
proposed in this paper. First, the model does not take into consideration any 
social or institutional factors which may have extensive influence on the 
management control practices within a joint venture. Second, in practice it 
would be difficult to decide whether a joint venture is one with a medium or 
high control complexity. The boundaries between these classifications are 
vague and difficult to define. Third, the linkages between the three control 
patterns and the firm types identified in the model are over-simplistic. For 
example, the study predicts that joint ventures with high control complexity 
will have a high level of uncertainty and information asymmetry which creates 
the risk of opportunistic behaviour. Parents then will try to create trust by 
focusing on providing good inputs and creating a good relationship. However, 
such assumptions that parents will be more trust worthy in a high risk context 
are hardly realistic. Further, although the study acknowledges that the joint 
venture controls are influenced by the interactions of different firm 
characteristics in concert, it does not examine in detail how these different firm 
characteristics interact and what influence such interactions would have on the 
control model.
There is growing interest in understanding the application of management 
accounting practices in the People’s Republic of China, given the rapid and 
complex economic reforms the country is undergoing. Some writers have
25
commented on aspects of different management accounting systems deployed 
in Chinese organisations and have summarised academic research which 
contrasts Chinese and western practices (Bromwich and Wang 1991; Chow, et 
al. 2007; Scapens and Yan 1993). Firth (1996) studied the adoption of modem 
management accounting ideas from foreign companies by state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) using a survey approach. He compared the adoption of newer 
developed management control systems in Chinese state-owned enterprises 
with and without associations, with foreign partnered JVs, and concluded that 
Chinese enterprises having associations with foreign partnered JVs tend to 
adopt newer control mechanisms (e.g. activity based costing, detailed budgeting, 
sensitivity analysis) which are seen in western capitalist countries to a much 
greater extent than in China. It has been suggested that national cultures have a 
strong influence on the design and application of management controls in multi­
national organisations (Chow, et al. 1999; Chow, et al. 1996; Chow, et al. 1994; 
Chow, et al. 1991).
O’Connor et al. (2004) examined the adoption of westernized management 
systems in state-owned enterprises. They discovered that the use of 
management control systems has increased in recent periods, and these can be 
separated into 5 groups -  approval procedures, formal procedures, Total 
Quality Control procedures, budgets, and performance targets. Their survey and 
interviews show that the transition is due to institutional factors such as joint 
venture experiences and stock listings, etc. Chalos and O’Connor (2004) found 
in their study of the determinants of Chinese -  US joint ventures that partner 
equity ownership influenced expatriate staffing but none of the other control 
systems, and that knowledge dependency and asset specific transaction costs 
were determinants of controls for both partners based on their survey results. 
O’Connor et. al (2006) developed a theoretical framework which explains the 
determination and evolution of Chinese state-owned enterprises organizational 
design and they discuss the influence of five determinants on organizational
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design: liberalization forces (industry, export sales, joint venture experience, 
stock exchange listing) and political constraints. These previous studies 
illustrated some important facets of control systems in Chinese enterprises. 
Most of these studies are based on survey results that are analyzed statistically. 
Chow et al. (2007) used surveys to examine the application of accounting in 
China including activity-based costing, activity-based management, target 
costing, quality costing and decision making techniques, and highlight factors 
that facilitate and hinder the application of modem management accounting 
techniques.
To summarise, the conceptual perspectives of transaction cost economics, 
resource based perspectives and strategic management theories have been the 
most widely used in investigating strategic alliances. These approaches seek to 
explain the nature of strategic alliances, provide optimum designs of control 
mechanisms and prescribe actions to take in order to improve the performance, 
adopting positivistic methods. Much of this research either proposed economic 
models to simulate the game-theoretic reactions of partners or hypothesised the 
relationship among different contingency factors (including trust, risk, 
bargaining power, etc.), the types of controls implemented and the performance 
of strategic alliances. Statistical analysis of empirical data which is mostly 
obtained by surveys and data bases is then used to test the validity of such 
hypotheses. This research contributed to the understanding of the formation, 
and the different attributes, of strategic alliances. Research that has been 
conducted from a management control perspective was mostly aimed to 
develop a generalised and widely applicable model to integrate different factors 
that have an influence on the control mechanisms adopted within strategic 
alliances, and their effects (Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2007; Van 
der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000). Such an approach elaborates on some 
important facets of control and its conditioning factors, but it does not illustrate 
the way in which control mechanisms are shaped by various agents and
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agencies; how such mechanisms come to be reformed in the face of new events; 
how different elements of control mechanisms are implemented and used 
through day-to-day practices; or, what are the actual effects on employees of 
those control mechanisms. There is a void of a socially informed analysis of the 
development, implementation and effects of control mechanisms within 
international joint ventures.
International joint ventures have been one of the most frequent forms of foreign 
investment vehicles in China and are considered the most effective way for 
international firms to gain access to Chinese market. Research on controls 
within Chinese joint ventures is very recent (Chalos and O'Connor 2004). This 
research offers more empirical data on which to base conclusions, but it is still 
narrowly focused. Much of this research collects empirical data via field 
surveys which is then analysed statistically. It adopts a functionalist perspective 
and uses positivist research methods culminating in the prescription of 
potentially optimal action. There are no in-depth longitudinal case studies about 
how management controls have evolved, transformed and been implemented 
within international joint ventures in China, from a management accounting 
perspective. Prior research has not sought to examine the development, 
application and actual effects on employees of the control elements within the 
social and institutional context in which the joint venture companies are 
embedded. This thesis attempts to contribute to the literature by exploring the 
control dynamics within one Chinese international joint venture of long 
standing.
3 Structure of thesis
The remainder of the thesis is structured into five parts. In Chapter 2, a 
theoretical frame of reference is developed which draws upon both new
28
institutionalism and governmental literature in an attempt to address the 
research questions probed.
In Chapter 3, the transition from a quality oriented control mechanism to a cost 
oriented mechanism is identified at FAW-VW. Such a transition is examined in 
the context of historical events and discourses. It illustrates how discourses, 
national programmes and diverse bodies of expertise within and without the 
joint venture came together and influenced the shift in management control foci.
Chapter 4 adopts a conceptual approach which draws upon, but which moves 
beyond, new institutionalism to examine how control elements are used 
strategically and politically to exert more control over the joint venture 
company by both partners. The chapter discusses the institutional pressures 
faced by the two partners. It is argued that in the joint venture under study, 
institutional forces, whether implemented managerially or whether 
symbolically decoupled from daily operational activities, are not derived purely 
from outside forces, but are themselves produced within the joint venture and 
exerted to attain more control. Control elements including quality and cost, are 
used rationally and strategically to effect power and orchestrate control.
Chapter 5 investigates how a series of control mechanisms were deployed at 
FAW-VW in an attempt to align the actions of employees with the quality 
improvement or cost reduction objectives of the firm. It considers the actual 
effects such control mechanisms have on employees. Compared with actors 
studied in a neo-liberal setting, as documented in the literature, employees at 
FAW-VW are influenced by different cultural, institutional, social and political 
factors. It is contended that they are deeply influenced and institutionalised by a 
particular Chinese philosophy, the Doctrine of the Mean, and respond to formal 
and informal control in a particular way so that to some extent, formal control
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systems are disconnected from actual practices and informal control has a 
stronger impact on the actions of employees at FAW-VW.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main findings and the 
contributions of this research.
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Chapter 2 Analysing the Control Dynamics at 
FAW-VW: A Theoretical Perspective
This thesis is concerned with developing an understanding of control dynamics 
within a joint venture. The control mechanisms under study are not seen as 
fixed, static or being mechanically implemented. Instead they are considered as 
proactive and subject to employees’ interpretation and strategic manipulation. 
This study centres on the way in which management controls evolve, transform, 
get implemented and operationalised in practice. It seeks to explain how control 
mechanisms are shaped by various social and institutional forces within and 
without the joint ventures, how control mechanisms are deployed rationally and 
strategically by the partners and the actual effects of controls on employees.
In the previous chapter, prior studies on the design and use of management 
control mechanisms within strategic alliances were examined. It is argued that 
much of the extant research is influenced by economic theory (Baiman, et al. 
2001; Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2007; Parkhe 1993; Williamson 
1991) and contingency frameworks (Dekker 2004; Groot and Merchant 2000; 
Gulati, et al. 2000; Luo 2002), and guided by their concerns about the 
relationships among contracting risks, characteristics of transactions, and the 
optimal design of control mechanisms. These studies provide analytical insight 
and enable models and hypotheses to be developed and tested statistically. 
However, there is a void of in-depth sociological analysis of the complex 
practice of controls within international joint ventures (IJV). This research 
attempts to address this void by examining the development and 
implementation of the controls and their actual effects within a Chinese- 
German manufacturing joint venture, FAW-Volkswagen. A theoretical 
framework, inspired by the govemmentality literature and new institutionalism,
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is proposed and discussed in detail in this chapter. The first part of this chapter 
will prior to the empirical analysis in the following chapters, provide a brief 
history of the development of firm under study: FAW-VW, and the car 
manufacturing industry as a whole against the backdrop of China’s extensive 
economic reform. The second section will highlight the theoretical frames of 
reference drawn upon. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the research 
methodology adopted which I consider as the most apposite in investigating the 
research questions raised.
1 The establishment of FAW-VW
After thirty years (1949-1978) of ‘Maoist socialism development’, 
characterised by the Soviet-model of a command economy with its over­
emphasis on state and public ownership and accompanied by political 
movements and tremendous turmoil1, China started a series of economic 
reforms which heralded an era of high economic growth and financial 
prosperity. During this process, the Chinese economy gradually evolved from a 
socialist centrally planned economy towards a market-based economy, which 
was referred to by the reform commander Deng Xiaoping, as ‘socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’. The economic reform in China was by no means a 
coherent, smooth and systematic process but rather a pluralistic multi-staged 
transformation which was permeated with failed attempts, contradictory 
rationalities and disturbing turbulence (Gao 1996). Placed in the spotlight of the
1 Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the political 
rationality upheld by the Communist Party of China (CPC) was deeply influenced by Marxist- 
Leninist socialist theories. However, both the socialist command economic rationalities and 
Mao’s attempt to fast forward from socialism to communism in the agricultural commune from 
1958 to 1961 had failed to generate enough economic surplus to improve the living standards of 
its population in poverty. Although Chinese economic reform has been characterised as one 
within the socialist camp, the centralised plan economy is substituted by a market based 
economy adopting economic policies used in capitalist nations. Economic reform policies are 
chosen by CPC on the basis of their instrumental effectiveness instead of ideological reasons. 
(Don and Xi, 1990; Fan and Nolan, 1993; Shen, 2000)
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overall revitalisation of national industries, the automobile industry since the 
initial stage of the economic reform, has undergone a series of reforms which 
aimed to modernise the whole industry in terms of technologies and 
management systems.
In 1978, the annual production of passenger cars countrywide was 5,000 units, 
while the large bulk of passenger cars to meet market demand were mainly 
imported. The initial strategy of the State Council for building a passenger car 
industry was to innovate the existing products by purchasing technology from 
prestige car manufacturers worldwide. The Ministry of Machinery Industry 
sent out invitations to several world renowned car manufacturers including 
Ford, GM, Toyota, Renault, VW, and Mercedes to enter into negotiations for 
the importation of technology. Except for Toyota, which was then negotiating a 
project with Taiwan, and Mercedes which rejected the possibility of technology 
transfer, other manufacturers showed their interest in the potential collaboration. 
In October 1978, the CEO of GM at that time, Thomas Murphy visited 
Shanghai, and for the first time introduced the concept of a ‘joint venture’, as 
well as its associated meaning for China2. After the meeting, this proposal for 
establishing joint ventures with technologically advanced foreign companies 
was filed and submitted in the briefings to the State Council. This aroused the 
interest of the Vice President of China at that time and then was reported to the 
leader of the communist party, the initiator and commander of China’s 
economic reform, Deng Xiaoping, who then commented ‘joint ventures are 
practicable’. Such concession of potential affiliations with ‘foreign capital’ and
2 During the discussion of potential cooperation of the production of trucks and passenger cars, 
Thomas Murphy inquired ‘why do you only talk about importing technology with us? Why not 
consider joint ventures?’ At the time the word ‘joint venture’ had never been heard before so 
that no one from the Chinese negotiation team understood it. Thomas Murphy had one of his 
managers explaining the meaning, benefits and feasibility of joint ventures as well as 
introducing the prior joint venture experience of GM. Murphy commented ‘simply speaking, a 
joint venture is like a marriage, two partners build a family together’. The idea of ‘building 
families with foreign firms’, on the one hand, sounded interesting and appealing to Chinese 
representatives, but on the other hand, was simply politically infeasible under the social and 
political background at that time.
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‘capitalist conglomerates’ literally lifted the restraints of the socialist ideologies 
at that time. The idea of developing joint ventures with foreign partners then 
swiftly spread over the entire business society while the possibility of 
developing joint ventures was opened not only to the automobile companies but 
to all developing manufacturing industries3.
In 1979, a team led by the Vice Minister of Machinery Industry visited GM in 
the United States to negotiate the possibility of establishing joint ventures 
between Chinese car producers with GM. Unexpectedly the decision making 
body of GM vetoed Murphy’s proposal. The issue of developing joint ventures 
with advanced ‘capitalist’ car manufacturers was halted. Concurrently with the 
endeavour to establish collaboration with established car producers worldwide, 
the development of a national car industry was given great importance by 
leaders of the reform, government officers of related bureaucratic agencies, 
entrepreneurs and scholars. Starting from around the 1980s, the vitalisation of 
the national automobile industry was linked by various actors with the welfare 
of the population, with the rise of the machinery industry as well as economic 
growth overall. Numerous seminars and symposiums were held to discuss the 
exigency of the advancement of the automobile industry in which its 
intersections with other arenas were identified while the problems with the 
current car industry were identified.
In 1986 in the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, 
the five year plan of the development of the national economy was set for the 
period from 1986 to 1990, in which the government outlined the agenda for 
developing the automobile industry as the pillar industry4 of the whole
3 The first joint venture was formed in China in 1980: Beijing Airline Food Co. LTD. The first 
joint venture in the car industry was established between American Motors Corporations and 
Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Corporation in 1986.
4 The pillar industry is considered as the vanguard industry that constitutes a significant portion 
(usually over 5%) of a nation’s GDP and is able to promote and guide the development of 
related industries.
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economy. The next twenty years witnessed a substantial increase in the total 
output and product variety of the automobile industry. China grew from a 
country where there was one passenger car owned per two thousand people in 
the 1980s to being the third largest automobile producer and the second largest 
automobile consumer market in the world in 2009 with approximately one 
private car per fifty people. Most major international car manufacturers had 
established joint ventures with local manufacturers by 2004 including 
Volkswagen, General Motors, Toyota, Mercedes, BMW, Honda, Nissan, and 
Hyundai. The first joint venture that Volkswagen set up in China was with the 
Shanghai Automobile Workshop in 1985, the success of which laid the 
groundwork for the succeeding collaboration between Volkswagen and First 
Automobile Workshop5.
The joint venture, which is the central concern of this thesis, FAW-VW, was 
officially founded on 6th February 1991 and is located in Changchun, the 
capital of Jilin Province in the northeast of China. In terms of the equity 
structure of the joint venture, FAW Group owns 60% of the equity and 
Volkswagen Group owns 40%, of which Volkswagen AG owns 20%, Audi AG 
owns 10% and Volkswagen Automobile (China) Investment Co., Ltd. owns 
10%. It is China’s first modem passenger sedan industrial base of considerable 
economic scale. To date, it has two modem manufacturing plants covering an 
area of over 1,820,000 square metres, and a product range of over 10 different 
models of cars including two brands, VW and Audi.
Beginning with the production of the first batch of Jetta in 1991, FAW-VW 
Automobile Co., Ltd. has grown from a company with RMB3.712 billion 
(£259.3 million) registered capital, to a major automotive enterprise with total
5 FAW group is a state owned company until today.
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assets of RMB27.6 billion (£1.93 billion). To date FAW-Volkswagen’s 
cumulative taxes exceed RMB40 billion (£2.8 billion)6.
Since the establishment of FAW-VW, it was regarded as vital for a fully 
fledged national car industry. The collaboration with advanced automobile 
manufacturers overseas in the form of joint ventures is seen as a way to satisfy 
the domestic demand for passenger cars, which skyrocketed as the economic 
reform and opening-up of the market economy broadened, as well as to achieve 
a smooth technology and knowledge transfer.
Decisions are made by the Board of Management (BOM) inside the Joint 
Venture. There are five members on the BOM, three from the Chinese partner 
and two from the German partner. All important decisions have to be agreed by 
all five BOM members. Each member is in charge of one area (several 
departments) and his opinion would carry the most weight in the decision 
making for that specific area. The five BOM members comprise the CEO 
(from FAW, in charge of shareholder interests, internal auditing, company 
administration, etc.), the CFO (from German VW, in charge of the Finance 
department, Control department, etc.), Human Resource Vice-president (from 
FAW partner, in charge of HR department, management department etc.), 
Technology Vice-president (from German partner, in charge of Planning 
Department, Product Management Department, and etc.), Sales Vice-president 
(from FAW partner, in charge of the Sales department). Any decisions made at 
FAW-VW need to be agreed by both FAW and VW managers in the same 
department.
6 Company brochure
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2 Theoretical perspective
This study’s focus is on the control dynamics and their conditioning forces 
within a JV. How are control foci shift shaped and transformed by discourses, 
national programmes and diverse bodies of expertise within and without the 
joint venture? How are control elements used strategically and politically to 
effect power and impose control on the joint venture by each partner? How do 
employees react to the controls imposed on them? To address the above 
questions, a two-fold theoretical frame of reference is proposed.
To examine how various conditioning forces came to shape the control focus 
and enable its subsequent transformation within the joint venture company, the 
govemmentality literature is drawn upon to study the linkages formed among 
rationales, discourses, national programmes, diverse bodies of expertise, and 
the transition in control focus within the joint venture under study (Foucault 
1991a; Foucault 1991b; Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and O'Leary 1994b). 
Concepts from the govemmentality literature are adopted to illustrate how 
various forces within and without the joint venture become commingled to 
shape and transform the control elements at FAW-VW. The govemmentality 
literature sheds light upon the manner in which the control foci at FAW-VW 
are linked to wider national programmes and discourses through a multiplicity 
of different actors and agencies, including politicians, government officers, 
entrepreneurs, scholars and engineers.
However, this framework focuses more on the national discourses and 
rationales at the macro-level. The actors depicted in govemmentality literature 
tend to be submissive and passive. They react to the calculative devices in a 
predictable manner and contribute to the achievement of a desirable state of the 
authority in their pursuit of a better and more fulfilling self. The 
govemmentality literature does not allow a more active role for the two partners
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to play. In this way this research benefits from the new institutionalism 
literature. It allows an examination of the strategic uses of rationales and norms 
by the two sets of actors within the joint venture company. Therefore, new 
institutionalism is appealed to with the attempt to illustrate that control 
elements are used politically and rationally to vie for more extended control 
over the joint venture company.
2.1 The govemmentality literature -  three concepts
To understand how control foci are shaped and transformed by discourses, 
national programmes and experts within and outside the joint venture company, 
certain concepts from the govemmentality literature are drawn upon. The 
govemmentality literature, although with a comparatively short history, consists 
of a group of fruitful and enlightening works, most of which attempt to 
elaborate the way in which socially legitimated authorities intervene and act 
upon people’s lives (Foucault 1991a; Miller 1990; Miller 1991; Miller, et al. 
2008; Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and O'Leary 1994b; Miller and O'Leary 
2007; Miller and Rose 1990; Miller and Rose 2008; Rose and Miller 1992). 
Three concepts in the context of accounting studies: problematisation, 
programme, and technology are introduced in the next section, followed by a 
discussion on how these concepts make it possible to understand how control 
elements evolved and transformed at FAW-VW.
The process of ‘problematisation’ is explained as
... what is decisive is the moment at which such problems come 
to be identified as intrinsic to a particular calculative regime, 
when these difficulties come to be endowed with a wider 
meaning and significance than that o f their deployment in 
particular organizations, and when an alternative technology 
can be appealed to as resolving these difficulties in a manner
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congruent with their wider perceived significance. ... (Miller 
1991: p.737).
The notion of ‘programme’ is also pivotal to the analysis of control dynamics of 
FAW-VW. Miller (1991) notes that:
... The term programmes refers to the more general objectives 
that particular issues such as investment appraisals decisions 
can come to be associated with. ... Whilst these programmatic 
statements and proposals are by their very nature often 
heterogeneous, at certain points in time a limited coherence can 
be discerned between them. ... These idealized schemas, for  
representing, analysing and seeking to rectify the problems 
associated with particular aspects o f economics and social life 
can be called programmes. ... (p. 738)
Further, the concept of ‘technology’ has a particular meaning in understanding 
the process of transformation of control elements at FAW-VW:
... We need to study the humble and mundane mechanisms by 
which authorities seek to instantiate government: techniques o f  
notation; computation and calculation; procedures o f  
examination and assessment; the invention o f  devices such as 
surveys and presentational forms such as tables; the 
standardisation o f systems for training and the inculcation o f  
habits, the inauguration o f professional specialisms and 
vocabularies; building designs and architectural forms -  the list 
is heterogeneous and in principle unlimited. (Rose and Miller 
1992: p. 183)
Applying the above concepts to explore the control dynamics in a particular 
joint venture is valuable. First, such a framework does not constrain our 
attention within the boundary of the factory. Neither is this a simple 
implementation of contingency theory. The ‘context presupposing control 
mechanisms’ theory is too simple to capture the complex and delicate nature of 
such a reality-creating process. Miller & O’Leary, (1994b) hold that ‘...there is 
no “outside” or “inside” to such attempts to create reality. There are simply
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ways of problematising...’ (Miller and O'Leary 1994b: p. 123). The 
govemmentality literature allows the simple aspiration of a local car 
manufacturer to become the best joint venture at a micro level, to be connected 
to the national discourses at the macro level. The examination of the 
connections between national rationales and the control elements within FAW- 
VW illustrates how various forces came together to enable the transformations 
of control foci within FAW-VW.
Second, by examining the linkages formed between a national scheme of 
economic development in the car industry and local control foci in the joint 
venture, the govemmentality framework helps to elaborate why and how certain 
arrangements of the VW partner, which were acceptable to and welcomed by 
the FAW partner at one point in time, gave rise to increased tensions and 
became the point of departure for the two partners. This suggests the temporary 
agreement and peaceful cooperation between the two partners was only 
remotely evident from a sense of strategic consideration. Instead, such a 
vulnerable and temporary balance of power between the two partners is more 
likely to be associated with certain mechanisms and technologies of one partner 
(VW’s high quality control mechanisms) according with the programmes of 
another partner (FAW’s programme of building a modernised factory with 
internal competitiveness). Once the programme of FAW evolved, or was 
invested with new meaning, particular control mechanisms appeared to be 
incongruent with the new agenda of FAW. In such a case, different 
programmes are adopted by each partner, as are a different set of techniques. 
Tensions between the two partners were inextricably elevated.
Third, the govemmentality framework helps to explain how heterogeneous 
mechanisms rendered different programmes of FAW-VW operable. It is 
through these calculative and non-calculative technologies that partners are able 
to institutionalise and normalise the conduct and aspirations of employees.
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Through this process, it is imperative to examine how the ‘mundane’ 
techniques such as reports of quantified quality, or the quantified assessment of 
cost savings of individual employees, serve to transform employees into 
‘governable individuals’. The new programme (Cost reduction) superseding 
the old agenda of the FAW partner (High quality standards) does not mean that 
the old programme is completely removed from the joint venture. Shifting 
programmes up-held by the two partners can coexist at the firm level. 
Heterogeneous technologies are then adopted to alter employees’ conduct and 
enable intervention. A high degree of struggling between employees from the 
two partners and senior management, as well as contradictory decisions, can 
ensue. The govemmentality framework enables us to understand these 
conflicting actions and decisions.
Although the govemmentality literature makes it possible to understand how 
control mechanisms are shaped and transformed, it does not examine how 
controls are deployed rationally and strategically by each partner. Actors 
depicted by the govemmentality literature tend to be more submissive. The 
govemmentality framework does not take into account the strategic and 
political actions and reactions of both partners of the joint venture company in 
their attempt to legitimise and exert more extended control over the joint 
venture company. New Institutionalism provides an analytical tool to 
investigate the political usage of control elements against the backdrop of the 
social and institutional contexts in which the joint venture company FAW-VW 
is embedded. Concepts from this literature shed light on the different 
institutional forces and norms that both partners appeal to, to justify their 
attempt to exert extended control.
In the next section I will examine the previous developments in the New 
Institutionalism literature and explain how this literature is helpful in the 
present research and the contributions it attempts to make to the literature.
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2.2 New institutionalism -  an analytical tool
New Institutionalism is a theoretical enterprise that has been widely applied, 
discussed and debated in the area of economics, politics and sociology over the 
past 25 years. New institutionalist research in these areas is not based on a 
single set of assumptions. In fact it is united by little more than ‘atomistic 
accounts’ of social processes and a common acknowledgement that social and 
institutional context matters (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). New 
institutionalism, unlike previous theories about institutionalism, does not aim to 
describe the workings of institutions but attempts to explain the relationships 
between institutions and the actions of the actors involved.
Meyer and Rowan (1977) unpack the ‘taken for granted’ legitimacy of formal 
structures and argued that organisational structures are created and made more 
elaborate with the rise of institutionalised myths. In highly institutionalised 
contexts, organisations need to both support these myths and attend to practical 
demands, hence maintaining a loosely coupled state suits organisations best to 
increase resources and survival capabilities. DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) 
attempt to explain why organisations look similar and identified three 
mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change: Coercive, Mimetic and 
Normative isomorphism. Though such distinctions may shed light on how the 
ceremonial models and myths arise, which is missing from Meyer and Rowan 
(1977), in real institutional contexts it is almost impossible to reduce the actual 
processes to any of these categories.
7 Weick (1970) construe the concept of “loosely coupled” as, “By loosely coupling,the author 
intends to convey the image that coupled events are responsive, but that each event also 
preserves its own identity and some evidence of its physical or logical separateness.” (p. 3)
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Taking the neo-institutionalism approach, Covaleski and Dirsmith (1983; 1986; 
1988a; 1988b) look into the use of budgets within the settings of hospitals and 
universities. They propose that budgets are not simply means for planning and 
controlling activities through a downward flow of information as traditionally 
viewed, but are used by middle management to legitimise the existence of the 
sub-units. They also find that the external imagery of acting rationally 
penetrated and influenced the internal operations in six hospitals (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith 1986).
Consistent with the argument that accounting is not only embedded in social 
relations but also constitutes the social reality (Burchell, et al. 1980; Hines 1988; 
Hopwood 1987; Hopwood and Miller 1994), Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988a; 
1988b) show that by studying the budgeting process between university and 
state, accounting is more of a social invention complicit in the construction of a 
social reality, than a ‘rational’ reflection of a technical reality. Jepperson and 
Meyer (1991) demonstrate how modem actors are constructed through the 
process of institutionalisation, carrying their collective dependence continually 
with them, maintaining and reifying the modem order within formal 
organisations. Galaskiewicz (1991) takes institutionalism in another direction 
by presenting a case study which shows how actors can behave purposely under 
the umbrella of rationality to construct and create institutions which in turn 
control and govern organisations’ actions.
Orru et al. (1991) attempt to measure the level of isomorphism within and 
across four countries in East Asia by analysing organisational forms. Their 
results point to the uniformity within firm relations in each country, and they 
develop several cultural, social, and political explanations. Brint and Karabel
(1991) present a case study which shows how institutions are transformed in 
specific contexts by regarding organisational fields as arenas of power with 
some actors occupying more advantaged positions than others. Meyer et al.
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(1992) develop an institutional model of organisations that are more embedded 
in institutional environments than technical ones, and they support their 
argument by explaining the structure of educational organisations. Meyer and 
Rowan (1992) analyse the educational system in the USA. They provide several 
currently fashionable frameworks to explain the lack of central control in 
educational organisations and conclude that the institutional framework 
provides a more legitimate basis for reasoning. Scott (1992a), by studying 
health care organisations in the 1980s, suggests that the adaptation of 
organisations to their environments occurs not only at the level of the individual 
organisation but also at the population level as some units thrive and multiply 
while other types shrink and expire. Scott (1992c) shows a process of 
rationalisation of reform and institutionalisation of new ideas in the actions 
dealing with ageing problems in the USA and argues that the rationalisation 
process could proceed at various levels, and developments at one level could be 
independent of others.
Scott and Meyer (1992) review the currently popular organisation-environment 
models and criticise these models for neglecting the larger system of relations 
with which organisations are concerned. They also propose several hypotheses 
concerning the effects of societal sector characteristics on the form of 
organisations. Scott (1992b), attempts to sketch an agenda to study the social 
and cultural environment of organisations, by stressing that the functions and 
forms of organisations are significantly affected not only by the technical, but 
also by the social and cultural environment in which they are embedded. He 
argues that it would be useful to identify network, cultural and historical 
elements, and to apply three distinct levels of analysis: the interorganisation 
field, societal and world-system contexts. Ingram (2001) examines the 
influence of organisations on institutional change in the USA hospitality 
industry and argues that new organisations in particular are an important source 
of institutional change. However, new institutionalism has been criticised for
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assuming that institutions are stable, reductive, constrained and passive (Powell 
and DiMaggio 1991). Powell proposes several approaches to expand 
institutionalism for example, uncovering the varied ways in which institutional 
factors buttress or attenuate the competitive struggles among organisations, and 
showing that political and institutional forces set the very framework for the 
establishment of economic arrangements.
The foregoing review of new institutionalist studies suggests the usefulness of 
this perspective in addressing the control dynamics in the shaping of strategic 
alliances and for investigating control structures when two firms partner to 
create a new organisational entity. However, this strand of research only attends 
to the accounting in a single social context that is constituted by actors who 
have the same ethnic origin and who are subject to the same national culture. In 
international joint ventures where the partners are from different countries and 
are united by their strategic aspirations, there exist multi-institutional contexts 
to which different systems of symbolism and meanings are endowed. Therefore, 
two sets of social and institutional contexts are distinguished and examined 
within FAW-VW. New Institutionalism provides an analytical tool to 
understand the mechanisms through which institutional influences shape the 
behaviours of each partner.
Moreover, this study attempts to contribute to the literature of new 
institutionalism by illustrating how norms, rationalities and institutions are 
constructed purposely and internally within the joint venture company. It is 
argued that institutional forces, whether instrumentalised managerially or 
whether symbolically decoupled from daily operational activities, are not 
purely shaped by outside forces but are themselves produced within the joint 
venture and exerted to attain more control. Certain control practices are 
legitimised by managers as they appeal to technical rationalities and norms. As 
a result, the symbolic usage of institutions goes back and forth between the two
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partners and serves the ultimate purpose of exerting and legitimising control. 
The application and deployment of certain control mechanisms are better 
portrayed as rational and strategic uses of economic rationalities to enable more 
extended control over the joint venture by each partner.
While the concepts from the govemmentality literature are borrowed to analyse 
how control mechanisms are shaped and transformed by discourses, national 
programmes and expertise within and outside the joint venture company, new 
institutionalism makes it possible to understand how control mechanisms are 
deployed in practice and wielded to vie for control. The combination of these 
two approaches provides a comprehensive understanding of the evolution and 
deployment of control dynamics at FAW-VW combining both factors and 
forces within and without the joint venture company. In the next section, the 
research methodology and empirical materials collected for this study are 
examined.
3 Research methodology and empirical materials
The empirical materials used in this study comprise archival materials, 
miscellaneous internal documents, 264 issues of internal corporate newsletters 
from 1996-2006, in-depth interviews with 24 FAW-VW employees, and public 
information on FAW-VW as well as on related government regulation. This 
empirical material is carefully chosen to secure a rich understanding of how 
control mechanisms evolved, transformed and are implemented at FAW-VW. 
With regard to research questions probed in this study, a qualitative empiricism 
approach is adopted to gain a deeper understanding of the field under study. 
The emphasis is placed on the way in which control mechanisms are shaped 
and transformed by, and interrelates with, the social and institutional 
environments in which FAW-VW is embedded.
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The triangulation of data8 is deployed not to test presupposed hypotheses but to 
serve as an alternative to validation (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). It is understood 
that ‘objective reality can never be captured’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: p.5). 
Therefore, the different methods of data collection are carefully chosen as a 
‘strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness and depth’ to the field of 
study (Flick 2002: p.229). Triangulation is used to explore the conditioning 
forces of control mechanisms, display the strategic and political uses of control 
elements and facilitate an understanding of the actual effects of controls 
imposed on FAW-VW employees.
The empirical work for this research was carried out during 2007 and 2009. A 
two-month access to FAW-VW was negotiated from July to August 2007. 
During the stay at FAW-VW, internal documents and corporate newsletters 
were collected and 24 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 
both FAW and VW employees. Public information on FAW-VW was collected 
via published books, academic journals, newspapers, media and the internet. 
Government regulations for the automobile industry, policies on joint ventures 
with foreign partners, national five-year plans as well as speeches delivered by 
government agents from the 1970s to 2009, are also important components of 
the empirical data, which shed light upon the evolving national discourses and 
government policies (McKinlay 1998; Miller 1990; Miller and Rose 1988). 
Archival research of Chinese dynastic history was carried out to facilitate an 
understanding of the historical and institutional origins of certain management 
practices at FAW-VW (Hoskin and Macve 1986; Hoskin and Macve 1988). A 
detailed analysis of the different sources of data and the reason for choosing
8 Four different forms of triangulation are distinguished in the literature on qualitative research 
methodology: triangulation of data, investigator triangulation, triangulation of theories, and 
methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1978; Flick, 2008).
Triangulation of data is defined as ‘combining data drawn from different sources and at 
different times in different sources and at different times in different places or from different 
people’ (Flick, 2008, p. 328)
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them is provided in the next section in accord with the sequence of analysis of 
the empirical data.
The collection of internal documents took place during the two-month period at 
FAW-VW from July to August 2007. The internal documents included short 
and long term plans for FAW-VW, product quality documents, flow-charts for 
key jobs in each department, incentive plans and job requirements, detailed 
descriptions of responsibilities for every department and important positions, 
and the code of conduct for employees. This empirical data was used to 
facilitate an understanding of the components of formal control systems that 
were put in place at FAW-VW. Moreover, 264 issues of the FAW-VW internal 
newsletter for employees from 1996 to 2006 were obtained. The newsletters are 
published in Chinese twice every month and circulated to all FAW employees. 
The materials published in these newsletters included news stories from 
different departments of the firm, inspiring stories of star employees, different 
projects being undertaken at FAW-VW, information on the market and 
competitors, as well as changes to the related government and industrial 
regulations. Such data enabled insights to be gained into different projects and 
control mechanisms deployed at FAW-VW as well as their historical 
transformations from 1996 to 2006. The newsletters for employees at FAW- 
VW over 17 years also allow the influence of discursive programmes on the 
firm, to be traced and analysed. Furthermore, informed by the govemmentality 
literature, the empirical analysis of different firm projects was able to shed light 
on how certain programmes at the national and firm level were made operable 
within FAW-VW.
Public information was also collected, including the history of FAW-VW, 
national five-year plans, government industrial guidance, and related 
regulations for the automobile industries as well as for joint ventures with 
foreign partners. The data collection was carried out throughout 2007 to 2009
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via published books, academic journals, newspapers, print media and the 
internet. Such information is critical to the understanding of the broader social 
and institutional environments in which FAW-VW is embedded. This public 
information was analysed subsequent to the analysis of the FAW-VW internal 
documents and corporate newsletters. Such an analysis provided insights into 
the changes of national discourses and government regulations, allowing the 
interpretation of the influences that actors and agencies external to FAW-VW, 
had on the transformation of control elements within FAW-VW. Informed by 
the govemmentality literature, this information allowed an examination of the 
linkages and relays formed among discourses, various government agents and 
agencies, and the transition in the control foci in a local joint venture company.
There were 24 semi-structured interviews in total conducted with both FAW 
and VW employees in different departments during the two-month stay at 
FAW-VW from July to August 2007. The interviewees were carefully selected 
to ensure an exposure to different divisions of FAW-VW as well as to gain an 
insight into the overall control mechanisms implemented. Managers in each 
department chosen were approached first to obtain an overview of the control 
mechanism in place while the employees were then referred to to discuss how 
the control mechanisms are implemented through day-to-day practices and how 
they interpret and respond to the controls imposed. The interviews were 
conduced in Chinese with FAW employees and in English with VW employees. 
A breakdown of interviews conducted in terms of the background of employees 
is provided in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1: Functional Breakdown of Interviews Carried Out9
FAW Employees
9 For the duration of each interview, please refer to Appendix 1.
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Control Department 2
Factory Plants 3
Finance Department 2
Management Department 1
Marketing Department 1
Planning Department 2
Product Department 2
Production Management Department 2
Purchasing Department 1
Quality Assurance Department 2
Sales Department 1
Total 19
VW Employees
Factory Plants 2
Planning Department 1
Production Management 1
Managing Department 1
Total 5
Total number of interviews carried out 24
All interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions. The open- 
ended questions included: ‘What are the main responsibilities for your position? 
What does your job entail? How is your performance evaluated? Who are you 
accountable to? What are your opinions on (incentive systems, cost reduction 
projects...)?’. More specific questions were asked once detailed descriptions of 
the types of control mechanisms imposed on employees, were provided. For 
those interviewees who worked with partners from a different country (e.g. an
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FAW employee who had a VW co-worker, or superior), questions which 
addressed the differences between them and their partners were included in the 
interview, such as: ‘How well do you work with your (VW or FAW) colleagues? 
Are there any difficulties in communicating with them? What in your point of 
view are the differences between you and your (VW or FAW) employees?’. 
The semi-structured interviews were intended to gain an understanding of how 
control mechanisms were implemented in different divisions and how 
employees interpreted and reacted to the control mechanisms imposed on them. 
These interviews allowed insights to be gained about how control elements 
were used and implemented in practice and how employees reacted to the 
formal control mechanisms. New institutionalism is drawn on to inform the 
empirical analysis of the interview data to illustrate how the formation and 
implementation of control mechanisms is affected by institutional forces, and 
how different control elements are deployed by different partners strategically 
and rationally to effect power and exert more extended control over the joint 
venture company.
Archival research on Chinese dynastic histories and studies on Chinese ancient 
schools of thought as well as their implications for people’s mentality and 
behaviour today, comprise the last part of the empirical materials collected for 
this study. The reason for selecting such information is to trace the historical 
and institutional origins of certain management practices within FAW-VW and 
to provide an understanding of the reactions of FAW employees to the control 
mechanisms imposed on them.
The triangulation of different sources of data enabled a ‘simultaneous display of 
multiple, refracted realities’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: p.6). Different materials 
from multiple levels are combined to capture the particularities and 
complexities of the field under study. Internal documents and interviews were 
complemented with public information and archival research to provide a
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multi-layered understanding of the transformation, implementation and actual 
effects of the control dynamics at FAW-VW. The following chapters draw 
upon different sources of empirical data to address the research questions raised 
for this study. The data triangulation made it possible to trace the relationship 
between the control dynamics with FAW-VW and its conditioning forces 
within and without the joint venture company.
4 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to begin to develop a frame of reference to provide a 
deeper understanding of the development and implementation of the control 
dynamics at FAW-VW within the social and institutional context in which the 
joint venture company is embedded. It has been argued that the development 
and usages of different control elements within FAW-VW cannot be examined 
in isolation, without reference to the national discourses, government agents 
and agencies, various experts and institutional forces that appear to be external 
to the joint venture company. In order to gain insights into the ways in which 
control mechanisms evolved, transformed and were implemented and the actual 
effects of controls on employees within the JV under study, both the 
govemmentality and new institutionalism literature are coupled in this 
investigation. Such a composite framework, it has been argued, is intended to 
allow insights to be gained, that may not be identifiable via a focus on either 
approach in isolation.
The govemmentality literature which centres around the later work of Michel 
Foucault ((Burchell 1996; Foucault 1988; Foucault 1991a; Foucault 1997; 
Miller 1990; Miller 2004; Miller and Rose 1990; Rose 1992), was used to draw 
attention to the relays and linkages formed among discourses, national 
programmes, government agencies, expertise within and outside FAW-VW,
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and the transition of control foci within the joint venture company. Adopting 
certain concepts from this literature (programme, problematisation and 
technology) allows an understanding to be obtained of how certain control 
mechanisms within FAW-VW emerged at one point in time and came to be 
transformed in the face of new events. Although the govemmentality literature 
is insightful in this way, much of the research in this tradition tends to overlook 
the active and strategic roles actors are able to assume, as actors in this 
literature are generally depicted as passive and not consciously cognisant of 
wider forces of influence on their being. It is from this respect that new 
institutionalism is able to complement the findings of the govemmentality 
perspective.
It has been observed that the behaviour of employees from FAW and VW are 
subject to the influence of different norms and institutions according to their 
different cultural origins, educational backgrounds, as well as work and life 
values. It was argued that new institutionalism allows an examination of two 
sets of social and institutional environments in which the two camps of 
employees at FAW-VW are embedded. Therefore, further analysis and 
interpretation of their strategic actions are made possible. Drawing on new 
institutionalism, this study seeks to demonstrate the way in which the actions of 
employees at FAW-VW are influenced and shaped by coercive, mimetic, and 
normative institutional forces and more importantly, how employees from both 
FAW and VW appealed to norms and institutions in a political and strategic 
manner in order to exert more extended control over the joint venture company.
Overall, it has been argued that the combination of the govemmentality 
literature and new institutionalism sheds new light on the development and 
implementation of control dynamics within FAW-VW. The research 
methodology chosen for this study is considered pertinent in the context of 
research questions posed and the theoretical frame of reference proposed. It
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provides different sources of empirical data to be analysed in the subsequent 
chapters to gain a deep understanding of the dynamic control mechanisms at 
FAW-VW. In the next chapter, the formation of a quality oriented control 
mechanism, and its subsequent transition to a cost oriented mechanism, is 
examined in relation to wider forces of change.
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Chapter 3 From Quality Enhancement to Cost 
Containment: An Analysis of Forces of Change
1 Introduction
FAW-VW regards Product Quality as the Soul o f the Company: 
FAW-VW has, in its seven years o f life, always placed Quality in 
the central position o f  all its operation and made it the soul o f  
product formation. ( FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, May 
1998)
Cost is our first priority ...the situation has changed; now the 
real competition focuses on costs, unlike the past when high 
input might be able to bring out high output... Since last year our 
goal is to achieve continuous and significant cost reduction....
(An interview with the CEO of FAW-VW, Mr Qin published in 
People’s Daily: 2004)
Accounting scholars have shown extensive interest in understanding the forces 
which influence accounting and control systems. Some scholars have 
considered political, social, institutional and historical forces in the shaping of 
accounting (Ahrens and Chapman 2007; Burchell, et al. 1985; Burchell, et al. 
1980; Hopwood 1983; Hopwood 1987; Hoskin and Macve 1986; Hoskin and 
Macve 1988; Miller 1990; Miller 1991; Miller, et al. 2008; Miller and O'Leary 
1987; Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and O'Leary 1994b; Miller and O'Leary 
2007; Miller and Power 1992; Miller and Rose 1990; Miller and Rose 2008; 
Rose and Miller 1992). Developing an understanding of the social conditioning 
of accounting control systems in joint ventures has not been investigated before. 
In this chapter I examine the emergence of a quality oriented control system 
and the subsequent transition to a cost containment focus in the context of 
external influences in one Chinese car manufacturing joint venture.
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The joint venture under study, FAW-VW Automobile Co., Ltd. is a major 
passenger car production joint venture between FAW Group and Volkswagen 
Group. FAW Group owns 60% of the equity and Volkswagen Group owns 40%. 
The JV has two modem manufacturing plants and a product range of over 10 
different models of cars including two brands: VW and Audi. The empirical 
data I draw upon in this chapter comes from four sources: first, 24 interviews 
were carried out with FAW-VW employees. Second, 264 issues were sourced 
of internal corporate newspaper for employees from 1996-2006. Third, 
miscellaneous internal documents were sourced, ranging from the definition of 
responsibilities for each department to quality standards for different parts of 
cars. Lastly, public information on the JV, academic publications, and 
government regulations in the related area were obtained from the national 
library, electronic database, press and media.
Since the start of the FAW-VW joint, quality had been given centre stage. 
Strategies were developed and techniques were adopted to improve product 
quality. The firm was involved in both national and international quality 
certification programmes. Daily quantitative reports10 were produced, the 
results of which were summarised, integrated, and analysed statistically. Each 
decision in the process of product formation was made to conform to the central 
objective of improving and assuring product quality. Complicated and lengthy 
VW product tests processes, which exceeded the state standards regulated in 
China, were pursued to ensure high quality standards. Modernised management 
techniques such as 5S11 management and KVPA212 were introduced to provide a
10 For all components and final cars inspected, a quantitative score is awarded to illustrate the 
level of quality, see section 2.3.1.
11 This management is based on 5 Japanese words which can be translated into Sort, Set in 
order, Shine, Standardise and Sustain. The system seeks to remove unnecessary items from the 
production line and workplace, maintain order and tidiness (making sure everything has a 
home), and to keep a clean workplace to ensure a workable and efficient production system.
12 KVP is the initials of three German words which mean ‘the process of constant improvement’. 
The square of KVP means an accelerating process of constant improvement. The KVPA2
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platform for effective quality management. The old working practices were 
problematised and altered. A new spirit of dedication, responsibility and hard 
work was promoted by subjecting employees to quantitative evaluations of 
various forms. The FAW partner conformed to quality terms set by the VW 
partner from the start of the joint venture until 2002. However this quality 
centred mentality witnessed a sharp change in 2002.
From around 2002, a new meaning became attached to the idea of ‘being 
competitive*. Cost rapidly and abruptly became a focal issue in the overall 
management system. Cost reduction became linked with the firm’s sustainable 
development and future survival. It came to be conceived of as the ‘primary 
force of competition*. Every employee was to take the agenda of cost reduction 
seriously. A large portion of the profits came to rely on the effectiveness of cost 
reduction. Hundreds of thousands13 of proposals for cost reduction were 
received and adopted. The FAW partner began to replace parts originally 
imported from VW with parts produced locally in an attempt to save significant 
costs in materials supply. Lengthy inspection processes to approve the 
replacements arising from cost reduction proposals, or the localisation of parts 
supply, were no longer considered as a parade for high quality standards but as 
being ‘counterproductive’ with a need to be changed. Star employees who 
contributed to significant cost reduction were selected, publicised and rewarded 
on a monthly basis. The idea of cost control replacing quality maximisation 
infiltrated the lives of employees in FAW-VW. Tensions between the FAW 
partner and the VW partner grew under the new programme of FAW, as cost 
had not replaced quality in the regime of the VW partner.
programme is a group activity that was initiated in Germany in the 1980s and which targets the 
improvement of quality, service and product prices via the elimination of waste and the 
optimisation of working procedures.
13 It was documented in the company newspaper (Oct, 2003) that one division of FAW-VW 
collected 17,629 Cost Reduction Proposals while in another case it was reported that one 
manufacturing plant, the Welding Shop, collected 2,400 proposals in one month (FAW-VW 
Internal Newspaper, May, 2003).
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In this chapter, I attempt to explain the control focus applied in the joint venture, 
FAW-VW, in the light of wider discourses, government regulation, and the 
expertise of engineers and management within and outside the confines of the 
firm. The chapter is structured as follows: first, I provide a brief literature 
review and explain the theoretical framework and its usefulness in the analysis 
of my case study. Second, I explore the emergence of a quality oriented control 
mechanism in the early year of FAW-VW and extrapolate this from within the 
complex of linkages between control systems adopted and heterogeneous 
bodies of expertise. Third, I investigate the transition to a cost focused 
mechanism within FAW-VW and attempt to elaborate how such a transition 
was rendered imperative by various bodies and made operable by the 
technologies adopted within FAW-VW. I conclude by summarising the 
preliminary findings in this case and the limitations of the current chapter, as 
well as further work that needs to be done.
2 In pursuit of quality
To understand how concerns with quality within FAW-VW were given priority 
as a meaningful issue, attention first needs to be directed externally to the 
factory. Several steps are required to explain this. First, the development of the 
car industry as a whole was regarded as an essential element in the initial stage 
of Chinese economic development. The car industry was at that time beset with 
concerns about its lack of modernised management, lagging technologically, 
and concerns for its product quality and variety as expressed by a diverse and 
heterogeneous group of agents, such as politicians, economists, entrepreneurs, 
academics, engineers and so on. Thus, attempts to improve product quality and 
establish high standard quality management systems, were considered an 
imperative in an industry of key importance, but subject to significant
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underdevelopment. In this context, national car industry development was 
endowed with a broader meaning, reflective of a temporary complex of linkages 
among discourses of economic development, concerns with product quality and 
the interplay of various agents and agencies engaged in the shaping of control 
mechanisms, and within a specific locale: the FAW-VW joint venture.
Second, the focus subsequently shifts to the linkages and relays formed 
between a local factory scheme ‘becoming the best car joint venture in serving 
customers’ (FAW Internal Newspaper, August 3rd, 1997, p. 1), and a series of 
national programmes with the aim of increasing the competitiveness of the car 
industry as a whole. It is important to understand not only the way in which 
‘building the best joint venture’ was linked to concerns of competitiveness in 
the car industry as a whole, but also how ‘being the best joint venture’ became 
interpreted as ‘having the best quality’ products and services. Attention here is 
also directed to the manner in which the FAW partner became congruent with 
what were considered initially to be the excessively high quality standards 
deemed necessary by VW. The focus will be on the relation between the two 
locales in the sense that we try to understand how certain agendas of the FAW 
partner are linked to national aspirations of establishing a highly competitive 
and modernised car industry, rather than constraining attention at a particular 
macro or micro level.
Third, is a concern for two practices in the joint venture that illustrate how these 
mechanisms make operable, FAW’s programme of ‘becoming a modernised 
factory with high competitiveness’. One of these techniques was introduced by 
the VW partner, namely Quality Audit, which aims to collect product quality 
information, explores the nature of and reasons for defects, ascertains trends in 
quality change, follows the actions of defect removals, and eventually realises a 
constant quality improvement. The ultimate purpose of the Quality Audit is to 
examine and evaluate product quality from the standpoint of the most
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demanding customers. The other practice refers to the attempts made by FAW- 
VW to conform with international (ISO 9000 and 9001) and German VDA 6 
quality standards. The pursuit of high quality standards by FAW-VW was 
reinforced and also reassured by the implementation of a series of modernised 
management techniques, such as 5S, 6 sigma management, and KVPA2. These 
practices were articulated around the FAW partner’s aim of ‘becoming the best 
car manufacturer with high competitiveness’ and making this agenda capable of 
implementation.
In this process, a new dedicated, responsible, customer-oriented and 
hardworking ethic was instrumentalised, replacing the old non-accountable, 
bureaucratic and inefficient process. Star employees chosen as examples of the 
entire work force in this period were typically iron men who worked long hours 
and prioritised work over everything else. Both quality inspection reports and 
Quality Audit reports were produced on a daily basis for each individual motor 
part and manufacturing processes. Individual workers could be traced and held 
responsible should any defects emerge. Quantified quality scores down to each 
job process and worker were produced, integrated, compared and analysed 
statistically. The trend of such quantitative performance was followed and 
workers were evaluated based on this information. During the daily Quality 
Audit, the virtual distance between employees and ultimate consumers was 
effaced as the car under audit was compared against standards of imaginary 
customers, and workers confronted directly by perceived customer expectations. 
Moreover, during the implementation of international quality standards, the 
working process for each division was redefined and the role of each post 
standardised, therefore providing a benchmark for which each employee was to 
be held responsible.
In short, following these three steps, one may gain an understanding of how the 
pursuit of excessively high quality standards at FAW-VW was made necessary:
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the problematising of the car industry as a whole; embedding the idea of 
‘building car industry into the pillar industry’ within the aspiration of 
increasing international competitiveness of one local car manufacturing joint 
venture; and, imposing a product quality audit and international quality 
standards.
2.1 A shared concern with the development of the automobile industry
From around the mid-1980s, the schema for developing an internationally 
competitive Chinese car industry became a shared objective for various parties 
including government officers, leaders of existing car manufacturing companies, 
entrepreneurs in the related engineering industries, as well as economists and 
scholars in other areas. The development of the car industry was considered an 
essential contributor to the modernisation and industrialisation taking place in 
China, and more importantly to the overall development of ‘a socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics’ (Hu 1996). The concept was coherently 
discernible among a heterogeneous set of government reports, National 
Congress proposals for economic plans, schemes of business leaders in related 
industries, and scholarly publications from around 1985 onwards. The 
aspiration of developing the Chinese car industry formed a consistent point of 
reference for diverse interest parties and acted as an idealised design that sought 
to configure the economy in ways thought desirable. It became a programme of 
the governing group within the framework of govemmentality. Such a 
programme of developing a Chinese car industry with international 
competitiveness was not always considered so desirable (Investment Research 
Institute of People’s Bank of China. 1984; Li 1988; Zhang and Lu 1987). The 
notion came into being and came to be regarded as a programme only when 
various agents and agencies engaged were allied by a shared common interest 
(e.g. the benefits from a developed and internationally competent car industry)
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and constantly referred to it as an idealised and desirable state. Such relays, 
though temporary and fragile as they may be, are indispensable for the 
mobilisation of certain notions such as ‘economic growth’ or ‘the development 
of a national car industry’ into programmes. In the following section, I will 
illustrate how the notion of ‘developing an internationally advanced car 
manufacturing industry’ became a consistent reference point for diverse actors 
and came to be considered as an idealised schema in their attempts to rectify 
particular economic problems.
Since the 1980s, the import volume of passenger cars increased greatly as 
domestic production was unable to satisfy the increasing demand for passenger 
cars due to the economic reform and liberalisation of markets from 1978 in 
China. These aroused the attention of various parties.
From 1982, a debate about whether to develop a national car manufacturing 
industry was ushered into the spotlight. The diverse bodies of expertise 
involved in this debate came from politicians, government officers, economists, 
entrepreneurs, commentators and academics in different areas (Chen 1994; Ji 
1985; Li 1988; Liu 2003; Sina Auto. 2008; Wan 1995; Zhang and Lu 1987).
During this period, two distinctive opinions were voiced: one directed attention 
to environmental issues caused by heavy traffic, the underdeveloped 
infrastructure to accommodate cars, and the supply of petrol, and the natural 
resources required to satisfy the needs of car industry development and argued 
for a ‘restrictive car industry development accompanied by proportional import’ 
(Investment Research Institute of People's Bank of China. 1984; Li 1988; Sina 
Auto. 2008; Zhang and Lu 1987). Another perspective which favoured the 
development of a Chinese passenger car industry viewed it as an initiative that 
would put a stop to the outflow of foreign exchange, satisfy the domestic 
demand, stimulate the development of related industries, and provide jobs.
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From 1984, the State Council organised a series of forums for leaders from 
different areas of the bureaucracy, entrepreneurs and scholars to discuss the 
issue of the development of the passenger car industry. These meetings 
highlighted that ‘China does need to develop a passenger car industry of its 
own... Such a development has to start now...’ (Investment Research Institute 
of People's Bank of China. 1984). Developing the car industry was considered 
to be contributive and essential to Chinese economic development (Liu 2003). 
In December 1985, when meeting with the chairman of the Chinese 
Automobile Association, the Chairman of the State, Mr Hu, pointed out that 
‘the age of private purchase of passenger cars will arrive eventually.... the 
development of the car industry should be listed in the “Seventh Five-Year 
Plan”...’14 (Liu 2003; The State Council. 1985).
In 1986, in the proposal for the ‘the Seventh National Economic and Social 
Development Five-Year Plan’, the Central Committee of the CPC (Communist 
Party of China) stated clearly for the first time the objective to ‘make car 
manufacturing industry the pillar industry in order to achieve a greater 
development’ (Sina Auto. 2008; The State Council. 1985; The State Council. 
1986; Wang 1986; Zheng and Shen 1991). The ‘pillar industry’ is defined as 
the vanguard industry which has a relatively fast growth pace and is able to 
guide and promote the development of the whole economy. It is purported to 
have a strong contagion effect in terms of inducing the rise of new industries 
and exerting a far-reaching and profound impact on economic development and 
the transformation of related industries.15
14 The Five-Year Plans of China are a series of economic development initiatives submitted 
through plenary sessions of the Central Committee and national congresses. The plan sets out 
guidelines for economic and social development. A new round of planning starts every five 
years.
15 http://baike.baidu.eom/view/l024198.htm?fr=ala0# 1.
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As the automobile industry was denoted the ‘pillar industry’, the nexus was 
rendered more visible between its development, the rise of related industries 
and the success of the economic reform, while various actors were enlisted in 
the development project of the automobile industry. Developing the car 
industry was regarded as contributive and essential to other key industries and 
the economic development overall, by government officers, entrepreneurs, 
economists and diverse bodies of expertise. Wang (1986) stresses:
...[developing a car industry] reflects the requirements o f  
modem economic development, creates a wide range o f  
employment opportunities and has a far-reaching influence on 
the undergoing socialist modernization, the development o f the 
transport industry, the progress o f science and technology, 
social and economic benefits... ip. 7)
The agenda of developing a national car industry was construed as an idealised 
scheme to direct the development of the overall economy in ways considered 
desirable. Moreover, the percentage of the output of the car industry in the 
overall productivity of the national economy comparing China and US, Japan 
and Europe, suggested the exigency and potential of the development of the 
national automobile industry (Zhang and Lu 1987). The significance of the car 
industry in the national economy of several developed countries was cross 
referenced to prioritise the development of the car industry in the state’s 
national economic modernisation agenda. As Li (1988) points out:
...the international economic experience has shown that high­
speed development periodfor a country's car industry is also the 
same time period during which its economy prospers. The 
United States in its 1920s, Europe in its 1950s and 1960s, Japan 
in its 1970s, as well as South Korea in its 1980s, had all gone 
through the very same process, while Italy made the sixth largest 
economy in the Western World due to its very own car 
manufacturing industry. Automobile industry should be given the 
primary position in the industrial structure in a modernized 
industrial society, (p. 19)
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The car industry was further considered closely related to the future growth of a 
series of other key industries, requiring the inputs of a significant amount of 
resources as well as converted products including steel, nonferrous metal, latex, 
paints, lumber, glass, asbestos, textiles, high power batteries, axletrees and 
other electronic products. Therefore its development was regarded as ‘providing 
a market for the entire industry’ and ‘driving the development of lead 
metallurgy, machinery, chemical industry, light industry, construction industry, 
electronics and other related industries’ (Wang 1986; Zhang and Lu 1987). It 
was argued that developing a car industry also rendered imperative public 
investment in road construction which would drive a further round of economic 
growth (Zheng and Shen 1991).
Relays and linkages were formed between the development of a car industry 
with the future of various related industries and the economic development of 
China as a whole. Various agents and agencies including different government 
bureaus, leaders in the car manufacturing companies, entrepreneurs within 
related industries and scholars who were concerned with the future of the state, 
were allied to believe unanimously that the agenda of ‘developing a national car 
industry’ is the perfect way for ‘presenting, analysing and seeking to rectify’ 
the inefficiencies associated with the nation’s modernisation and marketisation 
process. Hence the notion of car industry development became a national 
programme, a consistent reference point for different parties to draw upon in 
their attempts to configure the relations within their own fields which were 
connected by the same concern and objective at this particular point in time. In 
the next section I will examine how the car industry was subsequently 
problematised by different parties, and how the idea of quality became attached 
to such a programme, which influences the control focus within one particular 
locale, FAW-VW.
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2.2 The prioritisation of quality
With the prioritisation of building the car industry as the pillar industry, another 
round of debate started concerning the strategies and approaches to develop the 
car industry. Discussion forums were organised, government seminars were 
convened, and scholarly proposals were published. At this stage, the current 
development of the car industry was further complicated in the following three 
ways. First, in terms of production volume: the overall production of cars was
370,000 and 470,000 in 1986 and 1987 respectively16. ‘The annual production 
volume of passenger cars in early 1980s was hardly the daily production of an 
advanced car manufacturer in developed country’ (web page). It was argued 
that with such a production level, the car industry was well short of becoming 
the pillar industry. Second, in terms of the variety and technology of products: 
the few existing models of passenger cars in production were characterised as 
being behind the times and lacking advanced technology (Chen 1986; Chen 
1988). Third, the car industry was problematised in terms of the management 
system in state-owned car manufacturing firms: state-owned manufacturers 
were criticised for being without a clear line between the functions of the 
government and enterprises (Li 1988), and of having no scientific management 
system or techniques. Fourth, the quality of the products was also a concern for 
various actors. The problematisation of quality was carried out both at a 
national level and at local firm level. It was argued that there existed a big gap 
between the overall quality of cars produced locally and those imported, in 
terms of safety, reliability, fuel consumption, comfort, and environment 
adaptability, while local car producers were criticised for lacking the expertise 
to ensure product quality. (Chen 1986; Chen 1988; Chen 1994; Li 1988; Lin 
1993; Lu and Chen 1989; Sheng 1986; Wan 1995; Yuan 1995).
http://tj sj .baidu.com/pages/jxyd/1 l/79/cbe73dcaef9e36f09da6284e07cec0c2_0.html16
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The solutions proposed concerning the above questions by experts included: to 
establish big and comprehensive enterprises with a high starting point in terms 
of high quality and advanced technology, to attract foreign capital in this area to 
realise technology transfer and improve product quality, to launch 
advantageous tax and tariff policies to encourage joint ventures and to conform 
with international quality standards, in the process of which management 
control systems can be transformed and industry’s competitiveness will be 
improved (Conference 1994; Fu and Han 2000; Ji 1985; Liu 2003; Zang 1994; 
Zhang 1994; Zheng and Shen 1991)
These solutions were reconfirmed in the ‘Automobile Industrial Policy’ (1994) 
issued by the Chinese government:
The Automobile Industrial Policy is particularly made in order 
fo r  the car industry to become the pillar industry o f national 
economy as soon as possible, to change the current condition o f  
small-scale and low-level products, to improve product quality 
and technological skills ...The state encourages automobile 
companies to establish research centres with foreign firms in the 
form o f inter-firm cooperation and joint venture. ... The state 
encourages automobile companies to attract foreign capital to 
develop China’s automobile industry, (p. 1)
The issue of quality, one of the many aspects of which the Chinese car industry 
was considered problematic, was further rendered imperative as linkages and 
relays were formed and reinforced among the idea of quality, diverse agents 
and agencies, and government agendas within and without the car 
manufacturing industry. The concern with product quality in general dates to 
the start of the Chinese economic reform. It was listed as one of the 
‘fundamental guidelines and goals for economic development’ in the CPC 
Central Committee’s Proposal for the Seventh National Economic and Social 
Development Five-year Plan (The State Council. 1985):
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...[we should] place in a central and prominent position the 
growth o f  economic efficiency, especially the improvement o f  
product quality... the poor quality o f  production goods, high 
material consumption, and low economic efficiency has been a 
long-term issue for construction o f China's socialist economy. ...,
[we] have to bring the product quality and economic efficiency 
up to a new level. This is the fundamental way to accelerate 
China's modernization process ... (p. 4)
The idea of quality was further linked to the international competitiveness of 
the Chinese economy and the success of its opening-up. In the same report, a 
‘quality first’ principle was put forward for competing in the international 
market. Great improvement in product quality was regarded as exigent for 
increasing the international trade volume and revenue (The State Council. 
1985). The relays among the concern with product quality, the export and the 
industrialisation of China were reinforced in CPC Central Committee's Proposal
17on the Eighth Five-Year Plan of National Economic and Social Development . 
It was pointed out in the guideline section of the proposal submitted to the 
Thirteenth National People's Congress that:
The focus for the development o f  the machinery manufacturing 
industry is to improve product quality and technical standards.
(p. 10)
In the section regarding expanding the extent of opening-up to the international 
market...
...O n the premise o f a continued steady development o f  export 
trade, the focus o f our work should be on reforming the export 
structure and improving the quality o f  exports ... [we] should 
rely on improved product quality to drive the increase in foreign 
exchange earnings. ... (p. 21)
From 1995 onwards, the linkage was further strengthened between the idea of 
quality and the development of the national car manufacturing industry. In
17 The Eighth Five Year Plan is for the time period starting from 1990 to 1995.
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December 1995, in the ‘CPC Central Committee’s Proposal for the Ninth Five-
1 ftYear Plan of National Economic and Social Development’, two fundamental 
transformations were raised by President Jiang as ‘the key to achieving the goal 
of the next fifteen years’, being the metamorphosis from a ‘planned economy 
system’ to ‘a socialist market economy system’ and the transformation in 
‘economic growth mode from extensive to intensive’ (The State Council. 1995). 
Quality was rendered imperative for two such fundamental transformations by a 
series of actors including government officials, entrepreneurs and scholars in 
various areas. In 1996, the Ministry of Machinery Industry,19 after several 
rounds of internal meetings, national workshops and consultations with the 
State Council, decided that the entire industry should concentrate on improving 
product quality, optimising organisational structures and ameliorating 
development capacities (which were referred to as ‘the three battles’) during the 
period of the Ninth Five-Year Plan in order to facilitate the ‘two fundamental 
transformations’ (The Ministry of Machinery Industry. 1996). With regards to 
‘the development of the automobile industry during the period of the ninth five- 
year plan’, the Ministry of Machinery Industry issued the ‘The Quality 
Development Plan for the automobile industry’ in which the issue of product 
quality was linked to, and regarded as indispensable to, the development of the 
automobile industry and the national economy as a whole:
... During the ‘ninth five-year plan' period ... the automobile 
industry as the pillar industry o f  the national economy must 
achieve a rapid development with high product quality. The 
development o f China's automobile industry is faced with fierce 
international competition and challenges. Quality has become 
the key determinant for a country or a company to survive in the 
international market ... Quality is an important strategic issue 
fo r the development o f  our national automotive industry ... The 
planning and implementing o f the quality development will 
enable China’s automobile industry to strengthen the domestic
18 The Ninth Five Year Plan covers the time period from 1996-2000.
19 The ministry that is responsible for providing guidelines for, issue regulations on and direct 
the development of the automobile manufacturing industry.
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market, and can gradually adapt to the needs o f  international 
market in the fierce competition. ... (p. 2)
The issue of this plan for the development of production quality was 
accompanied by a number of government guidelines on how to better improve 
the quality, discussions of standards and process control of product quality by 
engineers and other experts, and the determinations expressed by managers in 
the car manufacturing companies to materialise the idea of high quality (Cao 
1994; Chen 1995; Cheng 1996; Li 1994; The First Automobile Work Group. 
1995; The Ministry of Machinery Industry. 1994; The public relation division 
of FAW. 1996; 1995a; 1995b; Yang 1995).
In an interview, the Minister of Machinery Industry at the time, Mr Guangyuan 
He stressed the importance of product quality to the development of automobile 
industry:
... We believe that the vitalisation o f  the machinery and the 
automobile industry should be done step by step. From now to 
the end o f  this century is the first stage for the revitalization 
during which period the intermediate focus will be on improving 
product quality. ... (Cao 1994: p.6).
Korean experts, in a comparison between the development of the Korean and 
Chinese automobile industries, commented that:
...we believe that for the development o f Chinese automobile 
industry, the most important is to ensure a stable quality on the 
basis o f  mass production ... (Yang 1995: p.26)
Accompanied by the problematisation of the whole car manufacturing industry 
in terms of its product quality at the national level, the idea of quality was 
linked with the competitiveness of car manufacturing companies at the firm 
level. Within First Automobile Workshop, quality was made imperative to the 
future of the whole group:
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... Product quality is the most critical element for establishing a 
good brand name. Only by upholding to a high product quality 
standard can FAW compete with international branded cars...
(Li 1994: p. 13)
The complex of relays and linkages between discourses of economic 
development, the schemata for developing a national car manufacturing 
industry, the notion of quality, diverse expertise and various agents and 
agencies give rise to the local aspiration in one locale: FAW-VW and, more 
importantly, the meaning attached to such a programme.
FAW-VW was founded as one ‘big and comprehensive* car producer and the 
very first to be established on the basis of economies of scale. The government 
provided great support to FAW-VW in its initial establishment period in terms 
of favourable tax conditions, direct investment to ensure water and power 
supply, and easy access to bank loans (FAW-VW Newspaper January 10th 
1996). At this stage, the firm identified its strategy ‘to be the best joint venture 
in China’ (FAW-VW Newspaper August 3rd, 1997, p. 1), which was later 
constantly referred to by its employees, put on the home page of the firm and 
written in the training pamphlet of new employees. The strategy was linked to, 
and seen as contributing to, the realisation of a national objective of developing 
the car industry as a whole (FAW-VW Newspaper March, April, August, 1997). 
In the FAW-VW newspaper, a letter was addressed to all employees to ‘Strive 
to build the best joint venture in China’ to inspire the morale of its employees.
...we will work even harder to build the best joint venture in 
China in order to build for our country a modernized car 
manufacturing base and to make greater contribution to develop 
China's car industry... (p. 1)
Such an aspiration, becoming ‘the best joint venture in China’, was expressed 
in the simplest language. It takes its meanings from national objectives, from
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government policy and regulation, from scholars’ and commentators’ 
publications, and from managers’ speeches. It is through these diverse and 
heterogeneous bodies of expertise, including the government agents and 
agencies, scholars, economists, and experts within and outside FAW-VW, that 
different meanings are attached to it in different time periods. Such meanings 
include what is meant by ‘the best joint venture’, what aspects in which to be 
‘the best’, who are responsible, and what are the approaches required to realise 
such an aspiration. Until 2002, the interpretation accorded to ‘the best’ was that 
of ‘the best quality’. Competitiveness was equal to better quality and 
‘improving quality’ was regarded as the primary objective at FAW-VW.
In a speech entitled ‘Quality is the Life of Enterprises’ made in the workshop 
for firm leaders of FAW-VW, Mr Lu, the CEO of FAW-VW argued:
Quality is the life o f  our firm. To assure quality is the prime 
responsibility o f  our leaders ...To  keep competitive, we have to 
develop the habit o f quality improvement ...w e need to set up a 
quality responsibility system, monitor and supervise quality... 
(FAW-VW Newspaper, April 1997, p. 2)
At FAW-VW, the competitiveness was conceived as high quality.
...the competition between firms is similar to a war. The 
difference is that it is a war o f  quality. The only way to stand out 
is to improve quality... (FAW-VW Newspaper, April 1997, p. 2)
Quality is not seen as a static notion. It is defined as dynamic -  it needs to be 
continuously improved and everyone in the firm is responsible.
...Quality is not a singular or narrow concept. It needs to be 
constantly improved. It comes down to working quality o f  
individual employee. ... Each employee should concern with our 
product quality and realise how to improve the quality o f our 
work Only in this way can the product quality be constantly 
enhanced.... (FAW-VW Newspaper, April 1997, p. 2)
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2.3 Technologies to mobilise the pursuit of quality enhancement
Before the programme of quality enhancement started, the focal concern of 
FAW partners was with the production itself. When FAW-VW started its 
production in 1992, there were very few quality assurance procedures. In the 
process of ‘continuous quality improvement’, a number of modernised 
management accounting techniques were adopted at FAW-VW, out of which 
two main mechanisms can be identified, Quality Audit and the Enforcement of 
International Quality Standards. These two mechanisms together rendered 
operable, the notion o f ‘high quality’ and ‘continuous quality improvement’.
2.3.1 Quality Audit
Quality Audit is a systematic way of seeking quality inspection. It collects 
product quality condition information, identifies the conditions and reasons for 
defects, tracks the trend of quality parameters, follows actions to rectify defects, 
and eventually realises constant quality improvement (FAW Internal 
Document). The ultimate purpose of the Quality Audit is to examine and 
evaluate product quality from the standpoint of the most demanding customers. 
It makes the aspiration of high quality operable in the following two ways: 
through standardisation of quality and quality inspection; and the quantification 
of quality. (FAW-VW Newspaper, April 1997)
Standardisation
Quality Audit endows reality to the notion of high quality by standardising 
quality. It provides a benchmark against which products at different stages will 
be judged, analysed and compared. ‘High quality’ is not just an empty slogan. 
It was attached with a meaning, ‘meeting with the expectations of the most
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demanding customers and ensuring customers’ highest level of satisfaction’ 
(FAW-VW Newspaper, April 1997, July 1997, p. 2).
A Quality Audit standardises quality by defining what defects exist. It 
categorises possible defects into three levels, providing criteria for each type of 
defect and stipulating the actions which need to be taken for each type of defect 
(see the table below).
Table 3.1: Categories of Defects
Defect-A Defect-B Defect-C
Prime Defects Major Defects Minor Defects
Problems causing  custom ers to 
complain
-  Have fu n c tio n a l f a i lu r e s
-  Do not conform w ith  law
-  Might lead  to  break-down
-  Compromises on sa fe ty
-  p a r ts  m isplaced and m issing
D efects th a t s t r i c t  custom ers may 
complain
-  Have no major in f lu en ce  on 
fu n c tio n
-  Add c o s ts  to  the se rv ic e  of 
ca rs
-  Obvious appearance d e fec ts
Need to  remind
m anufacturing
d iv is io n :
-  Something wrong w ith  
the p roduction  process. 
Do not in f lu en ce
fnnr.tinn hut this mioht
Immediately analyse the production 
process. Find out the reasons and 
remove defects. Refurnish and re-pick 
parts. Document the case.
I f Analyse the reasons and remove | I Analyse the possibility o f 
I defects. Document the analysis and M  such defects turning into 
B9 the actions taken. H  defects A/B as well asH process capability
(Source: FAW-VW internal document)
Through the standardisation of quality, workers are clear about what level of 
performance they are expected to attain. This also leaves no discretion for 
individual workers or quality inspectors with regards to sub-standard 
performance and subsequent actions to be taken.
A Quality Audit not only standardises the understanding of quality, it also 
standardises the process of quality inspection. It turns the dispersed actions of
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quality inspections into a body of structured processes. Tables detailing 
technological standards to adopt during the audit as well as the general audit 
process charts are given below. The quality assurance actions are then free of 
any personal judgements of the section chief, quality inspector, plant managers 
and engineers. These employees become the executors of standardised 
processes.
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Division Finished Car Audit Process
QA-AP
QA-AP
QA-AP
qa-AP
CP
QA-PP
QA-CP
QA-AP
QA-CP
CP
QA-CP
Start
Drawa Car
Make monthly Audit Plan
Audit according to detailed standards
Does the car 
need to be 
repaired?
No Yes
No
Yes
NoYesShip the car Pass re-audit?
Rediack all cac intis batdi
Give daily comments; distribute reports to related parties; Improve
Enter the inspection results and daily audit report into computer.
Figure 3.1: Finished Car Audit Process (Source: FAW-VW internal document)
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Quantification
In the process of Quality Audit, not only is quality standardised, it is also 
quantified. A quantitative score is accorded to each audit subject after the daily 
Quality Audit. For each part, there is a standard score against which the 
awarded score at the end of each day is compared. The quantified scores of 
quality are integrated into weekly and monthly information, which is further 
analysed statistically. A score chart (see below) is also plotted. Such reports are 
made available to all related departments. The reason for substandard quality 
would be identified immediately and a particular division or post will be held 
responsible for rectifying performance scores to meet the standard.
1GD 823 105A Aussenblech-Frontklappe
3.2
3.0
2.8
2.6
CO
2.4
2.2
2.0
1.8
Figure 3.2: Illustration of Quality Audit Scores (Source: FAW-VW internal 
document)20
20 The green line in the graph is the standard. For any score higher than the standard, it suggests 
that the quality is substandard.
77
2.3.2 Enforcement of International Quality Systems (IS09000 and VDA 6 
Series)
In the process of conforming to IS0900021, quality management systems were 
re-engineered. To conform to ISO standards, FAW partners defined in detail the 
responsibility and role of each division and individual production line position. 
Documents were produced to clarify the working processes and to systemise 
operational activities. From the beginning, the ISO standards were given high 
priority. Conforming to these international standards was not only conceived as 
a way to ensure high quality standards but also as an opportunity to transform 
and modernise the then current state-owned way of managing. FAW 
management also put in great efforts to make sure that each employee took the 
enforcement of standards into their focal concern and to ensure all employees 
would carry out their daily job strictly according to the specifications formed 
under ISO standards.
The following quotations taken from FAW-VW Newspaper show that the 
enforcement was seen as a way of achieving efficient production with high 
quality.
...IS09000 standards control and prevent factors which have 
negative impact on the process o f production, formation and 
realisation o f  quality in order to decrease and eliminate defects.
In this way, the overall competitiveness o f the firm would be 
significantly increased.... (FAW-VW Newspaper, May 1997)
Handbooks containing detailed working processes as well as responsibilities 
and roles for each department and position were written and made available to 
employees and workers during the implementation of the ISO-based quality
21 ISO 9000 is a family of standards for quality management systems, set out by the Technical 
Committee of International Standardization Organization. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IS09000.
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standards. This information was believed to have strengthened the 
‘consciousness of quality’ by workers:
Enforcement o f ISO standards strengthens our quality 
consciousness. When faced with a problem we know to analyse 
the problem according to the system [IS09000 system] 
documents... Rate o f rejected products are reduced. The 
operation o f our workers is more standardised ... (Employee 
Interview, published in FAW-VW Newspaper, March 1998)
Moreover, the enforcement of international quality systems is seen as a way of 
turning the old-fashioned and inefficient management system under a planned 
economy into a modernised system.
...Strictly enforcing IS09000 serial standards is bound to 
modernise, standardise and routinise management system o f the 
firm. ... (FAW-VW Newspaper, May 1997)
A better way of maintaining machines was implemented under ISO 
standards to achieve high quality assuring capability.
With ISO standards our plant has turned the maintenance o f  
machines from passively maintaining to preventive and planned 
maintaining, enabling a virtuous cycle. In this way quality is 
greatly ensured. ... (Interview with a plant worker, Newspaper,
March 1998)
By improving product quality, ISO standards were believed by managers to 
eventually increase the competitiveness of the joint venture.
...ISO standards have been conceived as the basis o f ensuring 
the quality assuring capability o f a firm in the internal economic 
and technological cooperation. Therefore, enforcing IS09000 
standards has a significant influence on the competitiveness o f  
the firm. ... (FAW-VW Newspaper, July 1997)
The following quotation shows the effect of the enforcement.
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Enforcement to ISO and VDA quality standards builds a 
management system which enables continuous high quality 
production. Quality management in each plant has improved 
significantly. ... The fact that we managed Jetted2 remodelling 
in such a short time in the face o f  all types o f  quality problems 
and scored a 2.6 in the quality audit evaluation with the first 
batch o f 400 cars is a living proof o f  the benefits we enjoy by 
such enforcement [with international quality standards].... 
(FAW-VW Newspaper, March 1998)
The application of ISO standards is considered to be exploited to full advantage 
when each individual holds themselves responsible.
...every manager and every employee has to have the knowledge 
o f the responsibilities and specifications o f his/her post defined 
under IS09000. Everyone has to follow the provisions and 
specifications for their posts when doing their daily work We 
also need to double check for our own positions as well as 
others' positions, to see i f  any non-conformance with the ISO 
standards still exists.... We have to turn these [conforming to 
the provision and specification o f ISO standards] into conscious 
activities ... (FAW-VW Newspaper, November 1997)
All staff members were required to show responsibility and awareness of 
quality:
...Enforcement to ISO standards would turn 100% o f employees 
“master o f quality ”. ... when asked who is responsible for  
quality, managers or workers, engineers or guards would 
answer “me”  (FAW-VWNews paper, November 1997)
In this way, individual employees became actively involved in quality 
assurance and managing activities by simply carrying out what was defined in 
the systemised working process. As indicated above, from the establishment of 
FAW-VW until 2002, quality had been given the highest priority. Various 
techniques and strategies were developed and implemented to improve product 
quality. The firm was involved in both national and international certification
22 A model of car produced in FAW-VW
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programmes for the quality management system. Daily quantitative scores for 
quality were produced, the results summarised, and integrated weekly, monthly 
and annually, and analysed statistically. All decisions were made to conform to 
the central objective of improving and ensuring product quality. Complicated 
and lengthy VW product test processes, which exceeded the state standards 
regulated in China, were adopted to ensure high quality standards. The FAW 
partner complied with the quality terms set by the VW partner from the start of 
the joint venture until 2002. However, this quality centred control mechanism 
was revised from 2002.
3 Transition to cost oriented management
Since 2002, a new interpretation has been given to the idea of ‘being 
competitive’ within FAW-VW. Cost is now the focal issue in the control 
systems of the joint venture. Cost reduction is conceived as the primary force of 
competition and linked with the firm’s sustainable development and future 
survival. A big portion of the profits rely on the effectiveness of cost reduction. 
Each individual employee has to take the agenda of cost reduction seriously. 
Hundreds of thousands of proposals for cost reduction were made by employees 
across all hierarchical levels and departments within the firm. These proposals 
were evaluated and adopted based on the value of the savings by each proposal. 
‘Star employees’ who contributed to significant cost reduction levels were 
selected, publicised and rewarded monthly. The FAW partner also strove to 
replace parts originally imported from VW in Germany, with parts produced 
locally. Lengthy inspection processes to approve the replacements arising from 
cost reduction proposals or the localisation of parts, are no longer considered as 
a parade for high quality standards but as something ‘counterproductive’ that 
needs to be changed. The idea of cost replacing quality shaped the conceptions 
of employees’ priorities at FAW-VW. Tensions between FAW and their VW
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partner grew under the new programme, as cost had never replaced quality in 
the regime within which the VW partner operated.
To understand this transition, the following three issues will be considered. 
First, is how the temporary and fragile complex of relays and linkages that gave 
rise to the national and local concern of quality, was ruptured and subject to 
discontinuities in the face of China’s renewed membership of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and the resultant problematisation of the Chinese car 
industry in the face of this challenge. Second, relates to how new linkages were 
established between the national programme for developing the automobile 
industry, the local aspiration for competitiveness, and the new concern with 
cost. Third, is how the programme of cost reduction within the joint venture 
was made operable by mechanisms adopted within FAW-VW.
3.1 Re - problematising the car industry in the face of new challenges
To fully understand the transition of the quality-oriented management to a cost- 
focused management we need turn our attention first to events and discourses 
outside the boundary of the firm under study.
In 2002, China rejoined WTO. Around this time, various parties began to 
reconsider the car industry in terms of the future challenges brought by such a 
change. The car industry was considered as ‘one area that is the most 
susceptible to this change’ (Wei 2000). This issue was specific in the following 
two respects.
First, a series of protections (such as tariffs, quotas, and import restrictions) 
imposed by Chinese government in the past were to be removed. In this sense,
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prices of imported cars would drop significantly. Chinese car manufacturing 
enterprises including joint ventures would face more severe competition.
...After joining WTO, import tariffs on cars would be reduced 
from 80% in 2002 to 25% in 5 to 6 years time. ...Currently, 
prices o f cars in the international automobile markets are only 
1/3 or 1/4 o f those in Chinese markets. After tariffs decreased to 
25% from 80%, the prices o f imported cars, even with the tariff, 
would be much lower than those o f the same kind made in China.
While those imported cars have salient advantages in terms o f  
quality, design and safety. ... For those high value-added car 
manufacture (FAW for example), the pressure would be even 
higher. ... (Changchun Daily, May 13 2000)
In the following quotation from a magazine article, the intensified competition 
resulting from the removal of government protection, was described in this way:
After joining WTO, the Chinese market which was effectively 
closed by high tariffs and consumption policies would become 
part o f the world automobile market. Chinese car industry is 
about to lose its current tariff and non-tariff protection. ...
Import tariffs on whole cars would decrease from current 100% 
to 25% in 2006. Tariffs on most parts would decrease from 50% 
to 10% in 2006. In three years, the full distributorship would be 
accorded to foreign companies. ... (Liu 2000a)
Price was considered as the primary way in which imported cars competed with 
local cars.
Once joining WTO, Chinese car industry is about to be subject 
to the influence o f price factor. ... This is the primary way by 
which imported cars impact on national market.... (Wei 2000)
Second, joining the WTO would further open up the Chinese market. More 
international cooperation could develop between developed car producers and 
Chinese enterprises. This would intensify the competition of Chinese car maker
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already triggered by the removal of industrial protection previously imposed by 
the government.
In 2002, the cooperation between Chinese and foreign car 
manufacturers is so large-scale and deep that it is unparalleled 
in the development o f  Chinese car industry. For example, the 
joint venture between FAW group with Toyota after the joint 
reorganisation between FAW group with Tianjin Automobile; 
the joint ventures developed between Dongfeng Group with 
Citroen and Peugeot respectively; and the biggest cooperation 
so far is established between Dongfeng Group and Nissan 
Motor. ... (China Statisitcal Yearbook. 2003)
As the Chinese economy became more liberalised, most foreign car 
manufacturers, such as GM, Honda, Toyota, Hyundai, Citroen, Nissan, Peugeot, 
Chrysler, Mercedes and BMW, found partners in China23.
These two aspects intensified the overall competition in the Chinese car 
industry. In the face of this event, new links were formed between the 
aspiration of building a national car industry, the concern with cost, and 
different agents and agencies. The issue of quality was subsumed by that of cost, 
and became the primary challenge both at a national level and at the individual 
firm level.
3.2 New focus of cost reduction
After the Chinese car industry was problematised with regard to intensified 
competition, cost reduction was prioritised and regarded as the primary means 
by which local car producers could stand out in the competition.
23 Toyota formed a joint venture with FAW group. In total, FAW group has three joint ventures, 
FAW-VW, FAW-Toyota and FAW-Mazda.
Faced with the challenges, FAW-VW has to take the road o f  cost 
reduction, the only way for all Chinese car manufacturers....
(Liu 2000b)
In a local newspaper, this issue of reducing product cost was addressed as 
essential for the whole Chinese car industry.
Excessive costs are the primary reason fo r  the lack o f  
competitiveness for Chinese car manufacturers. ... Therefore, 
lowering the cost o f products is the most important task fo r  car 
producers. ... (Changchun Daily, May 13th 2000)
In the ‘Chinese Engineering Industry Statistical Yearbook 2002’, reducing 
selling prices was proposed as the way for car producers to compete.
The current price o f cars is too high ... Car manufacturing firms 
are encouraged to reduce costs in order to reduce selling 
prices. ... (Yu and Xu 2002)
In the following quotation, cost reduction activities were greatly encouraged.
Car producers need to strategically reduce costs ... in order to 
narrow the price difference [between imported cars and 
produced cars] before tariffs decreased to 25% ... (Wei 2000)
Corresponding to such external discourses, new meaning was ascribed to the
core strategy of FAW-VW by the management of the FAW partner. Cost
reduction, replaced the concern with quality, and was given a central place.
Cost has become the "first signal ” for each department and 
every employee. ... Cost reduction is a protracted and arduous
battle. The construction o f international competitive cost level
requires the joint efforts o f  all staff. ... For FAW-VW, this is
just a beginning o f a long journey. ... (FAW-VW Newspaper,
May 2005)
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The quotation below shows the intensity of the price competition in the Chinese 
car industry around 2003.
From January to September this year, there are 48 new models 
o f cars launched in the market. Over 80% o f Chinese-made cars 
have reduced prices once, and 16% have reduced prices twice.
The average price reduction is 9% while some products have 
decreased prices by 30% ... (FAW-VW Newspaper, October 
2003)
Cost reduction was regarded with much importance, as a significant portion of 
the net income depends on the effectiveness of cost reduction activities.
...every employee feels the pressure on their shoulder as every 
one o f them has to fight for cost reduction. ... In the first 10 
months o f this year, one third o f the income originatedfrom cost 
reduction. ... (FAW-VW Newspaper, October 2003)
In an interview, the CEO of FAW-VW stressed the importance of cost
reduction for the firm to remain competitive.
... now challenges and pressures are from the market. What we 
have to do is to translate the pressures into our firm. This is 
mainly by cost reduction. . . .In the past, FAW-VW had a high 
input. Prior to WTO, such high input can lead to high 
output/revenues. But now with more and more competitors and 
competitive products, profit margins are very thin. To maintain 
a reasonable margin and a sustainable development o f the firm, 
cost reduction is the only way. ... (An interview with the CEO of 
FAW-VW, Mr Qin published in China Trade News, December 
2003 and FAW-VW Newspaper, November 2003)
3.3 Cost reduction technologies
With the central role accorded to cost reduction, two mechanisms were adopted 
to make the idea of cost reduction operable. These two mechanisms were the
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cost reduction proposals collected from all employees in FAW-VW, and the 
localisation of parts originally imported from VW.
3.3.1 Cost reduction proposals
All employees in the firm were encouraged to make cost reduction proposals 
based on their expertise. Product department engineers could suggest changes 
concerning the design and material of cars so as to lower costs. Plant engineers 
and workers could make suggestions about operational procedures, techniques 
for operation, and production tools. Manufacturing departments could 
contribute to cost reduction by means of optimising transportation. Such 
proposals were expected from every staff member.
Moreover, an annual target of cost reduction was accorded to each division. 
This even became a part of the evaluation system
Based on the idea “Cost reduction is the first signal o f  the firm ”, 
management in Welding Plant requires each production line to 
embed the concept o f “cost saving” in each operation. ... In 
May this year, more than 2,400 cost reduction proposals were 
made to contribute to the overall target o f FAW-VW. .. (FAW- 
VW Newspaper, May 2003)
The best proposals for cost reduction were selected and rewarded on an annual 
basis. The news item below describes one such event.
On Sep 25th, the factory?4 nominated 10 best proposals for cost 
reduction. ... The proponents fo r  those top 10 proposals were 
awarded bonus and certificates by the CEO and Vice President
24 The factory in FAW-VW is a separate department as opposed to Department of Procurement, 
Department of Planning and so on. It consists of four plants: Press Workshop, Welding 
Workshop, Body Workshop and Assembly Workshop. It is through the production lines in 
these four workshops a car is produced and assembled.
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o f FAW-VW, Mr Qin and Mr Mi. ... In the first half o f  this year, 
employees in the factory made 17,629 pieces o f cost reduction 
proposals, 3.15 pieces per person on average. These proposals 
achieved a cost reduction o f RMB 59.82 million in total... ” 
(FAW-VW Newspaper, October 2003)
In another scenario, the Top 10 cost reduction proposals firm wide in 2003, 
were selected. The annual cost reductions obtained from those proposals ranged 
from RMB 180,000 to RMB 20 million. The proponents were rewarded and set 
as examples for the rest of the firm. (FAW-VW Newspaper, March 2004)
Below is an excerpt from an interview with an engineer from the Department of 
Product, in which he gave a description of the cost reduction proposal project 
undertaken in his department.
My group is under the project called “constant cost reduction 
proposal ”. We look at the structures o f different models o f cars 
and try to make suggestions o f cost reduction. For example, 
here this CD case originally comes with each Audi A6. Each 
costs 160 RMB. I f  you buy the same CD case here in China, 
each might cost 10 or 8 RMB. Cost wise we are able to save 
around 150RMB then we will have the marketing people to look 
into how much customers’ values are. Apparently in this case 
the cost saved is much higher than the benefits so we will 
suggest to deduct this item from the list to cut costs. ... Usually 
cost reduction decisions include much more complex technical 
evaluation. For example, originally we use a piece o f  metal tube 
fo r the air conditioning equipment in Jetta, we suggested to 
substitute it with a piece o f plastic tube. Then after the people 
from the product department after testing and experimenting 
decided that this has no influence on cars ’ performance, the 
changes will be formally put into effect. ... (FAW-VW 
engineering from Department of Product)
The overall effect of savings from the cost reduction proposals within each 
division is then compared with target set by the firm.
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The “Cost Reduction Proposal Project * o f  Department o f  
Product , after a whole year's efforts, has achieved cost 
reduction o f RMB251.4 million by 18th December 2003, over 
fulfilling the annual target o f RMB 250 million set by the firm... 
(FAW-VW Newspaper, April 2004)
The technology ‘Cost Reduction Proposals’ required all employees to think 
from the perspective of constant cost reduction in their daily operational work 
and to make proposals to refine the working process, re-select materials used in 
production, and innovate manufacturing techniques. Such a technique motivates 
individuals by implanting the idea of cost deeply in the minds of all staff within 
the joint venture.
In the following section I illustrate how together with such cost reduction 
proposals, the other mechanism ‘localisation of parts’ contributes to the 
implementation of cost oriented control.
3.3.2 Localisation of parts
Besides the cost reduction proposal project, the second attempt made by the 
FAW partner to reduce cost was the supply of parts originally imported, with 
parts produced within China. FAW-VW does not produce all the different parts 
required, but instead buys components from its suppliers and then assembles 
them in the FAW-VW factory. The VW partner when introducing a model into 
the Joint Venture will clearly state which parts must be purchased from the VW 
Group in Germany and which parts can be purchased from FAW suppliers in 
China. Apparently the prices charged by Chinese suppliers are much cheaper 
than those by VW. Attempts by the FAW partner to increase the percentage of 
local components can be dated from the establishment of the FAW-VW joint 
venture. In the past, localisation had been effected with the purpose of
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conforming to government regulations. Since around 2003, such localisation 
attempts have been referred to as ‘crazy localisation to achieve cost reduction’ 
(FAW-VW Newspaper, March 2003).1 This phrase is to show how committed 
FAW partner is towards the localisation programme.
Under this project of ‘crazy localisation’, targets for cost savings, expressed in 
monetary terms, are set for individual departments, such as the Purchasing 
Division and the Product Division. Employees in those divisions were then 
given targets to meet, against which their performance was evaluated (FAW- 
VW Internal Newspaper, 2004, 2005). These measures were designed to make 
individual employees align their activities with the firm’s cost reduction 
objective.
According to an engineer from the Procurement Department:
For CKD parts [components that must be imported from  
German VW], VW will purchase them from their suppliers and 
sell them to us for twice the price they pay. In the past w e’ve 
tried to purchase those parts directly from VW’s suppliers via 
their Chinese representatives. But now this is forbidden. ... Our 
purchasing team will have localization targets each year to 
increase the percentage o f components purchased from Chinese 
partners. ...
Managers at FAW-VW also seek to locally source key parts and increase the 
local content rate overall.
Under ‘Crazy Localisation P r o je c tF A W -V W  strives to 
increase both the width and depth o f  localisation. ‘Localise all 
parts that can be localised’. We need to increase the 
localisation rate from 60% to 80% for some models. ... Some
25 ‘Automobile Industrial Policy’ issued by the Chinese government in 1994 stipulated that in 
order to avoid a whole car tariff, cars produced within China have to achieve a localisation rate 
of 60%.
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core parts as well as special crafts and materials are also on 
schedule to be localised... (FAW-VW Newspaper, June 2005)
Such localisation requires approval from the German VW Technique 
Laboratory. The system applied in the VW Laboratory seems to be very 
complex which usually results in delays in the localisation attempt of the 
Chinese partner as well as delays in their cost-cutting effects.
This in the past was conceived as proof of high quality.
...when selecting a local producer for car parts ... the quality o f  
parts needs to be tested strictly according with German 
standards mostly in VW labs. ... For example, to test the 
durability o f safety belts, Chinese standard is to test no less than
35,000 times while the German standard is no less than 70,000. 
German standard also requires a dynamic test fo r the safety o f  
the seat belts while Chinese standards do not require this. Strict 
test standards and procedures ensure the high quality o f  
products ... (FAW-VW Newspaper, May 1998)
After embedding ideas of ‘cost reduction’ within the management system of 
FAW-VW, such testing systems are conceived as ‘needing changes’
An engineer from the Production Department remarked:
Almost all o f the components that are applied to be produced in 
China have to be sent to the VW Laboratory in Germany for  
testing. As these tests are usually not prioritised by the 
Laboratory, some o f these could take as long as 2 years to finish.
Even i f  we try to rush the engineers from Germany, it will still 
take as long as more than 1 year until we are able to cancel the 
order from VW. ...
... we need to speed up the certifying process from VW lab. ... It 
seems that the VW subsidiary in Beijing might take over some 
testing and certifying responsibility from the VW
headquarters. ... This will greatly help solve partially the
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problem o f current over long certifying cycle. ... (FAW-VW 
Newspaper, June 2005)
The transition from a quality oriented management mechanism to a cost 
focused management became more pronounced after 2002.
4 Conclusion and discussion
In this chapter, I have analysed the emergence of a quality oriented control 
mechanism and the transition to a cost containment focus within a car 
manufacturing joint venture in China, namely FAW-VW. This is effected by 
examining control changes within the complex of linkages and relays formed 
amidst rationales, discourses, national programmes, diverse bodies of expertise, 
and the shifting control focus at FAW-VW.
Since the establishment of the joint venture in 1991 to 2002, quality was 
prioritised during the daily operation of FAW-VW. The local aspiration of 
‘becoming the best car manufacturing joint venture* (FAW-VW Newspaper, 
August 1997) was linked to the national concern to build a car industry as ‘the 
pillar industry’ while ‘the best’ was interpreted as ‘the best in quality’ within 
FAW-VW. A number of calculative and non-calculative devices were adopted 
to operationalise the local agenda of quality enhancement. Around the year 
2000, the issue of China re-joining the WTO directed the attention of various 
parties towards China’s competitiveness. In the face of this, the Chinese car 
industry was re-problematised in relation to the severe competition local car 
manufacturers would likely experience. The concern with the ‘competitiveness’ 
of Chinese car manufacturing enterprises was subsequently translated into a 
new local agenda accentuating cost reduction from the year 2002. Cost 
reduction superseded high quality as a programme of intent and became the 
new focus of control at FAW-VW. Hundreds of thousands of ‘cost reduction
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proposals’ were collected from employees and implemented, while component 
parts that were originally imported from VW were replaced by cheaper 
components made locally. It is through these processes that the concern with 
cost reduction was made operable at FAW, entering the body politic of the 
employee.
This chapter has drawn upon certain concepts taken from the govemmentality 
literature (problematisation, programme and technology). This work mostly 
seeks to elaborate on the way in which socially legitimated authorities intervene 
in and act upon people’s lives (Foucault 1991a; Miller 1990; Miller 1991; 
Miller, et al. 2008; Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and O'Leary 1994b; Miller 
and O'Leary 2007; Miller and Rose 1990; Miller and Rose 2008; Rose and 
Miller 1992). The govemmentality literature can be applied to study what 
underpins certain facets of social and organisational lives. To understand the 
control dynamics in a Chinese joint venture, programmes and technologies 
between different levels are explored (Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and 
O'Leary 1994b). The govemmentality literature is valuable to the analysis in a 
number of ways.
First, applying such a framework allows the analysis to focus away from the 
notion of boundaries around the joint venture. The ‘context presupposing 
control mechanisms’ contingency theory, for example, would not allow the 
capture of the complex and intricate nature of conceptualising the extensive 
contingencies which help us conceptualise the firm: ‘...there is no “outside” or 
“inside” to such attempts to create reality. There are simply ways of 
problematising...’ (Miller and O'Leary 1994b: p. 123). The govemmentality 
literature allows the simple aspiration of a local car manufacturer to become the 
best joint venture at a micro level, to be connected to the national discourses at 
the macro level. The examination of the connections between national 
rationales and the control elements within FAW-VW illustrates how various
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forces came together to enable the transformations of control foci within the 
joint venture.
Second, by examining the linkages formed between discourses, national 
concerns of competitiveness in the car industry and local control mechanisms in 
the joint venture, the govemmentality framework helps us to elaborate why, and 
how, certain arrangements of the VW partner which were acceptable to, and 
welcomed by the FAW partner, at one point in time, led to increased tension 
and became the centre of conflict at another. The temporary agreement and 
peaceful cooperation between the two partners cannot be fully conceived from 
strategic considerations. Instead, temporary balances of power between the two 
partners are more likely to be associated with certain mechanisms and 
technologies i.e. the technologies of one partner (VW’s high standard quality 
control mechanisms) resonating with the programmes of another partner 
(FAW’s programme of building a modernised factory with internal 
competitiveness). Once the programme of FAW evolved and was infused with 
new meaning as the new issue was problematised by a multiplicity of agents 
and agencies, particular mechanisms would appear to be incongruent with the 
new agenda of FAW. As such, different programmes have been adopted by the 
partners alongside different sets of techniques. The harmony that initially 
prevailed, dissociated and tensions between the two partners emerged.
Third, the govemmentality framework helps to explain how heterogeneous 
mechanisms rendered different programmes of FAW-VW operable. It is 
through these calculative and non-calculative technologies that partners are able 
to institutionalise and normalise the conduct and aspirations of employees. The 
study also shows how the techniques such as reports of quantified quality, or 
quantified assessment of cost saving of individual employee serve to transform 
employees into ‘governable individuals. In the case under study, the new 
programme (cost reduction) superseding the old agenda of the FAW partner
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(quality enforcement) does not imply that the prior balance is completely 
removed from the firm’s consideration. Shifting programmes upheld by the two 
partners can coexist at the firm level. Heterogeneous technologies are then 
adopted to enable interventions and alter employees’ conduct, which results in a 
high level of struggle between employees from the two partners and senior 
management, as well as the making of confrontational decisions. The 
govemmentality framework enables us to understand these conflicting actions 
and decisions.
The chapter suggests the emergence of a particular rationale and force of 
change and how this was subsequently reshaped, leading to new tensions and 
dynamics. The framework is less directed at explaining the institutional usage 
and political deployment of such rationality, but instead examines the 
conditioning factors of the conflicts and struggles between employees and 
managers of the two partners, as well as the contradictory decisions made by 
them. The next chapter will continue to examine the usage and implementation 
of the control elements highlighted in this chapter by seeking to capture the 
tension between the two partners and the subsequent actions taken by each at a 
micro-level, and the rationales underlying the manner in which accounting 
controls were deployed in the context of such tensions.
95
Chapter 4 Symbol and Technical Rationality as 
Strategy: The Political Dynamics of Control at 
FAW-VW
1 Introduction
... They [the Chinese employees] have a problem. They look at 
what Audi is doing and what VW is doing. Then they copy that, 
and it is like some fakes in the market. Outside it looks the same.
But inside it is empty because they only copy the outlook o f the 
function but not the function. It looks the same but it doesn’t 
work in the same way. ... (German engineer in Planning 
Department)
This chapter discusses the institutional pressures faced by the two partners and 
how the control mechanisms are shaped and reformed by such institutional 
pressures. It is argued that in the joint venture under study, institutional forces, 
whether instrumentalised managerially or whether symbolically decoupled from 
daily operational activities, are not solely sourced from outside forces but are 
themselves produced within the joint venture and exerted as a means to attain 
more control. The new institutionalism literature has not addressed the question 
of control dynamics in this manner, where legitimacy and the rational 
deployment of information are used in control settings.
In the past 20 years, most interpretive studies in accounting focus on how 
accounting, as a social and institutional practice, ramifies, extends and shapes 
the social environment in which it is embedded (Ahrens and Chapman 2007; 
Burchell, et al. 1985; Hopwood and Miller 1994; Miller and O'Leary 1994a; 
Miller and O'Leary 1994b; Miller and Rose 1990; Miller and Rose 2008). 
Miller (1994) summarises three distinct aspects of accounting as social and 
institutional practice: the first angle is that accounting acts as a technology that
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acts upon activities, individuals and objects; the second focus is that accounting 
rationales come to constitute truth under which organisations are remade, 
processes are reconfigured and individuals’ identities are redefined; the third 
aspect attends to the ways ‘in which the economic domain is constituted and 
reconstituted by the changing calculative practices that provide a knowledge of 
it’ (p. 1-3). Most interpretive research in accounting can be categorised into 
these three aspects, and contribute to the understanding that accounting cannot 
be interpreted without taking into consideration the context in which it is 
implicated.
However, this strand of research only attends to accounting in one social 
context that is constituted by actors who are of the same ethnic origin and who 
are subject to the same national culture. Though studies show how subcultures 
of an organisation are constituted in control practices that enable actors to 
pursue diverse objectives related to their subcultural origins (Ahrens and 
Mollona 2007), there is still only one social and institutional context from 
which the subcultures originated, and in which they are embedded. 
Nevertheless in international joint ventures where the partners are from 
different countries and are united by their strategic aspirations, there exist 
multi- institutional contexts to which different systems of symbolism and 
meanings are implicated. This chapter aims to elaborate on the way in which 
control mechanisms emerge from and shape multiple sets of contextual 
environments. Most importantly, this chapter traces the way in which 
institutional factors, not solely originating externally of the contextual 
environment, are produced politically by one partner to exert control over the 
other party. This is realised by studying the control system in one Chinese- 
German joint venture FAW-VW.
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2 New Institutionalism: FAW-VW Automobile
Interviews with members of each party to the joint venture shed light on the 
different ways of thinking exhibited by the partners. An IT specialist from VW 
who had worked at FAW-VW for a 3-year term and asked to come back to 
FAW-VW before his retirement, commented that the difference between 
German and Chinese employees pertain to the way in which decisions are made 
and carried out:
...To get to the decision to get things started takes maybe five 
times longer than in Germany. But once the decision is done the 
work itself is done five times faster than in Germany... (VW IT 
specialist)
Furthermore, he identified what he called three ‘core differences’ in work values 
between employees from the two parties:
I  can think o f three (differences from VW) one is the lack o f  
responsibility... Second one is that people tend to do wrong 
things even when they know these are wrong.... Third is the 
importance o f the complicated network — Guartxi here ... (VW 
IT Specialist)
Another manager who works at the Control Division at FAW-VW and is from 
Audi Germany also concerns the distinct values employees from FAW seem to 
share:
They (FAW employees) become very self-conscious, in my 
opinion, sometimes too much. People think that they could do 
everything. This is also something from the system. The higher 
management level believes that the Chinese employees have to 
learn and do everything by ourselves... (VW control manager)
Employees from FAW also find the ways in which tasks are undertaken, as well
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as values attached to operational work, quite dissimilar from theirs. One FAW 
manager in the Cost Division commented on the comparative advantages of 
work done by employees from the two partners.
...The advantage o f German employees is that they are very 
strict -  they follow the processes step by step. While the 
advantage o f  Chinese employees is that they are very flexible but 
they tend to be so clever that they take shortcuts. So it is the best 
to combine the preciseness o f  Germany and the flexibility o f  
Chinese.... (FAW Cost Manager)
One FAW middle manager from the Procurement Department also expressed 
his opinion on the inflexibility of VW employees.
... Germans are very strict -  in a meeting i f  you are explaining 
something to them, they will understand you even i f  you miss one 
step in between... (FAW Purchasing Manager)
An FAW quality engineer observes the different concerns with quality between 
the two partners:
...but they (VW employees) are too meticulous which is very 
costly. We have very different calculations fo r  quality cost ...
(FAW employee in Quality Assurance Department)
From the above statements it is suggested that the two groups -  FAW 
employees and VW employees -  are implicated in two sets of coherent and 
smooth, social and institutional environments.
Accounting in any single context originates from, and exerts influence upon, 
the two sets of social environments. The relationship can be viewed in two 
respects: first, the conflicts and compromises between the two contexts give 
rise to the unique control system adopted in the joint venture. Second, the 
rationalities imposed on each partner, as institutional factors are adopted
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politically, are a way to obtain more control and power over the other partner.
DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) identify three mechanisms through which 
institutional isomorphic change occurs: coercive isomorphism, mimetic 
isomorphism, and normative isomorphism. Adopting the above concepts from 
new institutional studies, this chapter does not attempt to imply that the control 
mechanisms at FAW-VW, to any extent, are sympathetic with those in any 
other firm. Notions, including coercive/mimetic/ normative isomorphism, are 
introduced to amplify the type of institutional forces to which actors are 
subjected. The focus here is on the manner in which institutional factors act on 
agencies and shape the control mechanisms.
Coercive isomorphism is defined as:
Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal 
pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon 
which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the 
society within which organizations function. Such pressures may 
be fe lt as force, as persuasion, or as invitations to join in 
collusion. In some circumstances, organizational change is a 
direct response to government mandate, (p. 67)
To a degree, coercive institutional forces are observable inside FAW-VW. The 
Chinese government has attempted to increase the international competitiveness 
of its enterprises by encouraging all companies to adopt ISO series standards. 
FAW-VW under pressures both from the Chinese government and industry 
competition, obtained ISO 9001 Quality System Certification in 1998. In 2002, 
the joint venture company passed the ISO9001:2002 standard certification, as 
well as the ISO14001 environmental control certification. During this process, 
FAW-VW redesigned the whole organisational system, redefined the functions 
and responsibilities of each department and position: ‘The way that the 
organisation operates is completely different after the adoption of the ISO 
standard’, commented an engineer who has worked in the organisation for more
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than 15 years.
However it is not necessarily the case that coercive force will bring out deep 
and extensive changes within the company. For example, every launch of a new 
model of car needs approval from the Chinese government. FAW-VW prepares 
a feasibility report that includes market research, technology feasibility, and net 
present value analysis. However, the report is completely decoupled from the 
actual activities. The net present value analysis is not technically properly 
executed. An incremental cost analysis perspective is not deployed. Therefore 
even though FAW-VW employs these management tools, actual 
operationalisation is mainly ceremonial.
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) define mimetic isomorphism as:
...not all institutional isomorphism, however, derives from 
coercive authority. Uncertainty is also a powerful force that 
encourages imitation. When organizational technologies are 
poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the 
environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may 
model themselves on other organizations, (p. 69)
FAW-VW shows signs of being subjected to mimetic institutional force, as VW 
employees are regarded as possessing more knowledge and expertises in the 
area of product design, quality assurance, manufacturing, and financial control. 
This viewpoint is shared among employees from both partners and inspires 
learning and imitating VW practices by FAW employees, no matter whether 
such an imitation is firmly instrumentalised, or simply followed to signify 
legitimacy.
For instance, when the Chinese partner encounters problems they tend to 
imitate what the German partner would do. This was commented on by a 
German engineer in Planning.
101
...they [the Chinese employees] have a problem. They look at 
what Audi is doing and what VW is doing. Then they copy that, 
and it is like some fakes outside in the market. Outside it looks 
the same. But inside it is empty because they only copy the 
looking o f the function but not the function. It looks alike but it 
doesn't work alike. ... They look at how we solve it when they 
have the same problem. Then they try to copy it. Here you only 
have it as black or white no grey. In Germany we say we have to 
look out i f  this is the better way, or i f  that is the better way. But 
the copy here is always extreme.
Another comment made by a middle level FAW manager in the Control 
Division suggests the implication that the VW control system has on the control 
mechanism of the joint venture:
VW has a very advanced financial control system. We can learn 
a lot by working under the German CFO. ... (FAWmanager in 
the Control department)
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) noted that:
A third source o f isomorphic organizational change is normative 
and stems primarily from professionalisation. (p. 70)
In the joint venture under study, the way in which normative institutional forces 
shaped control mechanisms can be shown in the following ways. One instance 
is that of the VW engineers and managers who, by working in FAW-VW, bring 
to the joint venture company advanced technologies and management control 
systems. This resulted in a control structure in the JV more like that of the 
German partners:
When my Chinese partner came to work, he knew nothing about 
production. I  had to teach him from zero... (VW manager in 
Assembly Workshop)
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FAW employees rely on the specialties and knowledge of VW’s expatriates in 
their work:
We respect the German expatriates' opinions. They know more 
about quality and technologies. ... (FAW engineer in Quality 
Department)
Overall, the professional networks that span FAW, Audi and VW, enable the 
knowledge of quality and control to diffuse from the German partners to the 
joint venture.
Another instance of the control of FAW-VW being shaped by normative 
institutional forces is that the Chinese partner hired a consulting firm to re­
structure its management system. The new management tools resulting from 
this included a categorisation of positions. FAW-VW categorised all positions 
into 8 bands according to relative importance of the positions. The employees 
were then paid accordingly. However these procedures were decoupled from 
daily practices as indicated by some of interview quotations:
I  am not sure which band my position belongs to. ... I  don't 
really care about it. ... I  don’t see how it is different now... 
basically this is just a state-owned company... (junior engineer)
It is also made clear that no obvious changes in the incomes of employees were 
observed after the adoption of the management techniques:
After applying the new position categorization, it seems that 
everyone's incomes all increased. Overall there is hardly any 
change at all. ... (Employee in Plant 1)
From the above quotations, it is indicated that the change in the compensation 
scheme did not attempt to change the employee mentality and failed to link 
performance with pay.
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The above three types of isomorphism give some insights into forces that 
shaped controls at FAW-VW. But they did not address forces determining the 
control dynamics in the organisation. The dynamic shaping of controls seems to 
be determined by the negotiated activities of the two partners as well as other 
factors.
3 Unveil the technical world’
The above application of the institutionalist approach to examining this study’s 
data indicates the potential for this perspective and suggests that the limitation 
of the existing theoretical perspectives used to investigate alliance controls. 
They do not inform us as to the dynamics of control development, as the 
‘institutional pressures’ framework adopted above conceives the actors as being 
passively subjected to institutions and norms which are shaped and transformed 
externally from their social embeddings and exerting on actors from outside. 
Such a one-way theorising of the empirical data from the joint venture can only 
partially be explained. The presumption of institutional pressures being simply 
imposed from outside the joint venture, does not allow us to capture the tension 
between the two partners; tensions that are characterised by conflicts and 
compromises, interference and resistance, autonomy and frictions of the two 
sets of actors. In the following section, I will first examine the tensions between 
the FAW and the VW partners involved in the joint venture, and then explore 
how these tensions interface between the symbolic and rationalities.
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3.1 Demarcation between technical and institutional practices
Early new institutionalism studies regarded institutional pressures and norms 
only as existing in and apply to institutional environments, such as schools and 
hospitals, as actors in such contexts rely more on institutions and norms than 
rationality in terms of decision making and legitimacy seeking (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983; Scott 1992b; Tobert and Zucker 1983). It is argued that in a 
‘technical’ environment, effectiveness and efficiency is the driver for decision 
making while in an institutional environment it is the rules and norms that 
receive support and legitimacy (Scott and Meyer 1992). Although it is 
recognised by many neo-institutionalists that the institutional and technical 
environments of organisations are intertwined, the distinction between 
‘technical’ and ‘institutional’ is still prominent (Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997; 
Lounsbury 2008; Palmer, et al. 1995; Palmer, et al. 1993; Strange and Soule 
1998; Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001). The following definitions of the 
institutional and technical environment are borrowed to illustrate a neo­
institutionalist’s view on this demarcation.
Scott and Meyer (1992) defines institutional elements as
Institutional sectors are characterized by the elaboration o f  
rules and requirements to which individual organizations must 
conform i f  they are to receive support and legitimacy from the 
environment, (p. 140)
Conversely, technical elements are defined as:
Technical sectors are those within which a product or service is 
exchanged in a market such that organizations are rewarded for  
effective and efficient control o f the work process, (p. 140)
105
In the following section, I elaborate on an examination of the three main 
arguments of conflicts (‘Quality’ and ‘Cost’ Argument; ‘Personnel Rotation’ 
Argument; and ‘Two-culture Interaction’ Argument) captured by my empirical 
data to show that what appear to be “pure technical reasoning” is not entirely 
rational when exploring the instance of aroused tensions against its backdrop of 
social and institution contexts.
3.2 Conflict I: ‘Cost’ and ‘Quality’ Argument
The most prominent conflict observed at FAW-VW is the ‘cost’ versus 
‘quality’ argument between the two partners. Since around 2002, the FAW 
partner attempted to cut product costs in different ways, with ‘localisation’ and 
‘cost reduction proposals’ being the two focal mechanisms. This arose through 
the VW partner’s significant concern with quality, as it was argued that such 
cost reduction techniques would cause unwanted consequences to production 
quality. In the next section I will examine closely the arguments put forward 
under each of the cost reduction techniques and suggest that such arguments are 
deployed technically and symbolically to vie for control by the two partners.
3.2.1 Localisation
FAW-VW does not produce all the different parts required for its vehicle 
production, but instead sources all components from external suppliers and then 
assembles them within the FAW-VW factory. The German partner when 
introducing a model into FAW-VW will clearly state which parts must be 
purchased from the VW Group in Germany, and which parts can be purchased 
from Chinese suppliers in China. The prices charged by Chinese suppliers are 
reported to be much less than the prices for VW sourced components. Therefore,
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increasing the percentage of localised components is a commercially viable 
approach for the Chinese partner. However such ‘localisation’ requires approval 
from the German VW Technique Laboratory. The approval system applied in 
the VW Laboratory seems to be very complex which usually results in lengthy 
delays, thwarting the localisation attempts of the Chinese partner, as well as 
impacting their cost-cutting goals .
An employee from the Management Division commented:
... The more localised parts you purchase or the quicker you can 
realise parts localisation, the more interest VW will be losing.
VW first makes money for the sales o f  car where the two 
partners are sharing the interest based on their equity in the firm  
- F A W  60% and VW 40%. Then VW is also making money by 
selling parts to FAW-VW. The more parts we import from VW, 
the more money VW is making. ... One o f  the most important 
part o f  the Localisation process o f  car components involves VW 
Technique Laboratory. ...the right to confirm whether this is 
alright belongs to VW Germany originally. They have the right 
and they tend to say that the parts produced in China are not 
good and reliable enough to be used in their cars. ...
It was made clear with the above quotation that VW partners would lose part of 
their economic interest and the control over the production that they gained 
through their monopoly of technology, as the localisation rate at FAW-VW 
increased. As a result, delaying the process of localisation at FAW-VW served 
VW’s best interests. This denial or delay of the localisation projects of the 
FAW partner was justified strategically by the concern with quality of the VW 
partner as further indicated in the quotation below.
Most importantly, this process could take a long time. Firstly, it 
takes time for the parts produced here to be transported to 
Germany. Then there is a long queue for the tests. You do not 
have priority there -  the laboratory has a lot o f  other tests to
26 More evidence relevant to the localisation project can be found in 4.3.2 in Chapter 3
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perform. Thirdly, after the test, i f  the parts are approved, it takes 
a long time for them to pass us the news. I f  they are not 
approved, it takes even longer to obtain the information. Then 
you have to re-choose the local factory, re-design, re-produce 
and ship the parts to VW again... (An Employee in Management 
Department)
The above illustrates one part of the ‘Cost’ versus ‘Quality’ argument between 
the two partners which permeates FAW-VW. With the FAW partner trying to 
source parts required for production from local suppliers, VW appeared to delay 
the process of localisation and set very high quality standards which the locally 
produced parts had to meet before the localisation could be approved by the 
VW partner. According to the demarcation between ‘technical’ and 
‘institutional’, such a conflict may be interpreted as technical, as both parties 
were adopting technical rationales for their arguments: the FAW partner was 
trying to cut costs in a competitive market, while the VW partner who 
considered quality as essential and primary did not wish to allow sub-standard 
parts to be used in their cars. This is only one aspect of the ‘cost’ (FAW) versus 
‘quality’ (VW) argument between the two partners. Such commercial collision 
is further manifested in the next sections:
3.2.2 Cost reduction proposals
From 2003, the FAW partner started a cost cutting project, Cost Reduction 
Proposals, which required all its employees, whatever division they belonged to 
and in whatever hierarchical ranks they were categorised, to make cost 
reduction proposals based on their expertise. Product department engineers 
could suggest changes concerning the design and material of cars so as to lower 
costs. Plant engineers and production workers could make suggestions about 
the operational procedures, techniques for operations, and production tools. The 
manufacturing department contributed to cost reduction by proposing the means
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to optimise transportation27.
In most of the cases such proposals commanded a higher level of technological 
knowledge. The same engineer in the Production Division further commented:
Usually cost reduction decisions include much more complex 
technical evaluation. For another example, we changed the 
intake tube in Jetta from metal to plastic. Based on an annual 
manufacturing volume o f 100,000, such a change will decrease 
the cost by 3 million RMB. ... Such innovative ideas usually 
come from all employees in FAW-VW;
Moreover, a German manager in the body shop expressed his dissatisfaction 
about the FAW partner’s neglect of quality:
Chinese managers do not care too much about quality. In the 
beginning we had 2 groups o f  workers working 12 hours a shift. 
According to the Chinese manager, workers like this 
arrangement because they will be able to make more money to 
support their families. But the daily quality indicators looked 
terrible. So I  forced him to change the arrangement to 3 groups 
o f workers working 8 hours each. The quality after this change 
improved to a satisfactory level.
Such constant endeavour for cost reduction from the FAW partner became a 
source of disagreement and conflict. Another instance of such a collision at 
FAW-VW in terms of the cost reducing endeavours of the FAW partner, and 
quality concerns of the VW partner, is shown below:
The joint venture has two manufacturing plants. The two plants employ around
10,000 workers in total. However, only 60% of these 10,000 workers are formal 
employees. Take Plant 1 for example: there are 7708 workers, only 58% of 
which are formal permanent employees (4448). The rest include 2770
27 For more evidence regarding the cost reduction proposal project, please refer to 4.3.1 in 
Chapter 4.
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temporary workers and 490 interns. For temporary workers, FAW-VW pays 
much lower wages and does not need to cover the social insurance, pensions 
and other social welfare benefits. The Chinese partner apparently has its own 
strategic considerations in choosing such a worker profile, according to the 
assistant manager of Plant 1.
FAW-VW by choosing such a worker structure [very high 
proportion o f temporary workers] has its own considerations.
Such an action will save the company a large amount o f  money 
in labour cost every year. While the formal workers may have a 
base salary o f  4000- 5000 RMB, the temporary workers by 
performing the same task only earn 2000-2500 RMB, let alone 
the money saved in social insurance and pensions the company 
needs to pay.
When asked whether this can lead to a high turnover in the work force or 
influence manufacturing unfavourably, the manager noted that:
Yes, this is unavoidable. This might have some impact on the 
production, but o f course this has been taken into consideration 
when such a decision is made.
There is a very high turnover of the workers. The data obtained from the 
interview showed that in Plant 1, workers who have worked in FAW-VW for 
more than 6 years comprise only 4.49% of the total number of workers, while 
56.45% have worked less than one year. However, the time to train a worker to 
operate independently could last as long as 3-6 months dependent upon 
different workshops. According to the German manager, such a configuration 
has decreased efficiency and quality to a substantial extent:
We are not happy with their attitudes concerning quality at all.
They [Chinese managers] hire too many temporary workers who 
have a very high mobility rate. By the time we finish training 
them, they leave maybe due to some family issues or maybe 
because they find a better paid job. This has a big influence on
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quality. I f  you look at the relationship between working years 
and quality level the workers are able to achieve, usually the 
longer you work, the more efficient you are and the higher the 
quality is. We’ve tried to persuade them but we can *t overrule 
their decisions in this case.
The above conflict between FAW’s cost reduction endeavours and VW’s 
quality concerns may appear to be simply a technical interaction between cost 
and quality arguments. However after examining closely the social and 
institutional context in which each partner is embedded, it is argued that 
technical rationales are used strategically by each partner to expand their 
control over FAW-VW.
In the previous chapter, Chapter 3, it has been argued that from the start of the 
FAW-VW joint venture to 2002, a quality oriented control mechanism was 
adopted at FAW-VW while after 2002, cost replacing quality rapidly and 
abruptly became a focal issue in the overall management system. The swift 
change of control focus from quality enhancement to cost reduction for FAW 
managers can not be simply interpreted as a technical consideration in a highly 
competitive market. The govemmentality framework helps to link the transition 
of control focus of the FAW partner from ‘quality’ to ‘cost’ by identifying 
wider shifts in associated rationales, discourses, national programmes, and 
diverse bodies of expertise. For the VW partner, the amplification of quality is 
not simply a technical consideration either. The transition to a cost focus with 
mechanisms including localisation and cost reduction proposals, rendered part 
of the exclusive expertise of the VW partner potentially useless, depriving them 
of their monopoly power over the products, and to some extent, weakened their 
power to control the joint venture as well as the ability to further benefit 
financially. Hence, the amplification of quality, the high quality standards set 
by VW, and the complicated processes for approving localisation proposals, are 
more likely to reflect the rational use of economic argument to impose more 
control over the other party (FAW partner). In a way, symbols of cost and
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quality go back and forth to exert control over the joint venture and each other. 
Control rationales are used as a guise for control by the partners - they signal 
the need for adherence to technical standards in the absence of commitment by 
either party to the legitimacy of their technical rationality.
Another illustration of this in the joint venture is the VW concern with the 
periodical rotation of FAW managers.
3.3 Conflict II: ‘Personnel Rotation’ Argument
In the joint venture the managers are rotated on a frequent basis. There is an 
informal policy in the company that the junior managers will be transferred to a 
different position every 2 years and senior managers every 4 years. The senior 
managers will even be re-allocated to other companies within the FAW group. 
The reasoning that the FAW partner provides to legitimise such an informal 
policy is that the all-embracing experiences that the managers have will develop 
their potential capacity and improve their performance. Such policy, as claimed 
by VW managers, impedes the effectiveness and efficiency of their work. The 
frequent change of the FAW managers, sometimes, even the interpreters, whom 
German managers work with, constantly challenge German managers’ daily 
work.
According to a German manager in the manufacturing plant:
...My Chinese partner was changed overnight. When I  began to 
work with him, he had no knowledge in this area at all. I  have to 
teach him from beginning. Then suddenly one day they wanted to 
transfer him to some other place, and they didn *t ask my opinion 
before they make such a decision. Then he was gone in one day.
Usually in Germany you will use two weeks to train your 
successor. But here when the new manager came, the old one
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was already gone. So I  have to start training him all over again.
One IT specialist was on his second visit and was complaining that all the staff 
he used to work with were gone.
...on my last visit, my colleagues and I  had worked hard to train 
the people in this department [IT department], but now almost 
all o f them are gone. I  have to start working with some people 
who know nothing again. ...
Another example given by a German manager in Planning:
I ’ve experienced that HR department changes jobs o f people 
every, don’t know maybe 2 years puts people which are 
experienced and learned special things with a big effort, takes 
them from this place to another where they don ’t have any skill 
about that and put new people there and they don’t have skills 
fo r this job.
A German manager in body shop explained how he struggled to keep his 
interpreter:
...in this company, they will change employees to other places.
Once they [HR department] decided to change my interpreter. I  
can’t accept that as she is not just an interpreter, she knows so 
many things by now. She makes my work easier. ...
Another German manager also confirms the interference on his operational 
work by such frequent personnel mobilisation as follows:
Three years ago we had a training campaign in Germany we 
educated 25 workers with a lot o f effort in Germany. A lot o f  
German colleagues came to here to train these people with 
special skills car electronics. None o f  these 25 guys is on his job 
now. They are all removed by HR department. Other colleagues 
are on this job but they cannot do it. So we have a lot o f trouble
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in production because people cannot do their work
The above can be interpreted again as technical conflict between FAW’s 
attempt to cultivate ‘comprehensive’ high quality management with 
experiences in different divisions, and VW’s motive to perform their jobs more 
effectively and efficiently by working with managers who have past experience 
and with whom they have worked. However such interface of technical 
rationalities cannot be taken at face value. I argue here that the rational conflict 
portrayed above again is the symbolic usage of economic rationalities in order 
to secure better control.
From the perspective of the FAW partner, other aspects of the consequences of 
the rotation policy for FAW managers, beyond the importance of experiences in 
different departments, have to be taken into account. First, as the managers only 
work in one position for no more than 4 years, and in some cases they do not 
even know how long they will continue to work for FAW-VW, their 
commitment to the job will be discounted and they will tend to make short­
sighted decisions. Second, as the decisions about transfers are made by HR 
departments of FAW-VW and FAW, who have little knowledge about the 
constitution of the technical jobs and their requirements, the managers could be 
transferred to a position where their previous experiences are of little use. Third, 
there have been several cases where managers have been transferred to some 
companies or positions that are less important or less well-paid than the ones 
they used to work for, before choosing to quit and take their experience to 
private companies. Therefore it is argued that this frequent reallocation of 
managers within the FAW group has a strong institutional footing . This is to 
highlight the control of FAW over the joint venture. As for VW managers, the 
economic rationalities are used politically to signal their dissatisfaction with 
their lack of control in this area. Again, the symbolic usage of rationalities goes
28 This issue is further addressed in Chapter 5.
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back and forth between the two partners and serves the ultimate purpose of 
exerting and legitimating control.
3.4 Conflict III: ‘Two-Culture Interactions’
In this section, I will further illustrate how rational reasoning coexists with 
symbolic adoption of control mechanisms by examining the third pervasive 
conflict in the joint venture: the abrasions between the different cultures and 
work ethics of FAW and VW employees.
During my stay at FAW-VW, almost all German managers complained about 
the different work cultures of their Chinese co-workers:
Here [FAW-VW]people's loyalty is not high enough, I  don't know. 
They are more worried about themselves. But when I  ask them to do 
some work, they say that this is not my responsibility, and that's it. ... 
In order to get them to work, I  have to say please do this job, i f  
anything goes wrong I  will be responsible for that. ... (VW Manager 
in Department of Planning)
An IT specialist commented:
... [when asked to do work] the first thing people ask is “is this my 
job or is it anyone else's job. I f  it is not my job I  will do nothing but I  
will not say that I  will do nothing. ...Here sometimes something must 
be told to be done. I f  not it is not done for days. Then suddenly they 
are told that i f  it is not done by tomorrow morning we have a 
problem. Then some thing happens overnight. When you come in the 
morning you will find things are done. This is the interesting thing in 
this country.
A FAW manager in the Control Department remarked:
German managers tend to think very formally. To work with them
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you have to explain every bit o f the details. I f  you miss one step in 
between, they will stop you and you have to start all over again. ...
The above comments exemplify the manner in which economic rationales are 
interfaced with the symbolic between the two partners. For FAW partners, the 
use of a loose responsibility system allows them to reject any requests from 
VW partners that are deemed as unreasonable or unfavourable on their behalf. 
Such an arrangement gives FAW managers the flexibility to impose more 
control on their own personnel. Therefore, the political adoption of rationales 
(such as job responsibilities) by the FAW partners is used to signal the 
legitimacy of autonomy when control is imposed by the VW partners. Hence 
for VW managers to successfully implement control, accounting serves the 
symbolic means by which to exercise control. As shown in the quotations 
below, VW managers seek to orchestrate their control on the joint venture 
company by their meticulous request of information via the tight accounting 
systems (such as the budget and ERP system) imposed:
Everything you do, every single cost that is incurred in this 
company has to be based on a certain budget. All the 
reimbursement applications and purchasing orders are 
processed within the system. We do not have any paper 
documents. ... The budgets are made based on historical data 
allowing for the need o f  our future development. For example, i f  
this year's output volume is not different from the one for last 
year, then most o f the costs have to be maintained at the same 
level as that o f last year, or even lower. (FAW manager in 
Control Department)
VW partners have introduced an ERP system to the joint venture 
which enabled all costs incurred to be examined within the system in a 
timely manner. All expenditures had to be processed according to the 
budget agreed upon and any changes to the budget needed to be 
approved by VW managers in the Control Department.
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I f  you have new projects this year, then you have to submit a 
proposal to the Control Department explaining how much 
investment you will need. Then Control Department will discuss 
with the proposing department to agree on the final budget for  
the new project. Once the budget is made, it cannot be changed.
... I f  there were any unforeseen or uncontrollable events 
happening, you can apply for a change or increase in your 
budget. But this can be very complicated. An application like 
this has to be approved by the BOM. So usually there will not be 
any increase in the budgets. ... Therefore, there are only positive 
variances at the end o f the year. (FAW manager in Control 
Department)
The above quotation indicates that budget system is designed in a way which 
enables enhanced control by VW managers over the joint venture. As the VW 
partners attempt to extend and operationalise their control over the joint venture 
company via the tight budget control mechanism, the FAW partners seek to 
justify the legitimacy of autonomy via the use of a loose responsibility system. 
The conflict of different cultures and work values can be interpreted as the 
interface of different strategies adopted by the two partners in their attempt to 
effect power and orchestrate control on the joint venture company. For the 
FAW partner, the loose responsibility system allows employees to signal the 
legitimacy of autonomy when VW managers attempt to impose control, while 
the VW managers adopt a tight accounting system to satisfy their demand for 
detailed information. Again rationality is manoeuvred politically to obtain more 
control.
4 Conclusion and discussion
In Chapter 3, the various forces were examined that enabled the transition of 
particular rationales from a quality focus to a cost focus within FAW-VW. That 
analysis has drawn upon certain concepts taken from the govemmentality 
literature (problematisation, programme and technology), works which mostly
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seek to elaborate the way in which socially legitimated authorities intervene in, 
and act upon, people’s lives (Foucault 1991a; Foucault 1991b; Miller 1990; 
Miller 1991; Miller, et al. 2008; Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and O'Leary 
1994b; Miller and O'Leary 2007; Miller and Rose 1990; Miller and Rose 2008; 
Rose and Miller 1992). From the establishment of the joint venture in 1991 
until 2002, quality was prioritised during the daily operations of FAW-VW. 
The local aspiration of ‘becoming the best car manufacturing joint venture’ 
(FAW-VW Newspaper, Aug 1997) was linked to the national concern for 
building the car industry as a ‘pillar industry’ while ‘the best’ was interpreted as 
‘the best in quality’ within FAW-VW. A number of calculative and non- 
calculative devices were adopted to operationalise the local agenda for quality 
enhancement. From 2000, the issue of China re-joining the WTO directed the 
attention of various parties towards the need for competitiveness. In the face of 
this, the Chinese car industry was re-problematised by various government 
agents, scholars, economists, and other experts within and outside FAW-VW, 
in relation to the severe competition local car manufacturers would expect to 
experience. The concern with the ‘competitiveness’ of Chinese car 
manufacturing enterprises was subsequently translated into a new local agenda 
in terms of cost reduction since 2002. Cost reduction superseded quality as a 
programme of intent and became the new focus of control at FAW-VW. 
Hundreds of thousands of ‘cost reduction proposals’ were collected from 
employees and implemented, while vehicle components that were originally 
imported from VW were replaced by cheaper parts made locally. It is through 
these technologies that the concern with cost reduction was made operable at 
FAW entering the body politic of the employee.
Although Chapter 3 examined the conditioning forces on the transition of 
rationalities within this joint venture, it did not show how these rationalities 
were used politically and symbolically in the joint venture.
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Chapter 4 attempted to complete the analysis by examining the ways in which 
rationales are adopted by each of the two partners to impose their control on the 
joint venture. This analysis draws upon, but also goes beyond, the new 
institutionalism framework. Traditional new institutionalism is based on one 
single set of social contexts and to some extent does not allow further 
elaboration of the tensions at FAW-VW characterised by conflicts and 
compromises, interference and resistance, autonomy and frictions of the two 
sets of the actors -  the joint venture partners.
What appear to be technical interactions and reasoning, can be anything but 
technical. This is evident in examining the three principal conflict types 
between the two partners exhibited within FAW-VW. The partners, each 
upholding different values and inhabiting different sets of social and 
institutional contexts, attempt to exercise a specific form of control over the 
other joint venture partner, thereby exhibiting the high particularity of a 
rationale. The pursuit of quality, and the stress on efficiency and effectiveness 
by the VW partners, contrasted with the focus on cost reduction, the emphasis 
on the comprehensive development of high quality managers, and the concern 
with a structured responsibility system by the FAW partners, are better 
portrayed as rational uses of the symbolic nature of an economic argument 
enabling more extended control over the joint venture.
The appeal to technical rationales to guide partner actions accords with 
symbolic uses of rationality as discussed in the institutionalist literature. 
However, the movement of such symbolic appeals back and forth between the 
two partners to exert control over the joint venture is of particular significance. 
The empirical interviews illustrate the degree to which both parties in the joint 
venture appeal to technical rationalities in a symbolic manner, whereby 
conditioning influences from within and outside the joint venture become co­
mingled and are not necessarily decipherable as having unique provenance or
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continuity. The joint venture evolves its own forces of change which combine 
with those external to the entity. FAW was constrained by having to meet VW 
based quality regulations and standard achievements. FAW met with the 
reporting requirements in a variety of ways: quality standards reports, 
localisation quality tests, and budget reports. By contrast, VW was challenged 
to meet the FAW imposed personnel rotation system, and cost reduction 
endeavours. One perspective in interpreting the control dynamics using the new 
institutionalist frame of reference is to consider the extent of the rationalistic 
versus symbolic appeal of the reported information to the other party. The 
evidence presented suggests an ambiguity between the technical and symbolic 
reporting of information. Technical and symbolic usages of control elements 
become commingled and inseparable.
The prior new institutionalism literature has not addressed the question of 
control dynamics in this manner where legitimacy and rationalistic deployment 
of information is used in control settings in an intertwined manner rather than a 
conceptually demarcated manner. The empirical evidence presented in the 
chapter suggests that control mechanisms are not only adopted by partners 
symbolically to justify their attempt to effect power and conform to institutional 
forces, but also implemented rationally to achieve certain strategic objects (e.g. 
to be more efficient). It is in this way this chapter seeks to contribute to the new 
institutionalism literature.
In the next chapter, the effects of the control mechanisms deployed within 
FAW-VW will be examined. It is contended that employees did not fully 
engage with the control system. Influenced by the ancient school of thinking, 
employees within FAW-VW followed certain protocols concerning 
interpersonal relationships and had a different attitude and philosophy 
pertaining to rules and norms, workplace and life values from the calculative 
selves in a neo-liberal context.
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Chapter 5 Control and Accounting Mechanisms 
and Effects: Managing Employees at FAW-VW
1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to contribute to the literature by adopting an approach 
grounded in qualitative empiricism in an attempt to increase our understanding 
of the social and institutional conditioning forces affecting management 
controls in a Chinese-German car manufacturing joint venture company. The 
govemmentality literature informs the empirical analysis of the in-depth, 
longitudinal case study. It is argued that Foucault’s concept of govemmentality 
is regarded as useful in analysing the mechanisms adopted to direct, shape and 
manage the conduct of individuals within an enterprise, such as the car 
manufacturing joint venture between FAW and Volkswagen (Burchell 1996; 
Foucault 1991a; Rose 1988; Rose 1992; Rose 1996).
A number of researchers have shown an interest in studying how a variety of 
technologies and devices are deployed to render activities, individuals and 
domains governable, and how certain political and regulatory programmes 
connect up to the ‘self-regulating’ propensities of individuals in the era of New 
Liberalism by drawing upon Foucault’s complex and multifaceted work on 
‘govemmentality’ (Burchell 1996; Foucault 1991a; Hoffman 2006; Hopper 
1998; McKinlay 1998; Miller 1991; Miller 2004; Miller and O'Leary 1987; 
Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and O'Leary 1994b; Miller and Rose 1988; 
Miller and Rose 1990; Miller and Rose 2008; O'Malley, et al. 1997; Rose 1988; 
Rose 1991; Rose 1992; Rose 1996; Sigley 1996; Sigley 2006). What Foucault 
termed govemmentality is the use of a plethora of theories, notions, calculative 
devices, technologies, strategies and specific expertise through which diverse
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authorities and institutions attempt to act upon individuals and their activities to 
achieve desirable states (Foucault 1991a). For Foucault, government is not 
perceived as certain administrative units or constraining bureaucratic authorities. 
Instead it is defined generally as ‘the conduct of conduct’ and construed as ‘an 
art’, or ‘a way of doing things’, for acting upon the actions of individuals, 
namely to guide, direct, channel, shape and modify the way in which people 
conduct themselves (Foucault 1991a: 234). Taking its cue from Foucault’s 
work, a stream of research has flourished which has looked at diverse aspects of 
people’s social and political lives with regard to the practices of ‘governing’ 
and ‘being governed’. It is contended that an array of technologies and 
mechanisms of government, such as the design of the factory floor, centralised 
systems of economic planning, accounting techniques and expertise, manage 
and shape the ‘self-regulating’ capacities of individuals to render their activities 
amenable to diverse political programmes (Miller 2004; Miller and O'Leary 
1987; Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and O'Leary 1994b; Rose 1992; Rose 
1996; Rose and Miller 1992).
The concern of this chapter is with the ways in which attempts to transform 
employees at the joint venture company FAW-VW into governable individuals 
were made. In particular the concern is with how certain calculative 
technologies attributed visibility and accountability to the individual employees; 
how the behaviour of factory workers was subjected to constant observation 
and scrutiny; and how individual employees were attributed different norms of 
conduct under different programmes. However, compared with actors studied in 
a neo-liberal setting, as documented in the literature, employees at FAW-VW 
were imbued with different cultural, institutional, social and political attributes. 
It is contended that these practices of government acted differently on the 
employees of FAW-VW and their activities. In a neo-liberal society, as Rose 
(1996: p.61) explains,
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... [ “advanced” liberal strategies o f  rule govern] through the 
regulated choices o f individual citizens, now construed as 
subjects o f choices and aspirations to self-actualization and self- 
fulfilment. Individuals are to be governed through their 
freedom...
In this sense, an individual citizen is a calculating self, ‘a self that calculates 
about itself and that works upon itself in order to better itself (Rose 1992: 
p. 146). The autonomous selves are inclined to choose freely from the choices 
available to them, with the aspiration of self-fulfilment, self-realisation and 
maximisation of personal well-being, being the ones that are aligned with 
certain political programmatic schemata. In the context of FAW-VW, the 
calculative technologies which were dependent upon individuals’ autonomous 
choice of self-realisation and self-improvement have different effects on 
employees. This is not because these persons are denied the freedom of choice 
(choice of an occupation, choice of studying for a degree, choice of climbing up 
the career path ...), but because to some extent these people, who are trained 
and institutionalised to take orders obediently from their superiors, find 
themselves confused and powerless when confronted with an array of choices. 
Deeply influenced by an ancient school of thinking (the doctrine of the mean), 
employees in the joint venture company held a different attitude and philosophy 
pertaining to rules and norms, and to the workplace, and altogether different life 
values compared to their German counterparts. They lacked the spirit of 
entrepreneurs to take initiatives and were held back by the fear of doing 
something wrong.
It is therefore argued that calculative devices such as the statistical 
representation of performance data, and the standardisation and quantification 
of parameters that are to be controlled, acted upon employees at FAW-VW 
because the FAW employees were inclined to follow societal norms and act in 
commonly recognised ways. They were likely to carry out operations as 
stipulated and avoid doing anything wrong. The fear of being out of line and
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being singled out stops them from pursuing further self-achievement. Such an 
effect is strengthened by certain institutional practices and phenomena in the 
company, such as the employee rotation practice and the extensive importance 
attached to interpersonal relationships, i.e., Guanxi. To a certain extent, there is 
resistance towards the devices and technologies of governing at the individual 
level. In some cases, actual practices become decoupled from the formal control 
mechanisms. Embedded in a completely different set of social, political and 
institutional contexts, FAW employees within the joint venture react to the 
control mechanisms imposed on them differently from individuals in a neo­
liberal setting as indicated in the literature (Burchell 1996; Rose 1988; Rose 
1991; Rose 1992; Rose 1996).
This chapter is organised as follows: the first section provides a short history of 
the transformation of the focus of control at FAW-VW which is helpful in 
understanding how certain norms and ideals were shaped at the joint venture 
company; the second section focuses on the way in which attempts were made 
to transform the employees at FAW-VW into self-regulated individuals by the 
use of a series of calculative devices under two different national- and factory- 
level programmes, i.e., quality improvement and cost reduction. The chapter 
discusses two apparatus designed to increase the visibility and accountability of 
individuals. In this process, different rules and norms are attached to employees 
under different programmes. Various calculations are used to align the actions 
of the employees with the objectives of the firm. In its third section, the chapter 
continues to examine the mechanism through which calculative devices act 
upon employees at the joint venture company. Then in the fourth section, the 
chapter looks at the level of resistance met from the employees and the extent to 
which actual practices deviated from those informed by the system of devices 
and technologies. The multiple effects the technologies generated are associated 
with certain practices followed in the joint venture company. FAW employees 
at FAW-VW are subjected to certain ways of thinking, by virtue of their
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education as well as their interactions with other members of society, and are 
enmeshed within a web of interpersonal relationships, i.e. a web of Guanxi, 
which constrains their ability to choose freely the responsive actions which are 
dictated by the calculative devices. The history of dynastic China is drawn upon 
in order to understand the conditions under which the specific practices and 
protocols prevailing at FAW-VW, have emerged.
2 A brief overview of the control shifts at FAW-VW
From the establishment of FAW-VW in 1992 to around 2002, a quality oriented 
control system was implemented, while standards and norms of quality as well 
as conduct to ensure and improve such quality, were established. Employees 
were made accountable for their conduct, it being judged against such norms 
and standards. After 2002, with China rejoining the WTO and increased 
concerns about the competitiveness within and outside FAW-VW, cost 
reduction quotas were imposed on employees. Different calculative devices 
were used to transform individuals into self-regulated entities who would 
automatically strive to achieve constant improvement and cost reduction. On 
these two occasions, the attempts to construct a ‘governable person’ were far 
from successful. Employees at FAW-VW responded to these rules and norms in 
their own ways, which were other than expected when these micro-management 
technologies were designed and implemented. The process of transforming 
individuals is an exceedingly complicated one as a number of institutional, 
social and political forces come together to affect individuals and influence 
their activities, factors that are beyond anyone’s control when the control 
system is designed to align the behaviour of people with the programmes of the 
firm.
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Shortly after China’s opening-up and economic reform in the 1980s, a concern 
with the competitiveness of the Chinese car industry was regarded as a central 
issue nation-wide. The car industry was seen as problematic, with concerns 
expressed about its lack of modem management, about its technological lag, 
and about its product quality and variety. Such concerns were expressed by a 
diverse and heterogeneous group of agents, i.e., politicians, economists, 
entrepreneurs, academics, engineers and so on. Attempts to improve product 
quality and establish high standard quality management systems were 
considered imperative. FAW-VW was established as part of the schemes to 
support the development of the Chinese car manufacturing industry as a whole 
in the 1990s. The company identified ‘becoming the best car joint venture’ as 
its core pursuit (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper August 1997). Linkages and 
relays were formed between such a local factory’s scheme and a series of 
national programmes with the aim of increasing the competitiveness of the car 
industry. ‘Being the best joint venture’ was interpreted as ‘having the best 
quality’ and a quality focused control mechanism was implemented. Quality 
was the first priority of the factory and every decision had to be made in 
congruence with the quality enhancement objective of the firm. A series of 
calculative technologies, such as a quality audit and quality standardisation, 
were implemented to make the programme of quality enhancement operable. 
Such technologies attempted to render visible and accountable, individual 
employees in the joint venture company, by surrounding them with prescribed 
quantitative and qualitative standards. Quality was quantified and quality 
control activities were standardised and routinised. Individuals were judged 
against such standards and were held accountable for their activities.
Such technologies were not a complete success. Employees who became 
familiar with the procedures and routines were transferred to other positions. 
Moreover, certain rules or quality standards were not observed, deemed as
29 This is indicated in FAW-VW’s Internal Newspaper from 1997 to 2002.
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special favours in exchange for other benefits.30 The transfer of certain 
techniques for quality control from the VW group in Germany to the joint 
venture company in China is not yet complete as these are embedded in a 
different social and institutional context. Such technologies, combined with the 
specific social and institutional factors, transformed and shaped the behaviour 
of individual employees in the joint venture company in a way which was not 
intended.
In 2002, China rejoined the WTO. Around this time, various expert parties, 
including commentators, government officers in different divisions and 
academic scholars, began to assess the Chinese car industry with regard to the 
intensified competition it was encountering. During this process, cost reduction 
was prioritised and regarded as the primary way for local car producers to 
differentiate themselves from their competitors. A new interpretation of what it 
meant to be competitive gained ground within FAW-VW. Cost reduction 
rapidly and abruptly became a focal issue in the overall management system. 
Cost reduction became linked with the firm’s sustainable development and 
future survival, and came to be seen as the ‘primary force of competition’. A 
large portion of the company’s profits relied on the effectiveness of its cost 
reduction procedures (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper August 2002).
Each individual employee was compelled to take the agenda of cost reduction 
seriously. Employees were required to consider any issues from the perspective 
of cost reduction and constant improvement of their working processes. Rules 
of calculations regarding cost savings were imposed. Hundreds of thousands of 
proposals for cost reduction were made by employees across all hierarchical
30 It was witnessed in the joint venture that certain rules regarding the selection of suppliers in 
an attempt to maintain high quality standards were not followed. In one case, a state-owned 
mobile parts manufacturer was selected as a favour to the government, which in the end 
supplied the joint venture with sub-standard products.
31 FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, 2002
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levels and departments within the firm. These proposals were evaluated and 
adopted based on the estimated cost savings. Employees were then judged and 
rewarded based on the monetary values of the proposals they made. ‘Star 
employees’ who contributed to significant cost reduction were selected, their 
names publicised and given an award, on a monthly basis. FAW partner also 
strove to replace components originally imported from VW in Germany with 
components produced locally. Individual employees, factory workers and 
engineers in particular were asked to continuously innovate the design of 
specific parts and test their feasibility to enable and facilitate the localisation 
project. Blue-collar workers and managers at certain key divisions regarding the 
localisation project, such as the purchasing and product departments, had 
localisation quotas expressed in monetary terms imposed on them which they 
had to meet every year (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper 2002,2003). These 
quantitative devices were deployed to align individuals’ actions with the cost 
reduction objective of the firm.
Complementary to the cost reduction project, FAW-VW implemented a new 
incentive and payment scheme as part of its larger plan of ‘building a 
modernised and scientific management system’ (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper 
January 26 2006). Under this new incentive system, the responsibilities of each 
division and individual positions were redefined. Working processes for each 
job were routinised and standardised. Different positions were then, according 
to their importance for the whole company, categorised into different bands, 
and individual remuneration determined. A new type of visibility and 
accountability was attached to an individual worker who would be identified 
and held responsible in the event of deficiencies being detected in performance 
relative to the formal measures. The new system attempted to construct a new 
governable space for individuals. It was designed in such a way that individuals 
would do their best to fulfil their responsibilities and reach the quota assigned
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to their positions, no matter whether the focus was cost-related or quality- 
related.
However, such calculative technologies had multiple effects on employees. 
Employees did not fully engage with the new incentive system. Influenced by 
the ancient school of thinking, employees in the joint venture company 
followed certain protocols concerning interpersonal relationships and had a 
different attitude and philosophy pertaining to rules and norms, workplace and 
life values from the calculative selves in a neo-liberal context. This is further 
discussed in detail in the rest of the chapter.
3 Modes of governing
When the joint venture company was established in 1992, employees were 
transferred from the FAW group32, a state-owned car manufacturing company, 
to the joint venture company. Afterwards with the development of the joint 
venture company, new recruits were added every year, giving rise to a diverse 
group of staff with a variety of educational backgrounds. From then on, 
attempts by the two partners to transform and modernise this group of 
employees never stopped. Managers from both partners sought to make 
employees more responsible and self-regulated. In a manager-level internal 
meeting, a VW manager commented:
Some employees including managers (FAWones) do nothing but 
complaining. They always make excuses to blame on others. I  
have been to many world class factories where none o f  these 
ever happened. . . . I t  is only the incompetent people who make 
excuses. I  do not want to hear you complaining but to solve the 
problem on your own. ... Such ‘doing nothing but complaining'
32 FAW group is still until today a state-owned company.
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behaviours o f the employees have to be put to an end. (FAW- 
VW Internal Newspaper, January 25 1996)
Responding to such comments, the CEO of the joint venture company pointed 
out:
... the problem raised above is associated with the lack o f an 
internal control system, a system that can clarify the 
responsibilities and put people to do their job on their own 
initiatives. ... Currently a lot o f issues are related to different 
departments and it is usually difficult for employees to decide 
which division to turn to when a problem is encountered. ... 
(FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, January 25 1996)
A plethora of technologies was deployed to direct the actions of FAW-VW 
employees under different programmes. Two major technologies are identified 
and discussed in the following section: 1. Award System and Career Path; 2. 
Re-organisation of business processes.
3.1 Award system and career path
A comprehensive evaluation, award and promotions system for employees in 
the joint venture company was put into place to align their behaviour with the 
objectives of the company, whether quality- or cost-oriented. This mechanism 
rendered employees governable in three steps: first, the objectives of the firm 
were standardised, quantified and in some cases (under the cost reduction 
programme) measured in monetary terms. A complicated process was followed 
to collect employees’ quantitative performance data which was then analysed 
statistically, recorded and distributed to related parties within the firm. Second, 
based on the performance information collected for individual employees, 
moral and financial awards were distributed to the people who had performed 
well. Employees who did not manage to meet the quota or target assigned to
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them were publicly criticised within the firm. In some cases, badly performing 
employees were suspended from their current position and put on probation. 
According to the regulations in place at FAW-VW, if an employee’s 
competency did not meet the requirements of his/her position in the assessment 
mentioned above, he/she would be suspended from their current position for 
one year. If the employee’s abilities still did not meet the job requirements after 
one year, they would be made redundant (‘Management Procedures for Staff on 
Probation’, FAW-VW Internal Document). Finally, promotions were promised 
to those who had a record of performing well. Meanwhile, employees who 
failed to perform well after being put on probation ran the risk of being made 
redundant.
In these three steps, an individual employee’s behaviour was closely monitored, 
supervised and gauged against quantified standards and norms. The award and 
promotions system was designed in such a way that white and blue-collar 
workers would attend to the targets given to them and align their actions with 
the focus of the company if they wished to pursue their own professional 
development. Moreover, unlike most state-owned companies in China, 
employees of the joint venture company could be dismissed if they 
continuously underperformed. Such an apparatus, implemented to ‘act on 
actions of people’, attempted to render employees governable in such a way 
that they would automatically attend to their own deficiencies in meeting the 
quantified quality/cost standards and fulfil the quotas imposed on them under 
different firm- and national-level programmes. The next part of the chapter 
discusses how such a reward and promotions system influences employees in 
three steps.
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3.1.1 Quantified standards and track of performance
Under the programmes for quality improvement (1992-2002) and cost reduction 
(from 2002 onward), different norms and values were upheld at the joint 
venture company. In order to make operable both programmes at different times, 
quality was standardised and quantified while the cost reduction objective was 
decomposed and distributed to individuals in key divisions. This section looks 
at how different quantified standards were applied to employees and how their 
quantitative performance was tracked and analysed under these two 
programmes respectively.
3. 1.1,1 Under the ‘Quality Improvement*programme
In the process of ‘continuous quality improvement’, a modem management 
technique, the concept of ‘Quality Audit’ was introduced to FAW-VW. This 
mechanism standardises and quantifies quality and keeps a record of quantified 
quality scores for each component and each individual worker. It does not only 
seek to render the notion of ‘high quality’ and ‘continuous quality 
improvement’ operable, but also to subject the quality control actions of 
employees at FAW-VW to close monitoring and supervision.
Quality Audit is defined by the joint venture company as follows:
Quality Audit is a systematic way o f seeking quality inspection.
It collects product quality condition information, identifies the 
conditions and reasons o f defects, tracks the trend o f quality 
parameters, follows actions to rectify defects, and eventually 
realises constant quality improvement. The ultimate purpose o f  
Quality Audit is to examine and evaluate product quality 
standing from the position o f the most demanding customers. 
(‘Standards for Quality Audit’, FAW-VW Internal Document)
132
Quality Audit makes the notion of high quality operable by standardising and 
quantifying quality. It provides a quantitative benchmark against which 
products at different stages can be judged, analysed and compared. ‘High 
quality’ is no longer an empty slogan. Quality Audit quantifies quality by 
giving a quantitative score to each process performed by individual workers. It 
is organised as below:
VDA6.5 standards
Quality Audit (Source: ‘The Introduction to Business Process inFigure 5.1:
Product Quality Audit
PaintingPressing Welding Assembling
Antisepsis
Presser
the Whole Car Unit’, FAW-VW Internal Document)
As can be seen from the chart in Figure 5.1, Quality Audit is embedded in the 
entire production process, which consists of four procedures: pressing, welding, 
painting and assembling. Workers’ performances are monitored closely; a 
worker is identified and held responsible should any unsatisfactory audit score 
be given or any problem detected. Numerous internal documents on the
133
processes of Quality Audit are produced. Detailed instructions are given 
concerning what quality information to collect, how to analyse and record such 
information, and who such information should be delivered to. Quality Audit is 
designed to be a standardised process. The passages below are taken from one 
of the relevant documents:
Daily Audit performance evaluation
Quality auditors need to carry out audit activities every day. On 
top o f awarding an audit score, i f  a problem is discovered,
“audit defect treatment notice ’ need to be filled in and related 
departments and responsible persons need to be informed. In the 
meantime, auditors should put the problem down in the ‘quality 
information daily ” for related person to explain and trace 
responsibilities.
On a daily basis, the performance of workers is quantified in terms of audit 
scores. Any material problems that are recorded should then be detected. 
Weekly and monthly examinations and analysis of daily audit information are 
critical to the overall quality audit programme.
Weekly Quality Audit comments
An audit review meeting is conducted every week concerning the 
evaluation o f last week's quality audit results. Factory managers, 
directors o f plant, and the relevant workshop instructors will 
discuss and analyse the defects and quality performance, 
summarise the feedback from the responsible departments, solve 
the problem, and evaluate its effectiveness In the meantime, 
relevant parties should inform the update on the ranking o f  
quality audit scores within FAW-VW and VW group.
Monthly data Presentation and Evaluation:
After analysing statistically the audit defects and scores 
obtained over the past month, the overall quality status for the 
past month can be obtained. Such information is compared and 
contrasted with the target and the actual data for the past six 
months. Its trend o f change should be observed and 
demonstrated to figure out i f  the quality continues to improve.
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The pivotal problems should be short-listed and the effectiveness 
o f the measures to correct them is to be tracked and verified. The 
latest audit ranking should be illustrated and distributed to 
factory managers, the manager o f the quality assurance 
department, workshop managers, and the relevant production 
line instructors in the form o f “Quality Report Monthly”.
During the weekly and monthly reviews of quality information, audit scores of 
employees are aggregated and analysed statistically. The results are then 
compared to budgeted and past performance, and even the performance of other 
manufacturing plants within the VW group. Annual information of quality audit 
scores is used to reflect the overall performance and the ranking of FAW-VW.
Annual Evaluation
Quality auditors from Quality Assurance Division should gather 
statistics on, analyse, evaluate and report on the overall annual 
quality status in the form o f ‘Quality Annual Report. At the same 
time the report should also reflect ranking o f audit scores, 
thereby playing a guiding role in the future improvement o f  
quality.
The comprehensive quality evaluation results should be 
distributed to factory managers, the manager o f the quality 
assurance department, and related personnel as well as the 
members o f the board o f management. (“The Procedures for 
Analysing, Presenting and Evaluating Quality Audit data”, 
FAW-VW Internal Document)
These extracts show that quantified quality information is gathered daily and 
analysed statistically for each manufacturing process and individual part (see 
Table 5.1 below). The trend of such quality information is then tracked (see 
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 below). A ranking of such audit scores is kept within 
FAW-VW across different production lines and also within the VW group.
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Table 5.1: Monthly Quality Audit Information (February 2007) (Source: 
‘Pressteile-chang. (2007.2)’, FAW-VW Internal Document)
FuL v 1 I w erK | Bauteile Benennung x-quer I m r*Y  I n 0  A 1 0  B
Changchun Audi A6 Lim Frontklappe 1.3 1.2 1.4 ... 3 " 0.8 1.1
Changchun Audi A6 Lim Turhi li 1.7 1.5 1.9 3 0.5 0.7
Changchun Audi A6 Lim Tur hi re 1.2 1.1 1.4 4 0.3 1.0
Table 5.2: Statistical Analysis of Quality Audit Information (Source:
‘Analysis of Quality Audit Information’, FAW-VW Internal Document)
Seitenteil li
min max Ziel x-quer
Jan 1.6 2.4 1.5 2.0
Feb 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.7
KW.9 1.5 2.0
10 1.5 2.3
11 1.5 2.2
12 1.5 2.0
Mar 2.0 2.3 1.5 2.1
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Figure 5.2: Trend in Quality Audit Scores (Source: ‘Analysis of Quality Audit 
Information’, FAW-VW Internal Document)33
By the use of such a calculative device, individuals are subjected to observation, 
supervision and administration. The quality of the products they produce is 
constantly monitored. They will be identified and held responsible should they 
fail to meet the standards. Together with awards presented, or punishments 
imposed, on people, such quantification and standardisation of quality attempts 
to encourage employees to be self-regulated individuals.
Besides following standardised manufacturing processes, employees are also 
required to submit creative proposals to achieve constant quality improvement, 
proposals including innovation of production tools, invention of specific 
manufacturing techniques and the change of production procedures. The 
number of quality improvement proposals submitted and implemented is used 
as a benchmark to compare performance within FAW-VW, as well as with the
33 This chapter has quoted several sim ilar figures to show  how quantitative scores of quality are 
tracked and analysed (see also p. 166). D ifferent figures are based on inform ation on different 
parts of the final cars.
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VW group, and to evaluate the performance of individuals, teams and divisions. 
One of the stories described in the joint venture company’s internal newspaper 
is as follows:
...in order to improve product quality in the Engine Plant, there 
is an urgent need to measure accurately the dimensional 
parameters o f  a number o f pistons. ... the engineer in precise 
measurement room Dong Ning, and the manufacturing squad 
leader Dahai Zhou proposed to make the tool themselves. They 
spent 20 days carefully designing a jig  which is able to measure 
accurately with high precision. ... This new tool highly improves 
the production quality. ... (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, May 
30 2000)
Another story reports on a company meeting held to summarise its semi-annual 
progress in a quality improvement project Those who had performed well, both 
individuals and subunits, were rewarded:
...in the first half o f this year, the joint venture collected 7273 
items o f  improvement proposals, increased by 75% from last 
year. 3442 items were adopted, raised by 119%, out o f which 
2055 items were implemented increased by 171% compared with 
the case o f last year. Through such activities, the quality 
awareness o f workers is further strengthened. The high priority 
attached by the leaders o f the company to the project is pivotal 
to its success. ... More than 2000 items o f suggestions out o f 
7000 items proposed were implemented within half a year -  this 
is very impressive even within the VW group. ...The CEO o f  
FAW-VW, Mr Lu, remarked "... only constant quality 
improvement can keep the strong and long-lasting vitality o f the 
firm. ... ” (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, July 20 2000)
Overall, the mechanisms described above, combined with the award and 
punishment system, seek to bind employees in the joint venture company with 
rules and standards regarding quality improvements and thereby influence 
individuals’ activities. Under such a system, employees’ performances are 
constantly monitored, quantified and gauged against the related quality
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standards put forward by the joint venture company. They are required to 
submit quality enhancement proposals, carry out their job responsibilities 
strictly according to the standardised procedures, and embed the notion of 
quality in their daily operations.
3.1.L2 The *Cost Containment*programme
In 2002, China rejoined the WTO. The Chinese car industry was considered 
problematic with regard to intensified competition. Cost reduction was 
prioritised and regarded by experts, including commentators, government 
officers in different divisions and academic scholars, as the primary way for 
local car producers to meet their competition. These discussions led to changes 
being made to the core strategy of FAW-VW by the management of the FAW 
partner. Cost reduction replaced quality as the central concern. A series of 
calculative technologies were implemented to bind individual employees with 
new norms and rules concerning cost containment. They were deployed to 
subject individuals to supervision and evaluation in the light of cost reduction. 
In this way, a new kind of accountability was ascribed to employees.
All employees in the firm were encouraged to make cost reduction proposals 
based on their expertise. Product department engineers could suggest changes 
concerning the design and material of cars so as to lower costs. Plant engineers 
and employees could make suggestions about operation procedures, techniques 
and production tools. The manufacturing department contributed to cost 
reduction by optimising production procedures. Any such proposals were 
evaluated and ranked in terms of the potential for cost savings and linked to the 
award system. The best proposals for cost reduction were selected and rewarded 
on an annual basis. Moreover, an annual target of cost reduction was imposed 
on each division, and in some cases on each individual employee. This was
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associated with the evaluation system of the firm as a whole. The performance 
was publicised throughout the company and compared both currently across 
different departments and historically within one department. The following 
quotation shows how individual employees are caught up in the new norms of 
cost reduction:
... in order to better implement the ideology o f “Cost is the first 
signal ”, the Assembly plant held a meeting to mark the launch o f 
"making proposals to reduce costs ” activities on May 5th 
2003. ... The leaders o f the plant illustrated the monthly plan for  
the project and call for one piece o f high quality and feasible 
cost reduction proposal from each individual. ... (FAW-VW 
Internal Newspaper, May 20 2003)
Information on the potential cost savings suggested in the proposals was 
collected and related calculations published as follows:
... in 2003, the whole company is involved in proposing cost 
reduction suggestions. 40062 items o f proposals were made in 
total, 3.71 items per person on average, out which 15923 pieces 
were implemented, 1.48 items per person. These proposals saved 
162million RMB. ... (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, February 
10 2004)
Besides the “cost reduction proposal project”, FAW-VW also allocates a cost 
reduction quota to the manufacturing division, production plants, the 
purchasing division and other departments that are cost related. The progress 
made towards fulfilling such cost reduction quotas is then publicised across the 
firm:
From this year, each division o f the company has reached 
satisfactory effects o f cost reduction under the working guideline 
o f “Cost is the first signal” put forward by the Board o f  
Management. Manufacturing department's annual cost 
reduction target is 54million RMB. By April they have saved 
18.7million RMB, achieving 34.62% o f its annual target. ...The
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annual cost reduction quota for the Production Division is 188 
million RMB. By April, they have saved 51 million RMB by 
optimizing production costs. By May their completion 
percentage o f the quota will reach 50%, expecting to exceed the 
annual quota. ... (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, May 28 2004)
From 2003 a project of ‘production cost optimisation’ was undertaken at the 
Product Department in FAW-VW to cut costs under the slogan of ‘Cost is the 
first signal’. The following excerpts from an article in the in-house newspaper 
summarises the effects of such a project in 2004:
It [production cost optimization project] reduces product costs 
by making changes to the product design on the premise o f  
satisfying customers’ expectation on product function, quality, 
capability and appearance. ... Such an activity does not only 
bring into the company huge economic benefits but also 
improves the overall ability o f  the product development team 
and implants the notion o f cost optimization in our staff’s mind. 
(FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, February 20 2005)
After the importance of the project for cost reduction proposals was 
stressed, the article continued to discuss the effects of such a project. Cost 
reduction quotas are allocated to each department and actual performance is 
gauged against the objectives:
... [the production division] investigated 294 proposals o f  
production cost optimization. The investigation involves 
technology analysis, economic analysis, market feasibility 
research and product authorization. 45 proposals were put into 
practice in 2004, composing 15% o f the total number. .. Under 
the support o f the managers o f all levels and the guidance o f  the 
project manager, in 2004, the product division achieved overall 
cost reduction o f242 million RMB, 28.72% more than the quota 
assigned to them in the beginning o f the year ... (FAW-VW 
Internal Newspaper, February 20 2005)
The ‘production cost optimisation’ project required employees to propose 
changes to product design in order to fulfil cost reduction quotas while at the
141
same time maintaining the customers’ expectations for fully functioning cars. 
Employees were subject to administration and evaluation based on the potential 
cost savings of their proposals.
FAW-VW also initiated a campaign in 2004 called ‘facing the challenge, 
lowering cost by 100 RMB’, which called on every employee to save 100 RMB 
by making proposals based on their expertise. Such a campaign turned the 
company’s slogan ‘Cost is the first signal’ into the tangible objective of ‘saving 
100 RMB’ per individual employee. The firm held a meeting to hand out 
awards to leading teams in this campaign. The excerpt below is from an article 
reporting the meeting:
In the meeting, the monitor o f the production group for Bora’s 
left front door, Yunfeng Chu, introduced his experience in cost 
saving. The production team is responsible for the production o f  
left front doors for Bora and Golf Under the campaign in 2004, 
the team saved 120,000 RMB in total and 10,000 RMB on 
average per person by its full involvement in making 
improvement proposals. ... (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper,
January 20 2005)
As can be seen, under such a calculative technology, individuals are given a 
central place in the programme to reduce cost. High visibility and 
accountability are ascribed to individual employees.
Since the launch o f the campaign o f “acting the challenge, 
lowering cost by 100 RMB” at the beginning o f  the year [2004], 
employees at all departments at the firm get into the swing o f  
cost reduction activities based on one's own position, turning 
the guide line o f  “Cost is the first signal” into “first actions”.
The effects were quite impressive ...
... Kaiyu Wang, the section chief o f the Manufacturing 
Technology Section discovered that rear-view mirror can be 
attached directly to the front window to save two parts which 
were used to suspend the rear-view mirror fo r  cars o f 2004
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model. Such a proposal could save 560,000 RMB per year for  
the company.
Employees are made visible and accountable for the cost savings they achieve. 
They are evaluated and ranked in terms of the monetary contributions they make 
to the company’s cost reduction objective. Star employees are selected and 
awarded financially. In this way, good performances are made public and 
encouraged.
An ordinary worker at the engine production line, Maojun Li, 
engaged in waste recycling in his daily work and saved the 
company 100,000 RMB. Workers in the Assembly Workshop are 
involved in energy saving activities. Take electricity for example, 
each worker manages to save one unit o f  electricity -  the whole 
plant is able to cut electricity expenses by 32,850RMB. ...
Welding Division saved the company more than 200,000 RMB 
by improving the mode o f maintenance. ... All workers at the 
firm are taking cost reduction as their own responsibility and 
turning the slogan into their self-conscious activities ... (FAW- 
VW Internal Newspaper, March 30 2005)
Another technology deployed by the FAW partner in its attempt to reduce cost 
was the localisation of parts originally imported, such parts now being replaced 
with parts produced in China. FAW-VW does not produce all the different parts 
required; instead, it buys most of the components from its suppliers and then 
assembles them in its factory. The VW partner, when introducing a model into 
the joint venture company, will clearly state which parts must be purchased 
from the VW Group in Germany and which parts can be purchased from FAW 
suppliers in China. Apparently the prices charged by Chinese suppliers are 
much lower than VW prices. Attempts to increase the percentage of localised 
components go back to the initial establishment of FAW-VW. In the past, 
localisation had been done with the purpose of conforming to government
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regulations.34 Since around 2003, such localisation attempts have been referred 
to as ‘crazy localisation to achieve cost reduction’ 35 (FAW-VW Internal 
Newspaper, March 2003).
According to an engineer from the Procurement Department:
For CKD parts [components that must be imported from 
German VW], VW will purchase them from their suppliers and 
sell them to us for twice the price they pay. In the past we ve 
tried to purchase those parts directly from VW’s suppliers via 
their Chinese representatives. But now this is forbidden. ... Our 
purchasing team will have localisation targets each year to 
increase the percentage o f components purchased from Chinese 
partners.
Managers at FAW-VW seek to localise key parts and increase the localisation 
rate overall.
Under the “Crazy Localisation Project”, FAW-VW strives to 
increase both the width and depth o f localisation. “Localise all 
parts that can be localised”. We need to increase the 
localisation rate from 60% to 80% for some models. ... Some 
core parts as well as special crafts and materials are also on 
schedule to be localised... (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, June 
2005)
The quantitative techniques described above, i.e., calculations of quality audit 
scores, cost reduction targets and the per capita contribution to the firm’s 
objective, best served their goal when combined with the firm’s award 
incentive system. Calculative technologies first set out a web of norms and 
standards, within which employees were enmeshed, and together with the 
firm’s incentive system, influenced the activities of individuals. Employees’
34 The ‘Automobile Industrial Policy’ issued by the Chinese Government in 1994 stipulated that 
in order to avoid a whole-car tariff, cars produced in China had to achieve a localisation rate of 
60%.
35 For more detailed information on this project, please refer to section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3, p.90
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performances in terms of quality enhancement and cost reduction were 
quantified. Such quantitative scores of quality and cost reduction were ranked 
within and across the related departments. Quality improvement and cost 
reduction quotas were allocated to each department and then segmented into 
group targets. An individual’s contribution to the overall realisation of his/her 
group’s targets was clarified and publicised. Employees were made accountable 
to their managers for how well they contributed to the group’s quality and cost 
related targets. Moreover, as shown in the next section, their contributions to 
the firm’s quality enhancement and cost reduction objectives were connected 
with their income and career development. Behaviours that were in line with 
the norms (cost and quality) and rules set out by FAW-VW were praised, 
awarded, and encouraged while employees who performed badly were 
criticised. Overall, the control mechanisms attempted to influence the behaviour 
of employees and embed the notions of quality and cost in the daily operations. 
The next section of this chapter focuses on how the firm’s award system was 
linked with the multiple calculative devices in order to make individuals 
governable.
3.1.2 Award system as a control technique
At FAW-VW, honours were awarded to employees who exceeded the quotas 
assigned to them under the cost or quality programmes and made contributions 
to the realisation of the firm’s objectives. Such honours included being 
identified with ‘the best ten employees of the year’, ‘“the best innovation plan’, 
‘the best cost saving team’, ‘the best quality improvement fighter’, etc. These 
honours were publicised within the joint venture company via internal 
communication mechanisms. Sometimes, provincial or national awards were 
presented to those employees who had best presented and internalised the 
standards and norms set by the firm.
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The quantitative calculations used to evaluate individuals’ performances were 
linked to their bonuses. Employees who successfully met the quantified 
standards (both quality and cost related) were rewarded financially. Also, if an 
employee won two honorary titles, he or she was given an extra bonus.
Under the quality improvement programme, employees received a higher bonus 
if their activities fell into the ‘good practice’ categories laid down by managers 
according to the standards of quality or cost. The quotation below is taken from 
an article in the firm’s newspaper describing the policy at one of the production 
plants at FAW-VW whose bonus allocation schedule was related to workers’ 
quality enhancement activities.
...each worker is required to keep a diary to record the 
difficulties encountered during the manufacturing processes and 
the methods used to tackle the problem. The diaries should be 
submitted to and evaluated by the monitor every Monday 
morning. The good ones will be praised while the bad ones will 
be criticised and helped. This will be one o f  the parameters 
based on which their monthly bonuses will be decided. ... 
(FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, February 29 2000)
The joint venture company has established certain rules regarding the allocation 
of bonuses for employees. An internal company document called ‘the Guided 
Method for the Distribution of Bonuses’ stipulates that the bonus allocation 
should be based on the quantitative scores employees have gained each month. 
Such scores are calculated based on the employee’s performance concerning 
quality improvement, capability, efficiency and so on. Also, a ‘special 
contribution made to production processes, management, and technological 
innovation’ was rewarded.
The cost reduction proposals made by the employees were also linked to 
employee bonuses. The monetary effects of the proposals submitted by the
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employees were calculated and ranked within each department as well as for the 
joint venture company as a whole. The most effective proposals, i.e., those that 
promised to make largest cost savings, are selected, and the employees who 
proposed them are awarded bonuses.
One of the FAW-VW managers, when commenting on the success of the cost 
reduction proposal project, described how employees who made the best 
suggestions were rewarded:
... [the success o f the “cost reduction proposal*’ project] also 
relies on the incentive system. The rewards for good proposals 
are multiple: the highest level o f monetary award is 10,000 RMB 
which has been attributed to more than ten people; there is also 
company supported trips for employees to many tourist sites... 
(FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, June 20 2005)
In the ‘Reward Section’ of FAW-VW’s internal document ‘Standards for 
Awarding and Punishing Employees’, awards made to employees were linked 
to the contributions they made to the quality improvement and cost reduction 
projects.
Financial awards should be allocated to employees should they 
satisfy one o f the following conditions:
Employees make contributions to production quality 
improvement, product development, technique innovation and 
etc.
Employees make contribution to cost reduction, savings o f  
capital, material, energy and so on. (‘Standards for Awarding 
and Punishing Employees’, FAW-VW Internal Document)
Such a reward system attempts to place individuals in the centre of the firm’s 
quality improvement or cost reduction programme. Together with calculative 
technologies, the award system attempts to render individuals visible and
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accountable. Moreover, from 2006 onwards, FAW-VW has deployed a new 
incentive system on the advice of several consulting firms. The new system 
completely reforms the original payment structure and subjects individuals to 
new forms of visibility.
New incentive system
Under the new incentive system, all divisions at FAW-VW are categorised into 
eight bands according to the importance of the positions, and each position in 
every department is assigned to a given level within the band of its division. For 
example, a junior engineer position in the Product Division could be 
categorised as 9.3, i.e., level 3 in band 9. Employees were paid according to 
their categories. An income range is specified for individual positions in 
different departments (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, July14 2006).
The new system ascribes a new form of visibility and accountability to 
employees. A junior engineer in the product division was graded a ‘9.3’ under 
the new payment system. It was made clear to individuals that their income 
level was linked to the importance of their positions. If they wanted to get the 
salary paid for that position increased, they had to contribute more to the firm 
and be promoted to a more important position.
The following quotation is taken form a newspaper article which gives an 
introduction to the new award system to employees and encourages them to 
work harder:
... the primary objective o f  the changes to the current payment 
system is to have the payments reflect the value o f the positions 
and the requirements o f  the positions ...the company’s new 
incentive system focuses on building a performance system 
which will decompose business objectives into the targets on 
different levels and make sure that everyone has a target and
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produces good performance. The changes made to the salary 
structures reflect the company’s value o f ’pay for the position 
and pay for performance ’. ... part o f  the employees should not 
only focus on the changes o f their salaries, but focus on how to 
improve their abilities, create values and make contributions for  
the firm... (FAW-VW Internal Newspaper, July 14 2006)
The above quotation shows that individuals were tied to their positions in this 
new system of visibility and accountability. If they wanted to increase their 
base salaries by increasing their importance in the firm, they had to climb the 
promotions ladder, which is discussed in more detail in the next section.
To summarise, calculative devices, by quantifying the performance of 
employees as well as the standards and norms imposed on them, render 
performance measurable and able to be ranked, thus making it possible to link 
financial rewards to these calculations. Such a mechanism attempts to enmesh 
individuals within a web of rules and standards (quality or cost related), 
motivating individuals to closely attend to their own activities and value any 
reward, be it an honour or a financial reward.
3.1.3 Career path as the centre of the promotion system
The joint venture company has a calculative performance evaluation system. It 
attributes a quantitative score to each employee, based on which employees are 
ranked and bonuses paid. The numerical score is also the criterion for the 
managers to decide whom to promote, and what adjustments to make to staff 
arrangements (‘Employees’ Annual Evaluation Process’, FAW-VW Internal 
Document).
The formula for the calculation of such a quantitative score was as follows:
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M=(0.8xM1)+(0.2xM2)+N (out of 100)
M is the formula by which the evaluation of the employee was scored. Ml 
refers to the evaluation of the competency of the employee, which comprised 
the evaluations by the employee’s senior (direct leader of the employee), co­
workers, juniors and internal users (the employee’s counterpart in the firm who 
requested the services of the employee).
M2 refers to the evaluation of the quality of the employee. M2 was given 
strictly in accord with the company’s regulations. They were decided by the 
employee’s senior based on an assessment of the facts which included 
employee’s educational background, past working experience, professional 
qualifications and so on.
N refers to a leader-weighted score, which is the adjustment made by the 
department’s senior manager to the overall evaluation (M1+M2) in an attempt 
to achieve a lateral balance within the whole department. Leader-weighted (N) 
=±1,2,3,...10.
The joint venture company had detailed guidelines concerning the calculation 
of Ml and M2. Employee performance was converted into a series of numbers 
with their abilities and potential quantified according to certain norms and 
standards.
Under this evaluation system, decisions made about the promotion and bonus 
allocation of the employees were made transparent.
The joint venture company designs career paths for both blue- and white collar 
employees from the start of their employment. It is made clear to them what 
awaits them should they perform well according to the rules and norms laid 
down by the firm.
150
Figure 5.3 shows how an ordinary college graduate can grow into an 
international leader within 20 years:
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Figure 5.3: Leadership Growth Trajectory (Source: “The Introduction to the 
Business Processes of HR Department”, FAW-VW Internal 
Document)
Figure 5.4 demonstrates what career development a blue-collar worker can 
achieve:
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Figure 5.4: Growth Trajectory from Workers to Leaders (Source: ‘The
Introduction to Business Processes for HR Department’, FAW-VW Internal 
Document)
Besides making clear how to climb the ladder in the company, it was also made 
clear to employees that their positions were not secure for the rest of their lives 
(a common situation for most state-owned companies) -  there existed an ‘out’ 
system, too. According to the regulations in place at FAW-VW, if an 
employee’s competency did not meet the requirements of his/her position in the 
assessment mentioned above, he/she would be suspended from their current 
position for one year. If the employee’s abilities still do not meet the job 
requirements after one year, they were to be made redundant (‘Management 
Procedures for Staff on Probation’, FAW-VW Internal Document).
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Therefore, for employees at FAW-VW, the career paths and the ‘out’ system 
illustrated what awaited them in the future given different levels of performance, 
while the performance evaluation system made it clear what it took for 
employees to advance their careers. This chain of calculative devices formed a 
sophisticated mechanism, which surrounded employees with norms and rules 
and attempted to align the actions of individuals with the objectives of the firm. 
It was made clear that employees’ career development, bonuses, base salaries 
and the security of their jobs, all depended on how well they attended to their 
activities, to follow the rules and standards set down by the firm, and contribute 
to the realisation of the norms attached under different national and firm level 
programmes.
3.2 Reorganisation of business process
A second mechanism to render individuals governable, and which this chapter 
considers, is the project to reorganise the business processes in FAW-VW.
In 2000 FAW-VW started a series of actions to reorganise the operational 
processes at the firm. It redefined the core activities in each division and 
clarified the responsibilities for each position. For every key job, a detailed 
flow chart was provided to demonstrate the processes performed by the job, the 
person and divisions responsible, the records to be kept and the actions to be 
taken under different scenarios. The organisation chart shown as Figure 5.5 is 
taken from the internal documents of FAW-VW. The chart in Figure 5.5 is a 
flow chart showing the quality control activities carried out for purchased parts.
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Figure 5.5: Quality Audit Process for Purchased Parts (Source: ‘Quality Audit 
for Purchased Parts’, FAW-VW Internal Document)
Under this project, an individual’s job activities were clearly defined and 
routinised. Employees were made more accountable for their actions, with their 
tasks and responsibilities being made more transparent. As shown in the flow 
charts, it was made clear to employees which divisions and positions were 
responsible for each step in their work and what actions to take if they detected 
a problem. Therefore, should a mistake be made, the person responsible is able 
to be identified and held responsible. Employees’ mistakes were recorded and 
documented in the company’s database, influencing their evaluations and 
eventually affecting their income and career development. They were allowed 
little room for mistakes.
The following story is taken from a speech made by a worker at the Body Shop 
(the paint plant of the factory) in a firm-wide speech contest:
That was when I  just joined the company. One day during the 
busy shift I  stretched my body, took my hat o ff and scratched my 
hair. This no-more-than-twenty-second movement caught the 
attention o f my team leader who rushed over and looked at me 
seriously: uhow can you take off your hat at this time? ” I  was 
shocked and confused. I  didn ’t think this was worth all the fuss.
He looked around and picked something from the ground. I  
looked closely and found that he was holding a hair. He said to 
me strictly: “You don’t think that scratching your hair is a big 
deal. But you are so close to the painting workshop. This hair 
can influence the quality o f a car/ The rework could cost our 
firm several hundreds o f RMB. ... (FAW-VW Internal 
Newspaper, July 30 2000)
This story shows that workers were expected to perform their work activities in 
a strictly professional manner -  nothing personal would be tolerated (not even 
anything as trivial as scratching one’s head). Individuals were considered to be
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machines performing specified jobs and were left with little room for personal 
activities. Under such a system, employees were expected to attend to their own 
deficiencies and to carry out their jobs strictly according to the standards laid 
down. Accountability and transparency were part of the system.
So far this chapter has focused on the mechanisms through which calculative 
devices were used in an attempt to make the employees at FAW-VW 
governable. This is a well-covered topic in the literature of govemmentality 
(Foucault 1991a; Miller 1991; Miller 2004; Miller and O’Leary 1987; Miller 
and O’Leary 1994a; Miller and Rose 1990). However, little has been researched 
concerning the actual effects on the individuals of such calculative technologies. 
Are the rules and norms imposed on individuals deeply coupled in their 
operational activities or do individuals only symbolically follow certain 
protocols? Are the evaluation standards laid down by the firm deployed strictly 
or are there informal standards and rules used? The next section of this chapter 
looks into these questions.
4 The mechanism by which calculative devices influence employees at 
FAW-VW
As illustrated in the previous section, an array of calculative devices was put in 
place in an attempt to align the actions of FAW-VW’s employees with the 
firm’s objectives. Norms (either quality- or cost-related) were standardised, 
quantified, monetarised and converted into performance indicators against 
which employees were evaluated. The information about quantitative 
performance indicators (such as quality audit scores, money saved by 
innovation proposals, monetary contributions by the localisation of certain 
components) was collected, compared, analysed statistically, stored and 
distributed to related parties. These analyses, reports and calculations rendered 
visible any departure from the norms of target performance, and together with
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other mechanisms discussed above, they equipped the employees with the 
knowledge needed to reach the bright future portrayed for them if they 
continued to perform well.
In a neo-liberal setting, individuals (problem teenagers, factory workers or the 
national population as a whole) are governed by calculative technologies 
through their individualistic ‘self-steering’ and ‘self-regulating’ capacities 
(Burchell 1996; Heelas and Morris 1992; Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and 
O'Leary 1994b; Miller and Rose 1988; Miller and Rose 1990). These devices 
seek to direct, shape, channel, guide and control the conduct of individuals so 
as to align them with certain political agendas through exploiting people’s 
aspirations of self-fulfilment and self-realisation. Calculations render reality 
amendable to political programming and ascribe a form of transparency and 
accountability to individuals, based on which people seek to govern others and 
themselves. Calculative selves brought into existence by such calculations 
enjoy the freedom and autonomy bestowed on them by choosing the options 
that would improve their well-being and enable them to achieve a state of self- 
improvement. By doing so, they direct their own activities, and those of others, 
to a desirable state of political forces, whether this be economic efficiency, 
social stability, balanced development of the national economy, or others 
(McKinlay 1998; Miller 2004; Miller and O'Leary 1987; Rose 1988; Rose 1991; 
Rose and Miller 1992; Sigley 1996). Employees are assumed to figure out the 
best way to fulfil their aspirations of self-fulfilment and self-realisation, i.e., to 
carry out their jobs as dictated to ensure the quality of the products they process, 
to innovate their working procedures to cut costs, to invent new tools to 
improve quality, to climb the career ladder and become ‘master of the factory’.
However, it is contended that at FAW-VW, individuals were not encouraged by 
calculative devices to perform in a manner which made them different from 
others in a quest for a more fulfilled self or a brighter future, but it was rather
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their ‘respect’ for the norms laid down by the firm that leads to their tendency 
to behave like everyone else. Because the employees are embedded in a 
different institutional, social and political context from the neo-liberal 
employee documented in the literature, the FAW-VW employee to some extent 
lacks entrepreneurial and industrial spirit, and the will to take control of their 
own lives. In dynastic China, with unlimited authority resting with the emperor, 
obedience and submissiveness had long been an important element of Chinese 
culture. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, with its 
centrally planned economy, individuals did not need to think, choose and plan 
for themselves. They simply had to obey orders and follow the track designed 
for them by the government. Students were taught to be subordinate to authority 
from their school days and onward. After completing their education, jobs 
would be assigned to them, their personal lives planned and their family taken 
care of. Later, with the transition to a market economy, some people became 
confused and felt lost when faced with multiple choices as they then had 
nobody to tell them what to do. (Liew 1997; Su 2008; Wang 2010)
Similar transitions can be found in FAW-VW. Before the complex mechanism 
was deployed (the new incentive system, the career path and other devices 
mentioned above), orders were given to employees, and disciplinary measures 
were used if orders were not obeyed. This simple ‘order-obey’ cycle has now 
been replaced by the sophisticated mechanism of calculative devices. Within 
the web of quantitative technologies, choices were open to individuals who 
were not used to having any and they may not have preferred such freedom. It 
was difficult for most of the employees to change their mentality in order to 
follow the calculations made, and visualise the link between them and their 
performance and future development.
Employees at FAW-VW and their conduct, were influenced and 
institutionalised by their heritage of ancient Chinese thought and philosophy
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which, until today, still shapes Chinese people’s perceptions of the world and 
their ways of acting. Diverse schools of thought in ancient China have left their 
traces on Chinese people today and affected their lives in different ways and to 
different extents. A brand of philosophy is particularly influential in this 
context, known as ‘the doctrine of the mean’ or ‘the middle course’ (Ding 2009; 
Feng 2001; Li 2000; Wang and Ma 2008; Wei 2009; Yu 2008; Zhang 2008; 
Zhang 2009; Zhang, et al. 2008; Zheng 2008).
4.1 Philosophy and culture
The doctrine of the mean first developed as an embodiment of the spirit of 
kingcraft with the meaning of ‘righteous’, ‘middle path’, ‘impartial’ and 
‘constant way’ in the primitive society of China from the 2nd century BC. It was 
conceived and upheld as the proper attitude toward the use of the imperial 
power bestowed on the emperors -  be righteous and impartial (Wei, 2000). This 
was further developed by Confucius and his apprentice into an ethical standard 
and a form of philosophy. Confucius’s thoughts were documented in The 
Analects, where he talks about a temporary and relative state in the 
development of things, summarised as ‘the middle course’ or ‘the doctrine of 
the mean’. The doctrine of the mean is conceived as the highest form of 
morality, whereas the middle course means that people’s temperaments, styles 
and virtues should not indulge in one or other of opposing sides so that both 
sides tie each other down and complement each other. The doctrine of the mean 
propounds compromise and reconciliation. These ideas are put in The Analects 
as follows:
Perfect is the virtue which is according to the doctrine o f the 
mean! Rare have they long been among the people, who practise 
it.
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I  know how it is that the path o f the mean is not walked in. The 
knowing go beyond it, and the stupid do not come up to it. I  
know how it is that the path o f the Mean is not understood: the 
men o f talents and virtue go beyond it, and the worthless do not 
come up to it. (‘The Analects’)
The doctrine of the mean is thus construed as a feudal code of conduct for the 
literate elites of the day and embodies a pursuit of the highest ethical realm. To 
conform to it, people were to perform in a certain way so that their words and 
conduct were consistent with the idea of moderation, and that their words and 
actions would not be considered as ‘deficient’ or ‘excessive’. To avoid being 
considered as ‘deficient’, people’s words and actions were required to meet 
with the ethical code of conduct prevalent in feudalist China or dictated in the 
Book of Rites (Zhang 2009), while being against ‘excessive’ requires that 
people’s words and actions do not violate or go beyond the specifications of the 
ethical code. This means that people must exercise self-restraint or even make 
sacrifices in order to bring their words and conduct into line with the extensive 
specifications and requirements of social protocols (Ding 2009; Huang 2008; 
Wang and Ma 2008; Yu 2008; Zhang 2009; Zhang, et al. 2008; Zheng 2008). 
Confucianism in particular argues that one should ‘keep the middle course by 
destroying one’s human desires’ (Wei 2009).
As ethical standard and philosophy, the doctrine of the mean has been given 
significant importance since the Han Dynasty and so became separated from 
The Analects and an independent set of doctrines for scholar-bureaucrats 
(intellectuals) in all subsequent dynasties. It was carried on by, and 
institutionalised through, the education of the scholar-bureaucrat class in 
China’s feudal society. The Analects was listed as one of the mandatory
36 The Book of Rites (“Collection of Treatises on the Rules of Propriety and Ceremonial 
Usages”) is an extensive collection of ritual matters of the Zhou Dynasty. It dictates certain 
ways of behaving for civilised person in all types of social scenario, ranging from one’s coming 
of age to what protocols to follow in the case of a death in the family.
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textbooks and a test text for literate people who yearned to join the ruling class 
(Zhang 2009; Zheng 2008).
People who followed the ethical code of conduct and stayed ‘in the middle* 
were considered civilised while those who did not were considered uncivilised, 
denied advancement and expelled from society. As a doctrine that was opposed 
to being ‘excessive’ and propounded the notion of ‘deficient’, it rendered 
individuals extremely cautious about their words and conduct, fearing any 
deviation from the majority. This cautious psychological state of mind on the 
one hand, made individuals follow norms and avoid deviating from the conduct 
of others, while on the other hand it restrained individuals’ creativity and their 
innovative and aggressive spirit. In this social environment of feudal China, 
innovation and creativity were considered ‘excessive’ and different from the 
norm, and individuals who had shown any trace of innovation and creativity 
were subject to denial and expulsion (Yu 2008; Zhang 2008; Zhang 2009; 
Zhang, et al. 2008).
Individuals’ regard for norms and standards as well as their fear of deviating 
from the majority were further strengthened by the ideology of collectivism and 
egalitarianism in socialist China. Before China’s economic reforms and 
‘opening-up’ in 1979, great importance was attached to collectivism and 
egalitarianism as an important component of the socialist culture and ideology, 
and these have exerted considerable influence on people’s conduct. 
Collectivism stresses the equal contribution by everyone in society while 
egalitarianism demands equal sharing of wealth. In such a social and 
institutional environment, the doctrine of the mean reinforced its influence on 
people’s perception of the world and of their activities. There is a rich body of 
research literature on the implications of the doctrine of the mean on the world 
view and activities of Chinese people today (Ding 2009; Wang and Ma 2008; 
Wei 2009; Yu 2008; Zhang 2008; Zhang, et al. 2008; Zheng 2008). It is argued
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that individuals guided by such a philosophy would act as the majority do, 
resist taking responsibilities, avoid standing out, staying out of trouble and 
being reluctant to take initiatives and innovative actions (Ding 2009; Li 2000; 
Liu 2008; Wei 2009; Yu 2008; Zhang 2008; Zhang, et al. 2008). Therefore, 
people’s regard for norms and a fear of being different were, and are still, an 
important element of the cultural and social values of China.
At FAW-VW, guided by the doctrine of the mean, employees were reluctant to 
take initiatives and shoulder responsibility. Unless it was defined clearly in his 
or her job responsibilities, employees were unwilling to take on any extra work. 
Being responsible meant that they risked being picked out for any mistakes 
made in the process. Individuals would only concentrate on the work clearly 
assigned to them, which they made an effort to perform in such a way that it 
was good enough to keep them out of trouble. They refused to take on extra 
responsibilities and only considered such from their own perspective. ‘Staying 
in the middle’, i.e., avoiding being picked out for mistakes, was of great 
importance to Chinese employees at FAW-VW. Such a tendency to eschew 
responsibilities made a strong impression on someone from outside Chinese 
society. All the VW managers I interviewed commented on how their co- 
workers were unwilling to take on responsibilities unless they were being 
ordered by their superiors to do so as part of their job. One VW expatriate in 
Engineering commented:
Here sometimes something must he told to he done. I f  not it is 
not done for days, then suddenly they are told that i f  it is not 
done by tomorrow morning we have a problem. Then something 
happens overnight. When you come in the morning you will find  
things are done. ... Let me give you an example: Once the firm  
decided to build a control room in the factory plant. This was 
related to two departments and none o f the heads took 
responsibility. Then the Board o f  Management decided it had to 
be done, I  never forgot, it’s Dec 15th, end o f discussion. Dec 18th 
they started to dig holes. Then I  was out o f the company for
162
thsome days. When I  came hack on Jan 5 , the control room was 
completely ready. (VW expatriate in Engineering Department)
Influenced by the doctrine of the mean, employees were unwilling to either 
outperform or underperform. They were unlikely to be encouraged by any 
potential merit accruing to them by taking on extra work. They were 
comfortable and satisfied as long as their own job was completed. The overall 
interests of the firm or of others were of little concern to them. VW managers 
were astonished at their lack of concern for anything other than their own job.
Here [at FAW-VW]people’s loyalty is not high enough ... They 
are more worried about themselves. But when I  ask them to do 
some work, they say that this is not my responsibility, and that’s 
it. ... In order to get them to work, I  have to say please do this
job, i f  anything goes wrong I  will be responsible for that. ......
The first thing people ask is, “Is this my job or is it anyone else’s 
job? I f  it is not my job I  will do nothing but I  will not say that I  
will do nothing’’. (Audi specialist in Planning Department]
Another VW manager also commented on the lack of concern shown by FAW- 
VW employees for the interests of the firm as a whole:
Chinese colleagues, in my opinion, I  have to be very careful, in 
my opinion they don’t think about the company as a whole. They 
think o f their own ... I ’ll give you an example: On my last stay I  
came back from the production site, and the IT  manager came 
out o f his office and told me “oh, company has a very big 
problem!” We produced 2500 cars with the wrong brand labels, 
they cannot be sold and so on but they had been shipped all over 
China. I  told him, “It is a very big problem I  see, but you look so 
happy. ” And he said, “Oh, it is not my problem. ’’ (VW manager 
in Production Department]
Guided by the doctrine of the mean, employees at FAW-VW were reluctant 
to take any initiative or innovate as this might have landed them in trouble. 
They preferred to carry out their superiors’ orders even if the orders were
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likely to cause a problem rather than propose innovative solutions to 
potential, or actual problems. When they encountered a problem, they 
tended to copy the solutions of their VW partner rather than think and act 
creatively. In these ways, it was easier for them to stay out of trouble, and 
they justified their decisions by directing any questions to their superiors or 
their partners.
The Chinese worker will perform his or her boss’s order even 
when it is wrong and they know it’s wrong. He will get a ... can’t 
find the English word... In Germany such a guy would be kicked 
out o f the company. ... As an example, when the new Jetta base 
was launched, there was a working list [a list o f  task to be 
carried out]. The front glass was glued. The old one was also 
glued. For the glue you have to add some chemical additive. The 
glue will actually stay. On the new working list this instruction 
was missing: add that additive. A worker went to his boss and 
said, "Boss, look these two have the same glue, there must be a 
mistake.’’ The boss said, "Shut up, you do what has been 
written. ’’ We produced 4500 cars without glue. They had to be 
called back from all over China. It took 4 months to repair them.
The guy who missed the line in the working list was kicked out o f  
the company. But nothing happened to the boss who said do 
what it say. (VW manager in Production Department)
As indicated in the story above, employees at FAW-VW were reluctant to 
voice their opinions, especially when such opinions were different from 
those of authority or their superiors’. It was safer to copy the solutions of 
others when they were faced with new problems:
What we often remark on is that when they have a problem they 
look at what Audi is doing and what VW is doing. Then they 
copy that, and it is like some fakes outside the market. On the 
outside it looks the same, but inside it is empty because they only 
copy the look o f the function but not the function itself. They look 
alike but they don’t work alike. ... They try to copy what we do 
when we have a similar problem ...In  Germany we say we have 
to check i f  this is the better way. But the copying here is always 
extreme. ... They don’t ask why you take this approach or that
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one [to make it] a bit better ... It is always, “ah, it doesn’t 
matter what happens [after]”. (Audi specialist in Planning 
Department)
As discussed above, it is contended that under the influence of the doctrine of 
the mean, employees feared to deviate from the behaviour of the majority and 
attempted to stay out of trouble by eschewing extra responsibilities, avoiding 
raising innovative and creative ideas and mechanically carrying out orders by 
their superiors even when such orders were regarded as problematic. It is also 
observed that workers at FAW-VW had a tendency to approach their targets 
with little deviation. Some quantitative performance data lends support to this 
claim. Figures 5.6a, 5.6b and 5.6c show the quality audit scores awarded to 
workers on the Jetta production line in 2007. The pink symbols in the graphs 
were the actual performance values whereas the green line was the target score. 
A lower score stands for a better quality.
1J4 809 605 2EWl m Seitenwandrahmen li
Figure 5.6a: Quality Audit Scores Awarded for Jetta Production Line Workers
(Source: FAW-VW Internal Document4Audit Score Tendency’)
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Figure 5.6b: Quality Audit Scores Awarded for Jetta Production Line Workers
(Source: FAW-VW Internal Document ‘Audit Score Tendency’)
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Figure 5.6c: Quality Audit Scores Awarded for Jetta Production Line Workers
(Source: FAW-VW Internal Document ‘Audit Score Tendency’)
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It can be seen in Figures 5.6a-c that the actual performance had a tendency to 
approach the target line without too much deviation. As discussed above, 
employees at FAW-VW, deeply influenced and institutionalised by the Chinese 
philosophy of the doctrine of the mean, tended to have a strong regard for rules 
and norms, and a fear of being different and picked out for both good and bad 
reasons. Those world views and the resultant activities, or lack thereof, of 
FAW-VW employees affected the implementation of the calculative 
technologies mentioned above.
On the one hand, to the extent that calculative technologies have the intended 
effects on employees, i.e., to align their behaviour with the objectives of the 
firm, they work through employees* respect for rules and norms and a desire to 
avoid being picked on. The calculative devices and technologies deployed at 
FAW-VW had standardised and actualised norms (quality and cost) while 
collecting and statistically analysing performance data for individual employees. 
Individuals were provided with information about their peers’ performance as 
well as the peer performance mean and the minimum requirement expected of 
themselves. Individuals sought to act with a tendency approaching the norm, 
follow what others did and strove to achieve what was achieved by the majority. 
They sought to carry out their job carefully to meet quality standards, put 
forward cost reduction proposals as others did, and avoided standing out by 
striving to fulfil the quota assigned to them. Calculative devices acted upon the 
individuals through their tendency to meet the norm and their fear of being 
different.
On the other hand, the predisposition and behaviours of FAW-VW employees, 
guided by the doctrine of the mean as well as other informal practices prevalent 
at FAW-VW, made it more difficult for the calculative technologies to 
encourage employees to behave in accordance with the rules and standards laid 
down by the firm. Employees were also reluctant to stand out; to be the first in
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raising new or creative ideas. They tended to be unwilling to express their 
opinions as they feel they should be taking a middle course and avoid getting 
involved in any kind of conflict. They were reluctant to take a position and seek 
to shy away from any kind of responsibility. Responsibilities were shuffled 
from one department to another, from one person to another. Employees were 
very careful of their interpersonal relationships -  being different, such as being 
ranked at the top, may be not so desirable as this might arouse attention and 
jealousy. Also this might make it more difficult for the evaluations from 
colleagues and juniors to yield a gratifying result. Managers tended to believe 
that workers should be kept in the dark about their real evaluations as well as 
the promotion processes as much as possible, to avoid conflicts and 
contradictions. This led to the distrust employees have in the quantitative 
evaluation system. The influence of the doctrine of the mean leads to a 
divergence between actual practices and those informed by the formal system 
of award, evaluation and promotion. This divergence was further exacerbated 
by the importance of interpersonal relationship networks (Guanxi) and certain 
practices carried out at FAW-VW.
4.2 Guanxi
Certain routine practices observed at FAW-VW clashed with the firm’s attempt 
to embed the notion of constant quality improvement and cost reduction in the 
minds of employees. These practices, i.e., Guanxi and the rotation practice, 
diluted the potential impact that the calculative devices had on employees. In 
this chapter, these two practices are now examined in detail.
Guanxi plays an important part in the processes of hiring and promoting 
employees at FAW-VW. The influence that Guanxi has on organisations and 
society in East Asian countries, and particularly in China, has been well
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discussed and documented in the literature (Bian and Ang 1997; Davies, et al. 
1995; Hwang 1987; King 1991; Li 2007; Park and Luo 2001; Tsang 1998; Xin 
and Pearce 1996; Yang 1994). The practice of Guanxi is deeply embedded in 
Chinese culture, having a history of 5000 years (Yang 1994). It is construed as 
direct particularistic ties between an individual and others, a relationship that 
captures the social and economic background and the family origins of 
individuals (King 1991). Guanxi is argued to have significant implications for 
an organisation’s marketing, and resource and network management, and is 
considered a competitive advantage for individuals and organisations (Davies, 
et al. 1995; Farh, et al. 1998; Tsang 1998; Tsui and Farh 1997; Xin and Pearce 
1996).
At FAW-VW, the practice of Guanxi is reflected in the informal networking 
between individuals and their superiors. The personal ties between individuals 
and their managers have a significant influence on the evaluation and 
promotions system of the firm. Evaluations of employees’ performance can 
hardly be as objective and neutral as the incentive system designed by the firm 
makes it seem. The existence of such an ‘invisible hand’ encourages employees 
to place less attention on the formal procedures designed for the selection of 
future leaders, and the complicated incentive system. The actual practices 
become disconnected from the formal procedures as indicated by some of the 
following quotations from interviewees:
I  am not sure which hand o f  my position belongs to. ... I  don't 
really care about it. ... I  don't see how it is different now... 
basically this is just a state-owned company...{A FAW junior 
engineer in Product Department)
It can be inferred that '[FAW-VW] is just a state-owned company’ means that 
the evaluation and the promotion decisions heavily depend on the personal 
relationship one has with one’s superiors. In this way the actual promotion
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practices became disconnected from the carefully designed career path and 
evaluation mechanisms.
It is also made clear that no obvious changes in the incomes of employees were 
observed after the adoption of the management techniques:
After applying the new position categorization, it seems that 
everyone's incomes all increased. Overall there is hardly any 
change at all. ... (An FAW engineer in Plant I)
A junior FAW manager in the Purchasing Department remarked on how the 
favourable personal relationship with one’s supervisors can affect the formal 
evaluation system:
An individual’s work is evaluated by his superiors and such 
performance evaluation is administered and documented by the 
HR department. ... Promotion decisions are made by managers 
based on such evaluations. ... But, o f  course, absolute fairness 
does not exist. I f  managers favour someone, then he can be given 
a task which is o f great importance. He then would have more to 
show in terms o f the contribution made to the firm and ends up 
with a more positive evaluation. I f  the same job was to be given 
to someone else, then that person would be able to perform it 
and be evaluated positively as well. ... (FAW junior manager in 
Purchasing Department)
Guanxi also plays an important role in the processes of hiring employees at 
FAW-VW. While walking along the assembly line at FAW-VW, an engineer in 
the Quality Department of Factory II pointed at the some blue-collar workers 
working on the production line and commented:
These electricians have the easiest job and best pay among all 
workers. So you see these people, they all have some relatives 
working as junior or senior managers here to get them such a 
goodjob. (FAW engineer in Plant II)
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This impact of the practice of Guanxi on the recruitment decisions at FAW-VW 
is also well-known by VW employees:
I  have some strong indicators that people who want to work at 
FAW-VW have to pay a year’s salary; this money is distributed 
among the managers o f FAW according to a fixed formula. You 
have to pay to get a job, you buy a work place. ... Not only 
workers, also members o f other departments, Logistics, IT, 
Planning and so on. Maybe these things happen in Germany too 
-  such things happen all over the world. But I  think the amount 
here is much higher, it is very common here. And in Germany it 
is extremely exceptional. ... When you don’t have Guanxi, you 
will get a work place only i f  your skills f i t  the requirements o f  
the job. I f  you can pay, your skills do not have to f i t  the 
requirements o f the job, and so you will not be able to do your 
job. I ’ve found a certain number o f colleagues who are not able 
to do their job. Why? Maybe one o f reasons is that ... (VW 
expatriate in Engineering Department)
The above quotations indicate that the change in the compensation scheme 
in some cases failed to link performance to pay. Guanxi, or the relationship 
employees have with the key players in the firm, plays an extensive and 
decisive role in the career development of employees.
As a result, employees prioritised informal personal relationships over the 
carefully designed incentive system and the career path pictured (Figure 5.3 and 
5.4) as they believed that the future development of their career had more to do 
with their managers’ opinion of them than with the quantitative scores awarded 
to them at the end of the year.
Another example of the informal practices which led to the deviation of actual 
behaviour of employees from the route informed by the formal control system 
was the rotation routine of FAW-VW, which was borrowed from the 
government. In the joint venture company, managers were rotated frequently.
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There is an informal policy in the company that junior managers will be 
transferred to a different position every two years and senior managers every 
four years. The senior managers might even be re-allocated to other companies 
within the FAW group.
Similar practices can be observed in the government. The Chinese government 
has a policy concerning the management of its personnel, which is that all 
senior governors should be rotated every five years and no one can stay in the 
same position for more than ten years. Such a system can not be entirely 
labelled as ‘distrust in allocating power’ but is a highly institutionalised 
historical practice which can be dated back as far as 300 AD.
In ancient China, emperors sent officers as governors to rule local people in 
different provinces, some of which could be quite far away, so they might have 
had difficulty communicating with the central government in a timely and 
effective manner. Therefore, to ensure the emperor’s control over the officers 
and to make sure that governors fulfilled their responsibilities in a loyal and fair 
manner in different comers of the empire, there existed a complicated 
‘suspicion-avoiding’ system. For example, an officer could not be the governor 
of his home area; officers who were related to each other could not work in the 
same department; a governor could not acquire assets in his jurisdiction; etc. As 
part of this ‘suspicion-avoiding’ system, a rotation practice started in the Jin 
Dynasty (around 300 AD) which was the first to limit a governor’s tenure to 
three years. The exact length of tenure as governor changed from dynasty to 
dynasty and emperor to emperor, but it was usually three, six or nine years 
(Fang(Tang-Dynasty) 1974; Shen(Liang-Dynasty) 1974; Wang 2007; 
Wei(Tang-Dynasty) 1973; Zhang(Qing-Dynasty) 1974). Today, the Chinese 
government’s practices still portray this heritage. Because of the strong 
connection existing between the joint venture company and the government, 
such a rotation practice is also found in FAW-VW.
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As FAW, one of the partners in the joint venture company FAW-VW, is a state- 
owned company, the government still has a strong say in some of the firm’s 
policies and its personnel management. High-level personnel changes at FAW 
have to be approved by the government. Senior managers at FAW can be 
transferred to other state-owned companies. There are even exchanges of 
personnel between the government and state-owned companies. For example, 
the previous CEO of the FAW group became the vice governor of Jilin 
Province (which is where FAW is located). Moreover, when the joint venture 
company was established, extensive support in terms of favourable policies, 
direct financial support, the waiving of taxes, etc. were given to it by the 
government. Even today, the government has to be consulted in -  and 
sometimes has to approve -  the launch of big projects, expansion schemes, 
imports of certain parts and decisions about certain local suppliers. Due to such 
close ties between the joint venture company and the government, certain 
practices have emigrated from the government to the joint venture company. 
The rotation practice is one of these practices.
The legitimisation provided by the FAW partner for this informal policy is that 
the managers’ all-round experience allows them to bring out the potential and 
improve the performance of managers. However, such a policy, it is claimed by 
VW managers, impedes the effectiveness and efficiency of their work. The 
frequent change of the FAW managers, sometimes even of the interpreters, with 
whom German managers work, constantly challenges the quality control and 
improvement activities.
According to a German manager in the manufacturing plant:
My Chinese partner was changed overnight. When I  began to 
work with him, he had no knowledge in this area at all. I  have to 
teach him from beginning. Then suddenly one day they wanted to
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transfer him to some other place, and they didn’t ask my opinion 
before they make such a decision. Then he was gone in one day. 
Usually in Germany you will use two weeks to train your 
successor. But here when the new manager came, the old one 
was already gone. So I  have to start training him all over again.
One IT specialist was on his second visit and complained that all the staff he 
used to work with were gone.
...on my last visit, my colleagues and I  had worked hard to train 
the people in this department [IT department], but now almost 
all o f  them are gone. I  have to start working with some people 
who know nothing again. ...
Another example is given by a German manager in Planning:
I ’ve experienced that HR department changes jobs o f people 
every, don’t know maybe 2 years puts people which are 
experienced and learned special things with a big effort, takes 
them from this place to another where they don’t have any skill 
about that and put new people there and they don’t have skills 
fo r this job.
A German manager in the Body Shop explained how he had to fight to keep his 
interpreter:
...in this company, they will change employees to other places.
Once they [HR department] decided to change my interpreter. I  
can’t accept that as she is not merely an interpreter, she knows 
so many things by now. It makes my work easier. ...
Another German manager confirms the interference caused in his operational 
work by such frequent personnel changes:
Three years ago we had a training campaign in Germany we 
educated 25 workers with a lot o f effort in Germany. A lot o f
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German colleagues came to here to train these people with 
special skills car electronics. None o f these 25 guys is on his job 
now. They are all removed by HR department. Other colleagues 
are on this job but they cannot do it. So we have a lot o f trouble 
in production because people cannot do their work.
As indicated above, the rotation practice makes it more difficult for staff to 
follow the rules and norms laid down. Quantified quality scores related to their 
performance were rendered useless as they might be transferred to a new place 
where their previous experiences and records were of no value. The career path 
drawn up becomes irrelevant as managers can be transferred to less important 
places where they may lose their special expertise or experience a decrease in 
their total income if they do not have their superiors’ personal support, i.e., 
Guanxi. The mechanisms which attempted to render individuals governable 
were disconnected from the actual practices in the joint venture company. With 
the rotation practice, employees found it more difficult to appreciate the 
importance and the fairness of the evaluation system and the career path put 
forward by the company. They tended to believe that the development of their 
career depended more on the informal system (e.g. Guanxi) than the formal 
control mechanisms, therefore, the informal prevailed.
5 Conclusion and discussion
Calculative technologies have been suggested as influencing peoples’ 
behaviour (Foucault 1991a; Hopper and Major 2007; Miller 2004; Miller and 
O'Leary 1987; Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and Rose 1990). They act 
upon individuals and intervene in their professional lives to ensure that 
individuals perform in accordance with the standards and norm laid down. They 
make actors and subjects accountable and visible and transform the way in 
which they are conceived. They are constitutive of the social and institutional 
realities in which they are embedded.
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During the 17 year existence of FAW-VW, a plethora of calculative devices 
have been deployed to transform employees into self-regulating individuals 
who will align their activities with prescribed norms and standards. Two 
distinctive systems of technologies as modes of governing have been identified 
and discussed in detail in this chapter: Performance Evaluation, Award System 
and Career Path on the one hand, and Reorganisation of Business Processes on 
the other.
This first system of technologies attempt to make employees governable in 
three consecutive steps: first, the objectives of the firm under different 
programmes are standardised, quantified and measured in monetary terms, with 
the quantitative performance of the employees measured against such standards 
and norms. Such data is then analysed statistically, recorded and distributed to 
related parties within the firm. Second, financial and non-financial (honours) 
awards are made to employees based on the performance information collected 
for them. Employees who were unable to achieve the quota or fulfil the target 
assigned to them would have criticisms published within the firm. In extreme 
cases, employees who performed badly could be suspended from their current 
positions and put on probation. Lastly, different career paths were drawn up for 
employees: a bright future and an upward career path was promised to those 
who had a good performance record, while employees who failed to improve 
after being put on probation might be dismissed from the company.
In such a calculative system an individual employee’s behaviour was closely 
monitored, administered and gauged against quantified standards and norms. 
The award and promotions system was designed in such a way that staff would 
attend to the targets assigned to them and align their actions with the focus of 
the company should they wish to pursue professional development. In extreme 
cases, employees in the joint venture company might be dismissed should they
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continuously underperform. Such technologies, implemented to ‘act on the 
actions of people’, attempted to render employees governable in such a way 
that they would automatically attend to their shortcomings in meeting the 
quantified quality/cost standards and the quotas assigned to them under 
different firm- and national-level programmes.
The second mechanism which was deployed to act on employees in the joint 
venture company was the re-organisation of business processes. Under this 
project initiated in 2002, the core activities of each division were defined and 
the responsibilities of each position clarified. For every key job, a detailed flow 
chart recorded the processes involved in carrying out the job, the person and 
divisions responsible, the records to be kept and the actions to take under 
different scenarios. (See Figure 5.5, which presents a flow chart of the quality 
audit activities for purchased components and parts.)
Under this project, individuals’ job activities were clearly defined and 
routinised. Visibility and accountability were ascribed to employees as they 
became more accountable for their activities, with them being clearly defined 
and responsibilities spelled out. As can be seen from the flow chart in Figure 
5.5, employees were clearly informed about the divisions and positions 
responsible for each step involved in the job process, and what actions they 
were to take if a problem was detected. Therefore should employees make any 
mistakes, they would be identified and held responsible. Their mistakes would 
be recorded in the company’s database; influencing the evaluations of the 
employees and eventually having an impact on their income and career 
development. Under such a mechanism, employees were motivated to attend to 
their own deficiencies and expected to carry out their jobs strictly according to 
the standards.
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The calculative devices and mechanisms discussed in this chapter actualised the 
norms (quality and cost) and were implemented in an attempt to align the 
activities of individuals with particular programmes. It is argued that these 
calculative devices deployed at FAW-VW acted upon individuals through their 
having regard for norms and their fear of being different, rather than through 
any aspirations for self-fulfilment as indicated in a neo-liberal environment. 
The social and political environment the employees of FAW-VW were imbued 
with, has caused them to uphold different values and a different philosophy.
Moreover, to some extent a decoupling of actual practices from the mechanisms 
designed, has been observed at FAW-VW. The evaluations of employees’ 
performance can not be as objective and neutral as desired by the quantitative 
incentive system due to the practice of Guanxi. This practice plays a vital role 
in promotion decisions made by managers, which causes the actual practice to 
deviate from the system designed by the firm. Other management practices 
followed at FAW-VW, such as the rotation system, made it more difficult for 
employees to follow the rules and norms set down. Quantified quality scores 
related to their performance can be rendered useless as the employee might be 
transferred to a new role where their previous experience and record is of little 
use. The career path mapped out for employees can be made irrelevant as 
managers are also transferred to less important places within the FAW group 
where they may lose or dilute their special expertise or experience, and 
experience a decrease in their total income if they do not have their superiors’ 
personal support - another example of Guanxi. Moreover, Chinese philosophies, 
which influence an individual’s way of thinking and their conceptions of a 
career, may also to some extent diminish the effects the above mechanisms may 
have on the actions of individuals.
Under the influence of Chinese philosophies, especially the doctrine of the 
mean, employees at FAW-VW tended to be extremely cautious about their
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words and conduct, fearing any deviation from the majority. This state of mind, 
on the one hand, made individuals follow norms and rules set out by the 
company and avoid deviating from the conduct of the majority, while on the 
other hand it restrained individual’s creativity and their innovative and 
aggressive spirit. Employees are reluctant to take initiatives and shoulder 
responsibility. Being responsible means that they risk being picked out for any 
mistakes made in the process. Individuals will only concentrate on the work 
clearly assigned to them, which they will make an effort to perform in such a 
way that it is good enough to keep them out of trouble. Employees are also 
reluctant to stand out; to be the first in raising new or creative ideas. Employees 
are very careful of their interpersonal relationships -  being different, such as 
being ranked at the top, may be not so desirable as this might arouse attention 
and jealousy. Also this might make it more difficult for the evaluations from 
colleagues and juniors to yield a gratifying result. Managers tended to believe 
that workers should be kept in the dark about their real evaluations as well as 
the promotion processes as much as possible, to avoid conflicts and 
contradictions. This leads to the distrust employees have in the quantitative 
evaluation system. As a result, the influence of the doctrine of the mean leads to 
a divergence between actual practices and those informed by the formal system 
of award, evaluation and promotion.
In sum, this chapter has investigated different modes of governing which 
attempted to align the actions of employees at FAW-VW with the objects of the 
firm. Different calculative tools of management accounting are deployed to 
administer and influence individuals and attempt to render employees 
governable. The discussion has shown that the process of ‘making people 
governable’ is a complicated one. The systems of calculative technologies 
embedded in specific social and institutional networks can have multiple effects 
on employees. At FAW-VW, routine management practices, webs of personal 
relationships and the distinct philosophies of Chinese people have led to a
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disconnection between the actual practices of employees and the formal system 
of calculative devices. Individuals are governed through their regard for norms 
and their fear of being different instead of their self-regulating propensities. 
This chapter has shown that making individuals governable is a more complex 
process than indicated in the literature (Miller and O’Leary 1994a; Miller and 
O'Leary 1994b; Miller and Rose 2008). The effects of calculative devices and 
control dynamics cannot be examined in isolation from the social and historical 
context in which organisations are embedded. Cultures, philosophies and social 
values all have an impact on the application and operationalisation of the 
control dynamics imposed on employees.
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Chapter 6 Control Mechanisms at FAW-VW: 
Dynamics and Action
The last forty years or so have witnessed an increased interest by researchers in 
joint ventures across the world. Joint ventures are now considered an important 
form of organisations instead of merely a transitional state. Particularly, this 
organisational form allows firms access to the enormous markets of emerging 
economies, which otherwise would have been impossible due to the market 
barriers imposed by governments and the limited knowledge of market 
conditions in emerging economies. In China alone, joint ventures account for 
over 60% of the total foreign investments. A growing volume of research is 
devoted to the studies of management controls in joint ventures, which mainly 
adopts a functionalistic approach and positivistic economic methods. This 
thesis attempts to contribute to the literature by adopting an approach grounded 
in qualitative empiricism, examining the control dynamics and their actual 
effects on employees within the social and institutional context in which the 
FAW-VW joint venture company is embedded.
This study has identified and analysed the conditioning forces of the transition 
from a quality oriented control mechanism to a cost oriented one at FAW-VW 
over a period of 17 years. It has argued that such a transition is not a simple 
strategic choice but instead is only made possible by discourses, national 
programmes, and expertise within and outside the joint venture company. The 
thesis has further examined the way in which technical rationales based on cost 
or quality are used strategically and politically to vie for control by each partner. 
It has been argued that institutions and norms that came to shape the control 
mechanisms deployed at FAW-VW were to some extent produced internally 
and purposely exerted more extended control over the joint venture company. 
As part of the control transformation process, attempts were also made by both
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the FAW and the VW partners to alter the predisposition of employees and 
workers, who came from a socialist legacy, into a new situation of governable 
self-regulation in a neo-liberal sense through various modem management 
technologies deployed at FAW-VW. It has been argued that individuals at 
FAW-VW were not induced to act through their attempt to develop a more 
fulfilling self, but rather through their regard for normalised values and a 
cultural tendency to avoid being different. To a certain extent, resistance toward 
the technologies of the governing body was expressed at the individual level. 
Actual practices are partially decoupled from the explicit mechanisms designed 
to effect control.
1 Summary of research findings
This thesis has sought to develop an understanding of how control elements are 
evolved, transformed and deployed, and what actual effects these control 
mechanisms have on employees within the Chinese-German car manufacturing 
joint venture, FAW-VW (First Automobile Work -  Volkswagen ). The first 
phenomenon, investigated in Chapter 3, concerned the emergence of quality 
focused control mechanisms and the subsequent transition to a cost reduction 
focus within FAW-VW in the context of historical events and discourses.
Since the establishment of the joint venture in 1991 until 2002, quality was 
prioritised during the daily operations of FAW-VW. The local aspiration of 
‘becoming the best car manufacturing joint venture’ (FAW-VW Newspaper, 
Aug 1997) was linked to the national concern for building the car industry as 
the ‘pillar industry’ while ‘the best’ was interpreted as ‘the best in quality’ 
within FAW-VW. A number of calculative and non-calculative technologies 
were adopted to operationalise the local agenda of quality enhancement. 
Around the year 2000, the issue of China re-joining the WTO, directed the
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attention of various parties towards competitiveness. In the face of this 
phenomenon, the Chinese car industry was re-problematised in relation to the 
severe competition local car manufacturers would likely experience. The 
concern with the ‘competitiveness’ of Chinese car manufacturing enterprises 
was subsequently translated into a new local agenda in terms of cost reduction, 
effective since 2002. Cost superseded quality as a programme of intent and 
became the new focus of control at FAW-VW. Hundreds of thousands of ‘cost 
reduction proposals’ were collected from employees and many implemented, 
while components and parts that were originally imported from VW were 
replaced by cheaper items made locally. It is through these technologies that the 
concern with cost reduction was made operable at FAW and entered the body 
politic of the employee.
Concepts from the govemmentality literature were adopted to study the 
linkages among rationales, discourses, national programmes, diverse bodies of 
expertise, and the transition in control focus within the joint venture under 
study. Chapter 3 has explored how the complex of these linkages and relays, 
which was by nature temporary and fragile, came to be reformed in a distinctive 
way in the face of new events. Focal attention was directed on the manner in 
which the simple aspiration for a local car manufacturer of ‘being the best joint 
venture’ was linked to the national concern for ‘building a modernised car 
industry’ as well as the way in which different meanings became attached to the 
pursuit of ‘being the best’ within FAW-VW, through the operation of a 
multiplicity of different actors and agencies, including politicians, government 
officers, entrepreneurs, scholars and engineers.
By examining the relays and linkages formed between discourses, national 
concerns of competitiveness in car industry and local control mechanisms 
within the joint venture, the govemmentality framework helps to elaborate why 
and how certain arrangements of the VW partner which were acceptable to and
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welcomed by the FAW partner at one point in time, ultimately led to increased 
tension and became the centre of conflict. The temporary agreement and 
peaceful cooperation between the two partners cannot be fully conceived from 
the sense of strategic considerations. Instead, temporary balances of power 
between the two partners are more likely to be associated with certain 
mechanisms and technologies i.e. the technologies of one partner (VW’s high 
standard quality control mechanisms) resonating with the programmes of 
another partner (FAW’s programme of building a modernised factory with 
internal competitiveness). Once the programme of FAW evolved and was 
infused with new meaning as the new issue was construed by a multiplicity of 
agents and agencies, particular mechanisms would appear to be incongruent 
with the new agenda of FAW. As such, different programmes were adopted by 
the partners using different sets of techniques. The harmony that prevailed 
dissociated and tensions between the two partners emerged.
Chapter 3 further illustrated how interpretations of quality enhancement and 
cost reduction tied to the local programme, were made operable by a series of 
calculative and non-calculative technologies adopted within FAW-VW. It is 
through these calculative and non-calculative technologies that partners were 
able to institutionalise and normalise the conduct and aspirations of employees. 
It has been shown how the techniques, such as reports of quantified quality, or 
quantified assessment of cost savings of individual employees and processes, 
served to transform employees into ‘governable individuals’. With FAW-VW, 
the new programme (cost reduction) superseding the old agenda of the FAW 
partner (quality enforcement) does not imply that the prior focus and balance 
has been completely removed from the firm. Shifting programme emphases 
upheld by the two partners can continue to coexist at the firm level. 
Heterogeneous technologies are then adopted to enable interventions and alter 
employees’ conduct, which results in a high level of conflict between 
employees from the two partners and senior management, as well as being
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reflected in confrontational decisions. The govemmentality framework sheds 
light upon these conflicting actions and decisions.
On the other hand, the govemmentality literature is less directed at explaining 
the institutional usage and political deployment of such rationality. It examines 
the conditioning factors of the conflicts and struggles between employees and 
managers of the two partners as well as the contradictory decisions made by 
them. However it does not seek to capture the tension between the two partners 
and the subsequent actions taken by each at a more micro-level, and the 
rationalities underlying the manner in which accounting controls were deployed 
in the context of such tensions. New institutionalism has been drawn on to 
inform the analysis of the strategic and rational usage of rationalities and 
institutions by each partner within the joint venture company in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 discussed the institutional pressures faced by the two partners and it 
has been argued that the behaviours of employees as well as the choice of 
control mechanisms within FAW-VW, were subject to the influence of coercive, 
mimetic and normative institutional forces. This chapter also attempted to 
elaborate the tensions in FAW-VW, characterised by conflicts and 
compromises, interference and resistance, and autonomy and frictions of the 
two sets of actors. What appeared to be simply technical interactions and 
reasoning between the two partners, appeared to be anything but technical.
Three principal conflicts between the two partners exhibited within FAW-VW 
were identified and examined in detail. With the partners each upholding 
different values and inhabiting different sets of social and institutional contexts, 
each partner exerted a specific form of control over the other joint venture 
partner, thereby exhibiting high particularity of rationale. Therefore the 
amplification of quality, and the stress on efficiency and effectiveness of the 
VW partner, as well as the FAW partner’s focus on cost, their emphasis on the
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comprehensive development of high quality managers, and their concern with a 
structured responsibility system, are better portrayed as rational uses of the 
symbolic nature of economic arguments enabling more extended control by a 
particular partner over the joint venture. The appeal to technical rationales to 
guide partner actions accords with symbolic uses of rationality as discussed in 
the institutionalist literature. However, the movement of such symbolic appeals 
back and forth between the two partners to exert control over the joint venture, 
is of particular significance. The empirical interviews illustrate the degree to 
which both parties in the joint venture appealed to technical rationalities in a 
symbolic manner whereby conditioning influences from within and outside the 
joint venture became co-mingled and not necessarily decipherable as having 
unique provenance or continuity. The joint venture evolved its own forces of 
change which combined with those external to the entity. FAW was constrained 
by having to meet VW based quality regulations and standards achievements. 
FAW met with the reporting requirements in a variety of ways: quality 
standards reports, localisation quality tests, and budget reports. By contrast, 
VW was challenged to meet the FAW imposed personnel rotation system, and 
cost reduction endeavours. One perspective in interpreting the control dynamics 
using the new institutionalist frame of reference is to consider the extent of the 
rationalistic versus the symbolic appeal of the reported information to the other 
party. The evidence presented suggests ambiguity between technical and 
symbolic reporting usage of information. Overall, Chapter 4 attempted to 
contribute to the new institutionalism literature by suggesting that the 
legitimacy and rationalistic deployment of information are used in control 
settings in an intertwined manner, rather than a conceptually demarcated one.
Chapter 5 has investigated the actual effects of control mechanisms adopted 
within FAW-VW on FAW employees in relation to the historical heritage and 
cultural disposition of the Chinese employees. As depicted in Chapter 3, a shift 
from a focus on quality to one on cost reduction is identified. Different control
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foci (cost and quality) were made operable through a plethora of calculative 
technologies under diverse programmes at different levels. During this process, 
attempts to transform the employees at the joint venture company into 
governable self-regulated entities were made by the use of various governing 
technologies. This chapter focused on how different calculative devices were 
implemented with the aim to ‘modernise’ and ‘internationalise’ their employees 
under different nation-wide and firm-level programmes by both the FAW 
partner and the VW partner.
Calculative technologies have been suggested to influence peoples’ behaviour 
(Foucault 1991a; Hopper and Major 2007; Miller 2004; Miller and O'Leary 
1987; Miller and O'Leary 1994a; Miller and Rose 1990). They act upon 
individuals and intervene in their professional lives to ensure that individuals 
perform in accordance with the standards and norms laid down. Within FAW- 
VW, a plethora of calculative devices had been deployed to transform 
employees into self-regulating individuals who would align their activities with 
prescribed norms and standards. Two distinctive systems of technologies as 
modes of governing were identified and discussed in detail in this chapter, 
namely Performance Evaluation, Award System and Career Path on the one 
hand, and the Reorganisation of Business Processes on the other.
It has been argued that with the first system of technologies an individual 
employee’s behaviour was closely monitored, administered and gauged against 
quantified standards and norms. The award and promotions system was 
designed in such a way that staff would attend to the targets assigned to them 
and align their actions with the focus of the company should they wish to 
pursue professional development. In extreme cases, employees in the joint 
venture company might be dismissed should they continuously underperform. 
Such technologies, implemented to ‘act on the actions of people’, attempted to 
render employees governable in such a way that they would automatically
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attend to their shortcomings in meeting the quantified quality/cost standards 
and the quotas assigned to them under different firm- and national-level 
programmes.
Under the second control mechanism, individuals’ job activities were clearly 
defined and routinised. Visibility and accountability were ascribed to 
employees as they became more accountable for their activities, with them 
being clearly defined and responsibilities spelled out. Employees were clearly 
informed about the divisions and positions responsible for each step involved in 
the job process, and what actions they were to take if a problem was detected. 
Therefore should employees have made mistakes, they would be identified and 
held responsible. Under such a mechanism, employees were motivated to attend 
to their own deficiencies and expected to carry out their jobs strictly according 
to the standards.
This chapter further considered what multiple effects such technologies have on 
the employees, effects many of which can be accounted for by the particular 
mentalities, webs of personal relationships and distinct philosophies of Chinese 
employees. It has been observed that the employees at the joint venture 
company followed certain protocols governing interpersonal relationships and 
practices. Employees were enmeshed within a web of personal relationships 
(Guanxi) which constrained their ability to choose freely their responsive 
actions which are dictated by the calculative devices. It has been argued that 
these calculative devices deployed at FAW-VW acted upon individuals through 
their regard for norms and their fear of being different, rather than through any 
aspirations for self-fulfilment as indicated in a neo-liberal environment.
Moreover, to some extent, a decoupling of actual practices from the 
mechanisms designed was observed at FAW-VW. The evaluations of 
employees’ performances could not be as objective and neutral as desired by
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the quantitative incentive system, due to the practice of Guanxi. This practice 
played a vital role in promotions decisions made by managers, which made the 
actual practices deviate from the practices designed by the form’s promotions 
system. Other management practices followed at FAW-VW, such as the 
employment rotation practice, made it more difficult for employees to follow 
the rules and norms set down. Quantified quality scores related to their 
performance could be rendered useless as they might be transferred to a new 
place where their previous experience and record was of little use. The career 
path mapped out for them could be made irrelevant as managers were 
transferred to less important places within the FAW group where they may lose 
their special expertise or experience, and experience a decrease in their total 
income if they did not have their superiors’ personal support. Another example 
of Guanxi. Moreover, Chinese philosophies, which influence individuals’ ways 
of thinking and their conceptions of a career, may also to some extent diminish 
the effects the above mechanisms have on the actions of individuals.
In sum, Chapter 5 has investigated different modes of governing which attempt 
to align the actions of employees at FAW-VW with the objects of the firm. 
Different calculative tools of management accounting were deployed to 
administer and influence individuals and attempted to render employees 
governable. The discussion has shown that the process of “making people 
governable” was a complicated and unpredictable one. The systems of 
calculative technologies embedded in specific social and institutional networks 
can have multiple effects on employees. At FAW-VW, routine management 
practices, webs of personal relationships and the distinct philosophies of 
Chinese people have led to a disconnect between the actual practices of 
employees and the formal system of calculative devices. Individuals were 
governed through their regard for norms and their fear of being different, 
instead of their self-regulating propensities.
189
2 Methodological and theoretical reflections
2.1 Reflections on triangulations of new institutionalism and the 
governmentality literature
Both new institutionalism and the govemmentality literature have informed the 
empirical analysis of this study. The combination of these two bodies of 
literature allows new insights to be gained that neither approach could provide 
in isolation. This study benefits from these two literatures in the following ways:
The study did not simply assume that the control mechanisms adopted in joint 
ventures were predetermined by their equity structure, risk factors and resource 
constraints. Instead it has established that the design and evolution of control 
mechanisms is a more complex and dynamic process. By drawing upon the 
govemmentality literature, this research has shown how the transition in the 
control elements at FAW-VW were made possible by discourses, national 
programmes, government agencies and expertise within and outside the joint 
venture company. Although the govemmentality literature (Miller and O'Leary 
1994a; Miller and Power 1992; Miller and Rose 1988; Miller and Rose 1990; 
Rose 1988) is very helpful in this respect, it does not examine the way in which 
control mechanisms are implemented or practised in the organisation. Much of 
the research in this tradition tends to overlook the active and strategic roles 
actors are able to assume, while actors are generally depicted as passive and 
submissive. Moreover, the govemmentality literature retains a macro level 
perspective stressing broad rationales and discourses effects and hardly focuses 
on specifics. It is from this respect that new institutionalism is able to 
complement the findings of the govemmentality literature.
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First, new institutionalism serves as the analytical tool that delineates two sets 
of social and institutional environments in which the two partners at FAW-VW 
are embedded. It has been observed that the behaviours of employees from 
FAW and VW are guided and influenced by different norms and institutions 
due to their different cultural origins and educational backgrounds, as well as 
work and life values. Therefore, by distinguishing the two sets of social and 
institutional environments in which the employees of FAW-VW are embedded, 
further analysis and interpretation of their strategic actions are made possible.
Second, new institutionalism provides the framework within which the control 
mechanisms are implemented and practised at FAW-VW, become open to 
investigation. This study has demonstrated the way in which the actions of 
employees at FAW-VW are influenced and shaped by coercive, mimetic, and 
normative institutional forces. More importantly, the study has illustrated that 
employees from FAW and VW appealed to technical rationalities, norms and 
institutions in a political and strategic manner in order to exert more extended 
control over the joint venture company.
Much of the research done by new institutionalists in organisational sociology 
has tended to focus on how various forms of institutional forces (e.g. cognitive, 
normative and regulative forces) lead organizations to converge in terms of 
structures and organisational practices (Covaleski and Dirsmith 1983; 
Covaleski and Dirsmith 1986; Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988b; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995). More recent research in this literature has begun 
to accentuate the institutional transformation process in which the old tradition, 
norm or institution is challenged and decomposed while the new ones are 
established (Lounsbury 2002; Lounsbury 2007; Lounsbury 2008; Scott, et al. 
2002; Thornton and Ocasio 1999). However, this strand of new institutionalism 
research tends to focus on the transformation of logic at a macro level across an 
entire industry or profession. It does not examine the way in which norms,
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institutions or logic prevailing in one local organisation are linked to those of 
the industry or national discourses. It is from this respect that this study 
benefited extensively from the govemmentality literature.
By drawing upon ideas from the govemmentality literature which centre around 
the later work of Michel Foucault (Burchell 1996; Foucault 1988; Foucault 
1991a; Foucault 1997; Miller 1990; Miller 2004; Miller and Rose 1990; Rose 
1992), this study has examined the linkages formed among discourses, national 
programmes, government agencies, expertise within and outside FAW-VW, 
and the emergence of a quality-oriented control mechanism adopted by the 
FAW partner and its subsequent transformation to a cost-oriented one. Drawing 
on certain concepts from the govemmentality literature (problematisation, 
programme and technology), this study has illustrated the way in which the 
simple aspiration for FAW partners of ‘being the best joint venture’ was linked 
to the national concern of ‘building a modernised car industry’. It has been 
argued that different norms, quality and cost, became attached to the pursuit of 
‘being the best’ for the FAW-VW partners through a multiplicity of different 
actors and agencies, including politicians, government officers, entrepreneurs, 
scholars and engineers. In this manner, after 2002 the logic of cost reduction 
for the FAW partner, and of quality for the VW partner, coexisted at FAW-VW, 
with both applied in a strategic and political manner by both the FAW and VW
-JO
partners, in their attempt to vie for control .
37 Lounsbury (2002) defines logic as ‘organizing principles that govern the selection of 
technologies, define what kinds of actors are authorized to make claims, shape and constrain the 
behavioral possibilities of actors, and specify criteria for effectiveness and efficiency’ .
38 As examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
192
2.2 Reflections on the transition from quality to cost:
As illustrated in the previous chapters, during the FAW-VW 17 year history, 
the control mechanisms adopted at FAW-VW had moved from a quality 
oriented focus to one that centred on cost reduction. From the start of FAW- 
VW in 1992, quality had been given centre stage. Strategies were developed 
and techniques were adopted to improve product quality. The firm was 
involved in both national and international quality certification programmes. 
Daily quantitative reports were produced, the results of which were summarised, 
integrated, and analysed statistically. Each decision in the process of product 
formation was made to conform to the central objective of improving and 
assuring product quality. After China re-joined the WTO in 2002, a new 
meaning became attached to the idea of ‘being competitive’. Cost rapidly and 
abruptly became a focal issue in the overall management system. Cost 
reduction became linked with the joint venture firm’s sustainable development 
and future survival. It came to be conceived of as the ‘primary force of 
competition’.
Such a transition may appear to be a purely strategic reaction to the change in 
market conditions. China’s re-joining WTO had induced intense international 
competition into the national car industry. With the significant decrease in 
import duties, local car manufacturers were faced with more severe competition 
from imported cars, which were considered superior in product design and 
quality. In this context, the shift to a cost reduction control focus may be 
construed as an adjustment of the company’s strategy in the face of the new 
competition. This functionalistic perspective provides a simple explanation of 
the change of control foci. But it does not shed light on why and how the cost 
reduction strategy substituted the quality enhancement strategy, and came to be 
considered as the solution for problems encountered FAW-VW.
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Drawing on certain concepts from the govemmentality literature, this thesis has 
shown the complex of networks beneath the surface of what appeared to be a 
simple strategic reaction to the change of market condition. It has been argued 
that the transition in control foci was only made possible by the linkages and 
relays formed among national discourses, government agents and agencies, and 
various experts within and outside the joint venture company. The local car 
manufacturers were problematised in terms of the issue of cost in the face of the 
new challenges brought up by China re-joining the WTO. The idea of cost 
reduction became attached to the national aspiration of building a strong 
national car industry and the cost reduction strategy came to be considered as 
the method by which car producers became more competitive. This thesis has 
illustrated how instead of being a simple and rational strategic choice of action, 
the transition in control foci was enabled by a multiplicity of actors and 
agencies including politicians, government officers, entrepreneurs, scholars and 
engineers.
2.3 Reflections on research of joint ventures
Prior research on joint ventures, which dates back to the 1980s, was the 
justification for strategic alliances, the criteria for firms to select partners, the 
trust issues among partners, the forms of risk emerging within alliances and the 
control mechanisms that could be deployed within the alliances. The main 
theoretical frameworks adopted by prior researchers included transaction-cost 
economics, evolutionary theories, resource-based theory, and game theory with 
the occasional application of organisational theory such as strategic- 
management theory, social network theory. This prior research tends to lean 
toward positivistivism and to be prescriptive and static. But there is some 
acknowledgement of the interactions, deliberations, and negotiations between
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partners, the trust and risk issues involved, and the non-rational, non-economic 
factors that shape the structures and roles of control systems.
This study contributes to the literature of research on joint ventures by 
illustrating how control mechanisms adopted in the joint venture were not a 
simple function of equity structure, risk factors and resource constraints. Two 
strands of literature in the sociological studies of accounting and organisations 
have been drawn upon to inform the empirical analysis. This study has 
indicated that control mechanisms at FAW-VW were subject to the influence of 
discourses, national programmes, government agencies, diverse bodies of 
expertise within and outside the joint venture company. Moreover, it has 
illustrated how control mechanisms are used strategically and politically by 
each of the partners to exert more extended control over the joint venture 
company. Some of the control mechanisms were instrumentalised and observed 
closely while others were only followed strategically and became decoupled 
from the daily operational practices at FAW-VW. It has been illustrated that 
legitimacy and the rational usage of control elements, were deployed in 
combination rather than in isolation. The thesis has examined the actual effects 
of controls on employees. It has been argued that at FAW-VW, routine 
management practices, webs of personal relationships and the distinct 
philosophies of Chinese people have led to a disconnect between the actual 
practices of employees and the formal system of control devices. Individuals 
were governed through their regard for norms and their fear of being different 
instead of their self-regulating propensities. It was in this manner this thesis has 
attempted to contribute to the literature of research on controls within joint 
ventures.
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3 Implications for future research
This study has been confined to the study of the development and 
operationalisation of control mechanisms and their effects on individuals within 
one particular joint venture and locale: FAW-VW. This research has drawn 
upon both new institutionalism and the govemmentality literature to shed light 
on how control mechanisms evolve and transform over time and the way in 
which control mechanisms are implemented and affect the actions and 
mentalities of employees. It has illustrated that the transformation from a 
quality oriented control mechanism to a cost oriented mechanism within one 
local car manufacturing joint venture is informed by wider forces of change. 
Further comparative studies on how the same transition in national discourses 
and rationales affects the control foci in other companies in similar industries 
could be useful in drawing out more clearly the linkages among wider 
discourses, government agents and agencies, various experts, and the changes 
in control elements in local companies. It would be helpful to investigate how 
the same group of actors are involved in making the connection between the 
discourses and rationales at the macro level and the development of control 
mechanisms at the firm, or micro level. Such studies could be helpful to further 
illustrate the mechanisms adopted by different companies to make the same 
national programme operable.
Furthermore, this research has indicated how different control elements are 
used both symbolically to justify the attempt to exert more extended control 
over FAW-VW by the two partners, and rationally to achieve a higher level of 
efficiency and effectiveness. The evidence presented in this study has suggested 
the ambiguity between the technical and symbolic usage of accounting 
information. Technical and symbolic usages of control elements by both 
partners become commingled and inseparable. This study has attempted to 
contribute to the institutionalism literature by addressing the question of control
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dynamics in a manner where legitimacy and rationalistic deployment of 
information is used in control settings in an intertwined manner rather than a 
conceptually demarcated one. It would be interesting to study how different 
control elements are appealed to both strategically and rationally in a different 
non-joint venture setting. It would be useful to explore other strategic 
aspirations underlying the symbolic usage of controls other than the 
justification and legitimisation of attempts to vie for control and identify 
different rationales implicit in the rationalistic adoption of control mechanisms. 
Further evidence in the combined symbolic and technical usage of accounting 
information and control elements in different organisational settings can 
advance the understanding in the new institutionalism framework. It would also 
be helpful to investigate in more detail how the symbolic and technical 
adoption of control elements interacts with each other.
Finally, this study has accentuated the mechanisms through which employees 
reacted to different forms of controls imposed on them within FAW-VW. It has 
been suggested that individuals’ cultures, philosophies and social values all 
have an impact on the application and operationalisation of the control 
dynamics imposed on employees. It would be interesting to explore how the 
influences that Chinese cultures and philosophies have on individuals’ reactions 
to the control dynamics imposed on them change over time as individuals 
receive training and further education in modem management concepts and 
rationales. Furthermore, how would control mechanisms affect the behaviour of 
various groups of employees who are embedded in different organisational 
settings, e.g. state-owned enterprises, private firms and overseas capital funded 
enterprises through the same regard for norms and fear of deviating from the 
majority? How would the exposure to modernised management education 
impact their responses to the calculative devices? Are disconnections of actual 
practices from formal control mechanisms present in other types of 
organisations of a similar form? Such studies could deepen our understanding
197
of the ways in which cultures, philosophies and social values affect the 
application of control dynamics. This thesis has sought to at least to open up for 
investigation, the development and usages of control mechanisms and the 
different ways through which employees are governed by calculative devices 
that emerge from diverse roots and platforms.
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Appendices 
1 List of interviewees
Interviewees Department______ Duration________ Record
Manager No.l Control Department 
Employee No.2 Control Department
32 min 
21 min
Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated 
Notes
Manager No.3 Factory Plants 42 min Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated
Employee No.4 Factory Plants 50 min Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated
Employee No.5 Factory Plants 75 min Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated
Manager No.6 Factory Plants 
(German)
35 min Taped and transcribed
Manager No.7 Factory Plants 
(German)
30 min Taped and transcribed
Manager No.8 Finance Department 62 min Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated
Employee No.9 Finance Department 37 min Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated
Manager N o.ll Management 
Department
40 min Taped and partly transcribed
Employee No.l 1 Management 
(German) Department
65 min Taped and transcribed
Employee No. 12 Marketing 
Department
20 min Taped and partly transcribed
Manager No. 13 Planning Department 30 min Notes
Employee No. 14 Planning Department 43 min Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated
Manager No. 15 Planning Department 45 min 
(German)
Taped and transcribed
Manager No. 16 Product Department 65 min Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated
Employee No. 17 Product Department 35 min Taped, partly transcribed
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and translated
Employee No. 18 Production Management 40 min Taped, partly transcribed
Department and translated
Employee No. 19 Production Management 27 min Notes
Department
Manager No.20 Production Management 45 min Taped and transcribed 
(German) Department
Manager No.21 Purchasing Department 85 min Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated
Manager No.22 
Employee No.23
Quality Assurance 
Department 
Quality Assurance 
Department
35 min Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated 
42 min Taped, partly transcribed 
and translated
Employee No.24 Sales Department 20 min Taped and partly transcribed
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2 Output of the Chinese Automobile Industries39
Number of Different Kinds Number of Passenger Cars
Year
of Vehicles Produced Produced
1972 108,227 661
1973 116,193 1,130
1974 104,771 1,508
1975 139,800 1,819
1976 135,200 2,611
1977 125,400 2,330
1978 149,062 2,640
1979 185,700 4,152
1980 222,288 5,418
1981 175,645 3,428
1982 196,304 4,030
1983 239,886 6,046
1984 316,367 6,010
1985 443,377 5,207
1986 372,753 12,297
1987 472,538 29,865
1988 646,951 36,798
1989 586,935 28,820
1990 509,242 42,409
1991 708,820 81,055
1992 1,061,721 162,725
1993 1,296,778 229,697
1994 1,353,368 250,333
1995 1,452,697 325,461
39 Source:http://www.aojauto.com/html/KeepData/200701191459210711914592120547.shtml
40 The number of imported cars has increased from 41,600 in 1981 to 314,100 in 2007.
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1996 1,474,905 391,099
1997 1,582,628 487,695
1998 1,629,182 507,861
1999 1,831,596 566,105
2000 2,068,186 607,455
2001 2,341,528 703,525
2002 3,253,655 1,092,762
2003 4,443,522 2,037,865
2004 5,070,527 2,316,300
2005 5,705,000 2,767,700
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